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The aim of this thesis is to study the e⁄ects of in￿ ation persistence due to rule-of-
thumb behaviour by price setters on optimal monetary policy. We start with a canonical
log-linearised New Keynesian model, which we extend by allowing a fraction of price setters
to follow a rule-of-thumb when setting a new price. We consider di⁄erent speci￿cations
for the rule-of-thumb. In all models, steady-state distortions are assumed to be small so
to guarantee the feasibility of optimal monetary policy analysis within a linear-quadratic
framework. We derive utility-based objective functions for the monetary authority and
analyse a range of optimal commitment policies. We perform welfare analysis in order to
rank the range of optimal commitment policies. We analytically derive the optimal steady-
state in￿ ation rates associated with each commitment policy. We show that rule-of-thumb
behaviour by price setters generates an incentive for positive steady-state in￿ ation. A type
of timeless perspective commitment policy is also capable of delivering positive steady-state
in￿ ation, even in the absence of rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters. The optimal
steady-state in￿ ation rates are directly proportional to the gap measuring the steady-state
distortions and turn out to be small in magnitude.
We depart from the assumption of small steady-state distortions and consider the case
of a largely distorted steady state within a nonlinear medium-scale model, which adds
both nominal rigidities and real rigidities to the basic New Keynesian model. We extend
the model by allowing a fraction of price setters to follow a rule-of-thumb when posting a
new price. We numerically characterise the optimal rate of in￿ ation in the Ramsey steady
state. We ￿nd that rule-of-thumb behaviour implies optimal positive in￿ ation only in the
absence of transactional frictions. We ￿nd that the gap re￿ ecting steady-state distortions
is only slightly larger than in the case of small steady-state distortions. Finally, we study
Ramsey dynamics and the implementation of optimal monetary policy via simple interest-
rate rules, which we expand to explore the importance of welfare-relevant output gaps.
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12CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, it aims to study how rule-of-thumb be-
haviour by price setters a⁄ects optimal monetary policy in an otherwise basic small-scale
log-linearised New Keynesian model. In doing so, we follow Woodford (2003) as we derive
a utility-based policy objective function and subsequently analyse the policy problem in
a linear-quadratic framework. Second, maintaining the presence of rule-of-thumb price
setters, it aims to the extend the analysis of optimal monetary policy to the medium-scale
economy developed in Altig et al. (2005). We characterise Ramsey-optimal monetary pol-
icy using the methodology and algorithms developed in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004b,
2007).
New Keynesian economics embeds nominal rigidities and imperfect competition into
the dynamic general equilibrium framework of the Real Business Cycle paradigm. In
its basic formulation, a New Keynesian model features one nominal rigidity modelled in
terms of a constraint on the frequency of price setting. Three main models of nominal
price rigidity are used in the literature: the quadratic price adjustment cost model of
Rotemberg (1982), the random price adjustment signal model of Calvo (1983), and the
model of staggered contracts of Taylor (1980). The Calvo model is the most widely used
in the literature for reasons of tractability and we maintain the assumption of sticky
prices ￿ la Calvo (1983) throughout this thesis. However, the analysis carried out in this
thesis applies equally well to the other models of nominal price rigidity since, as shown in
Rotemberg (1987) and Roberts (1995), they all lead, up to a log-linear approximation, to
the same form of aggregate-supply relation.
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In its basic formulation, a New Keynesian model derived from a discrete-time version of
the Calvo price setting model is purely forward-looking1. In￿ ation dynamics are described
by what Roberts (1995) labels the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC henceforth)2.
The NKPC relates in￿ ation today to a measure of excess demand and expected future
in￿ ation. On the one hand, the appealing features of the NKPC are well known. First, it
is microfounded in the idea that monetary non neutrality is due to nominal price rigidities.
Second, it recognises the importance of in￿ ationary expectations in the determination of
in￿ ation today as ￿rstly stressed by Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968). Third, it is
simple enough to be useful for theoretical monetary policy analysis. As a result, the New
Keynesian model derived from a discrete-time version of the Calvo price setting model has
become the workhorse for much research on monetary policy and it has been described by
McCallum (1997) as "the closest thing there is to a standard speci￿cation"3.
On the other hand, the failures of the NKPC are equally well-known as discussed in
Mankiw (2001). First, as initially pointed out by Ball (1994), it implies costless disin￿ a-
tion, namely no short-run trade-o⁄ between output and in￿ ation. Second, as pointed out
by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) it fails to capture the empirical fact that in￿ ation is highly
persistent. These two problems imply that a disin￿ ation of any size could be achieved
costlessly and immediately by a central bank that could commit to set the path of future
output gaps equal to zero. Third, evidence from VAR studies also show that the response
of in￿ ation to shocks is ￿hump-shaped￿ rather than front loaded as prescribed by the
NKPC. Studies which seek to estimate the NKPC ￿nd that it ￿ts the data poorly (e.g.
Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Fuhrer (1997), Nelson (1998), Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), Roberts
(2005), and Sbordone (2005)). These studies frequently reject the NKPC in favour of a
1The ￿rst use of a discrete-time version of Calvo￿ s model of price setting, in the context of dynamic general
equilibrium model, is in the work of Yun (1996). Other early applications of the same device inlcude King
and Watson (1996), King and Wolman (1996), and Goodfriend and King (1997).
2Aggregate-supply relation and Phillips curve are used interchangeably in this thesis.
3The survey article by Clarida et al. (1999) and the landmark work by Woodford (2003) are only two
examples among many others.15
hybrid Phillips curve, which entails that current in￿ ation depends on both in￿ ationary ex-
pectations and past in￿ ation, although the estimated relative values of the forward-looking
component and the backward-looking component vary greatly between studies.
To accommodate the persistence in in￿ ation data, two main variants of the basic New
Keynesian model have been put forward in the literature. Both variants generate the
dependence of current in￿ ation not only on expected future in￿ ation but also on lagged
in￿ ation by making an additional assumption about the price setting mechanism. The
￿rst variant is due to Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). They assume that a proportion of the ￿rms
randomly assigned to reoptimise their prices in the Calvo model do not behave rationally
but follow a rule-of-thumb4. Speci￿cally, the rule-of-thumb prices are a weighted average
of the optimal forward-looking prices set in the previous period plus an adjustment based
on lagged in￿ ation. The second variant is due to Christiano et al. (2005). They assume
that the ￿rms not assigned to reoptimise their prices will instead index their prices to
lagged in￿ ation.
In this thesis we consider backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters.
Rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters is appealing for at least ￿ve reasons. First,
it involves virtually no computational burden: all that is needed is for rule-of-thumb price
setters to observe last period￿ s output and/or price setting decisions. Second, it involves
passive learning of the behaviour of forward-looking optimising price setters. Third, it
implies convergence among individual choices once the e⁄ects of all shocks are eliminated
from the economy. Fourth, Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) provide empirical evidence of the
presence of rule-of-thumb behaviour in price setting5. Fifth, using backward-looking price
indexation as a modeling strategy is less appealing as it implies that all prices are re-
vised at every point in time, which not only contradicts empirical evidence that some
4An earlier example of the utilization of this type of assumption in order to better explain the deviations
of actual behavior from the predictions of models which assume fully rational agents is Campbell and
Mankiw (1989). They use this type of assumption to explain the relation between consumption and
income.
5Once we take the theoretical economies to the data, we carefully review the empirical evidence provided
by Gal￿ and Gertler (1999).16
prices are ￿xed for a certain amount of time in nominal terms (e.g. Bils and Klenow
(2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)) but also clashes with the rationale as to
why models with nominal price rigidity were developed. Moreover, while the implications
of backward-looking indexation are thoroughly analysed in Woodford (2003), the conse-
quences of rule-of-thumb behaviour on the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate have, to the
best of our knowledge, not been analysed previously in the literature6.
In characterising optimal monetary policy under rule-of-thumb behaviour by price set-
ters, we depart from the widespread practice in New Keynesian economics of restricting
the attention to models in which the deterministic steady state is e¢ cient. The Pareto ef-
￿ciency of the deterministic steady state is achieved by assuming the existence of subsidies
which eliminate the steady-state distortions originating from monopolistic competition
7.
This widespread practice has two potential shortcomings. First, the instrument necessary
to eliminate steady-state distortions (i.e. subsidies ￿nanced by lump-sum taxation) is em-
pirically uncompelling. Second, it is ex ante not clear whether a policy that is optimal
for an economy with an e¢ cient steady state remains optimal for an economy where the
steady state is distorted.
For these reasons, we do not make the e¢ cient-steady-state assumption but instead
work with models whose steady state is distorted. This implies that three equilibrium
levels of output coexist in the model: 1) the actual level output, which obtains in the
presence of both nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition; 2) the natural level of
output, which obtains in the presence of monopolistic competition and in the absence of
nominal rigidities; and 3) the e¢ cient level of output, which obtains in the absence of both
nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition.
6Rule-of-thumb behaviour has been extensively used to investigate various issues: responses to supply
shocks (Steinsson (2003)), monetary policy rules (Amato and Laubach (2003)), uncertainty (Kimura and
Kurozumi (2007)), and open economy (Kirsanova et al. (2007)).
7Steady-state and long-run are used interchangeably in this thesis.17
For the purpose of the ￿rst aim of this thesis, we consider the case of small steady-state
distortions as discussed in Woodford (2003). The degree of ine¢ ciency of the determin-
istic steady state is assumed to be minimal so that it can be treated as an expansion
parameter. This in turn guarantees that it su¢ ces to approximate the equilibrium of the
model to ￿rst order to obtain a second-order accurate measure of welfare. Steady-state
distortions introduce a gap between the the natural level of output and the e¢ cient level
of output. This wedge is constant and invariant to shocks so that the "divine coincidence"
in Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007) holds8. However, allowing for steady-state distortions mat-
ters for the optimal average levels of in￿ ation and output, namely for the deterministic
description of optimal monetary policy. This is because, from a welfare point of view, the
constant-over-time gap between the natural level of output and the e¢ cient level of output
appears in the central bank￿ s utility-based loss function. In other words, the combination
of general equilibrium foundations and steady-state distortions provides a microfoundation
for targeting a level of output above the natural level of output.
Following the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy, we assume that the
central bank￿ s policy instrument is the short-term nominal interest rate. The combination
of a cashless economy and the central bank￿ s control of the nominal interest rate implies
that the economy is fully described by the aggregate-supply relation and the central bank￿ s
objective function. This model of central bank behaviour then allows determining analyt-
ically the long-run in￿ ation rate associated with a given policy. In particular, as stressed
by Woodford (2008) "The fact that the equations are log-linearized does not mean that one
simply assumes an average in￿ation rate; the equations allow one to derive the average
in￿ation rate corresponding to a given policy". We consider three theoretical economies:
1) the purely forward-looking New Keynesian model; 2) the model with rule-of-thumb
behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999); and 3) the model with rule-of-thumb behaviour
￿ la Steinsson (2003). All models are small-scale New Keynesian models as they feature
8That is, percentage changes in the natural level of output correspond in the log-linear approximation to
percentage changes in the e¢ cient level of output.18
only one nominal rigidity (i.e. price stickiness) and one real rigidity (i.e. monopolistic
competition in product markets). We consider di⁄erent types of optimal commitment
policy that have been proposed in the literature: the zero-optimal policy, the timeless per-
spective commitment policy in Woodford (1999), and the alternative timeless perspective
commitment policy put forward by Blake (2001), Jensen and McCallum (2002), and Dam-
janovic et al. (2008). Our preference for commitment is based on our focus on analysing
the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate when the deterministic steady state is distorted9.
For the purpose of the ￿rst aim of this thesis, three results stand out from the literature
concerning optimal monetary policy in log-linearised New Keynesian models. First, rule-
of-thumb behaviour by price setters, speci￿ed either ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) or ￿ la
Steinsson (2003), breaks the optimality of zero long-run in￿ ation found in New Keynesian
models. Indeed, within New Keynesian economics, the optimality of a monetary policy
that aims at zero in￿ ation is surprisingly robust. Full price stability is optimal despite
the ine¢ ciency of the nonstochastic steady state and the existence of a positively sloped
long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄. Moreover, as shown in Woodford (2003), zero long-
run in￿ ation is also robust to the presence backward-looking price indexation. Rule-
of-thumb behaviour, regardless of its speci￿cation, implies that the stimulative e⁄ect of
higher in￿ ation is greater than the output cost of higher in￿ ation thus generating a long-
run incentive for positive in￿ ation under an optimal commitment. Second, a type of
timeless perspective commitment policy is also capable of delivering positive steady-state
in￿ ation, even in the purely forward-looking New Keynesian model. Third, all the optimal
long-run in￿ ation rates are directly proportional to the gap between the natural level of
output and the e¢ cient level of output. Hence, what we show here is that the widespread
assumption of an e¢ cient steady state is not innocuous: a policy that is optimal for an
economy with an e¢ cient steady state does not remain optimal in an economy where the
9Of course, discretionary conduct of monetary policy would result in the well-known in￿ ation bias stressed
by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).19
steady state is distorted. Moreover, the positive long-run in￿ ation rates turn out to be
small in magnitude for empirically realistic values of the models￿structural parameters.
For the purpose of the second aim of this thesis, we consider the medium-scale model
developed in Altig et al. (2005). This model emphasises the importance of combining
nominal as well as real rigidities in explaining business-cycle ￿ uctuations. Speci￿cally,
the model features four nominal rigidities, sticky prices, sticky wages, a transactional
demand for money by households, and a cash-in-advance constraint on the wage bill of
￿rms, and four real rigidities, investment adjustment costs, variable capacity utilisation,
habit formation, and imperfect competition in product and labour markets. We extend
the model by allowing a fraction of price setters to behave in a rule-of-thumb manner ￿ la
Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). We depart from the assumption of small steady-state distortions
and consider the case of a largely distorted steady state. We characterise both the Ramsey
steady state and Ramsey dynamics and address the question of implementation of optimal
monetary policy by characterising optimal, simple, and implementable interest-rate rules.
In doing so, we use the algorithms developed in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004b, 2007).
Speci￿cally, large steady-state distortions imply that to obtain a second-order accurate
measure of welfare it does not su¢ ce to approximate the model￿ s equilibrium conditions
up to ￿rst order. In characterising interest-rate rules, we use the methodology and the
algorithm developed in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004b) for second-order approximations
to policy functions of dynamic and stochastic models.
As for the Ramsey steady state, the key policy problem faced by the central bank is the
trade-o⁄ between the stabilisation of the degree of price dispersion and the stabilisation
of transactional frictions, which calls for the Friedman rule, namely a de￿ ation which is
consistent with a zero nominal interest rate. We ￿nd that the results in Schmitt-GrohØ and
Uribe (2007), who consider the possibility of backward-looking price indexation, generally
hold. Rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters does not alter the high sensitivity of the
long-run in￿ ation rate with respect to the degree of price stickiness: the optimal long-run
in￿ ation is always negative and it varies between the level implied by the Friedman rule20
and a level close to price stability. We depart from the analysis in Schmitt-GrohØ and
Uribe (2007) and consider the case of a cashless medium-scale macroeconomic model10.
Indeed, we seek to establish a link between the analysis of optimal monetary policy in a
basic log-linearised New Keynesian model and its counterpart in a much richer nonlinear
theoretical economy. We ￿nd that, in the absence of transactional frictions, rule-of-thumb
behaviour by price setters entails that the optimal long-run in￿ ation in the steady state of
the Ramsey equilibrium is positive. We thus obtain the same result that we analytically
derive in the linear-quadratic framework. Indeed, the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate is not
only positive but also small in magnitude. In the linear quadratic framework the in￿ ation
rate is directly proportional to the gap between the natural level of output and the e¢ cient
level of output. Hence, we solve the social planner problem in the medium-scale economy
so to compare the steady-state gap between the social planner level of output and the
Ramsey level of output with the steady-state e¢ ciency gap in the log-linearised small-
scale economies. We ￿nd that the di⁄erence between the two is in fact rather small.
We study Ramsey dynamics. In doing so, we are interested in addressing two issues.
First, we want to assess whether the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate con-
stitutes an impediment to optimal monetary policy. Indeed, one argument against setting
a negative in￿ ation rate, as recommended by the model in the presence of money demand
by households and ￿rms, or a near-zero in￿ ation rate, as recommended by the cashless
model, is that at negative or near-zero rates of in￿ ation the risk of incurring in the zero
lower bound on nominal interest rate would restrict the central bank￿ s ability to stabilise
the economy. We ￿nd that this argument is of no relevance in the context of both the
model with money and its cashless counterpart. The reason for this is that under the
Ramsey-optimal policy, the zero lower bound poses an impediment to monetary policy
only in the case of an adverse shock that forces the interest rate to be roughly 8 standard
10Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) go on to analyse the optimal long-run rate of in￿ ation by taking into
account the ￿scal side of the optimal policy problem. They do so by replacing the assumption of lump-
sum taxes with the assumption of distortionary income taxes. The optimal long-run in￿ ation, although
remaining always negative, is then found to be much closer to price stability.21
deviations below its mean. The probability of this happening is so small that the zero lower
bound on the nominal interest rate does not impose an economically important constraint
on the conduct of optimal monetary policy. Second, we characterise the Ramsey-optimal
impulse responses to the three shocks that drive aggregate ￿ uctuations. Speci￿cally, we
present the responses of key macroeconomic variables and we focus on how the Ramsey
planner uses monetary policy to respond to each of the three shocks. We show how the
Ramsey-optimal stabilisation policy is robust to the presence/absence of money in the
model.
Finally, we consider the implementation of optimal monetary policy by characterising
optimal, simple, and implementable interest-rate rules, using the methodology and the al-
gorithm developed in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004b) for second-order approximations
to policy functions of dynamic and stochastic models. Initially, we show how the imple-
mentation of optimal monetary policy is virtually una⁄ected by the presence-absence of
money. We characterise the operational interest-rate rule, which is de￿ned exactly as in
Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007), in both the medium-scale model with money and its
cashless counterpart. In both cases, the optimal operational interest-rate rule is con￿rmed
to be active in price and wage in￿ ation, mute in output growth and moderately inertial.
We also consider a modi￿cation of the operational interest-rate rule, which prescribes a
concern not for output growth per se but for stabilisation of output around a welfare-
relevant measure of output, namely the gap between the Ramsey level of output and the
e¢ cient level of output. We ￿nd that the optimal operational interest-rate rule remains
active in price and wage in￿ ation and moderately inertial, but also implies a positive coef-
￿cient on output stabilisation. Regardless of the presence/absence of money in the model,
it is optimal for a central bank to stabilise output gap, namely the log-di⁄erence between
the level of output and the e¢ cient level of output.
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows.22
Chapter 2 lays out a basic New Keynesian model that we extend by allowing a fraction
of price setters to behave in a backward-looking rule-of-thumb manner, speci￿ed either ￿
la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) or ￿ la Steinsson (2003).
Chapter 3 presents utility-based objective functions for the central bank. We extend
the analysis in Woodford (2003) by allowing a fraction of price setters to behave in a
backward-looking rule-of-thumb manner. The backward-looking behaviour is speci￿ed in
two ways: in the manner of Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) and in the manner of Steinsson (2003).
Chapter 4 studies what constitutes optimal monetary policy in the three theoretical
economies. We consider di⁄erent types of optimal commitment policy that have been
proposed in the literature: the zero-optimal policy and two types of timeless-perspective
policy. Our preference for commitment is based on our focus on analysing the optimal
long-run in￿ ation rate when the steady-state is distorted.
Chapter 5 discusses the calibration of the models￿structural parameters, evaluates the
optimal long-run in￿ ation rates, and studies welfare under the alternative commitment
policies.
Chapter 6 characterises the optimal steady-state in￿ ation rate of the Ramsey planner
in the medium-scale macroeconomic model developed in Altig et al. (2005), which we
extend by allowing a fraction of price setters to behave in a backward-looking rule-of-
thumb manner ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999).
Chapter 7 studies Ramsey dynamics and address the question of implementation of
optimal monetary policy by characterising optimal, simple, and implementable interest-
rate rules.
Chapter 8 provides concluding remarks.CHAPTER 2
Basic New Keynesian Model
In this chapter, we lay out a basic New Keynesian model that we extend by allowing
a fraction of price setters to behave in a backward-looking rule-of-thumb manner. This
results in a Phillips curve where current in￿ ation depends on both expected future in￿ ation
and on lagged in￿ ation, namely a hybrid Phillips curve. Backward-looking rule-of-thumb
behaviour is speci￿ed in two ways. First, following Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) we allow the
rule-of-thumb price setters to index their prices to lagged in￿ ation. Second, following
Steinsson (2003) we allow the rule-of-thumb price setters to index their prices to both
lagged output gap and lagged in￿ ation.
The case of rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003) contains an original con-
tribution to the literature1. Speci￿cally, we correct the hybrid Phillips curve reported
in the original paper. The mistake in Steinsson (2003) relates to the coe¢ cient on the
term in current output gap in the hybrid Phillips curve. It has been acknowledged by
the Steinsson in the Erratum to Optimal Monetary Policy in an Economy with In￿ation
Persistence, available on the author￿ s webpage.
The theoretical economy is assumed closed and there is no capital accumulation. The
model consists of households that supply labour and purchase goods for consumption
and ￿rms that hire labour and produce and sell di⁄erentiated goods in monopolistically
competitive markets. Households and ￿rms behave optimally: households maximise utility
and ￿rms maximise pro￿ts.
The model is basic in that it features only one real rigidity and one nominal rigidity.
The real rigidity stems from monopolistic competition in the goods￿markets, which is
1The hybrid Phillips curve in the case of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999) coincides with the one reported in Amato and Laubach (2003).
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modelled as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The nominal rigidity is given by staggered price
adjustment as in Calvo (1983).
Speci￿cally, the New Keynesian model laid out here is the basic neo-Wicksellian model
in Woodford (2003). Woodford (2003) calls models of this kind neo-Wicksellian in order to
stress the importance of a monetary policy transmission mechanism in which interest rates
a⁄ect intertemporal spending decisions. Yet, following Clarida et al. (1999) among others,
the terminology "New Keynesian" has become common place. We share the basic neo-
Wicksellian model￿ s assumptions and general formalism. Appendix A reports a detailed
derivation of the hybrid Phillips curve that obtains in the presence of rule-of-thumb ￿ la
Steinsson (2003).
2.1. Households and Market Structure
There is a continuum of households of size one. The representative household seeks to
maximise a discounted sum of utility of the form
(2.1) E0
1 X
t=0
￿
tUt = E0
1 X
t=0
￿
t
2
4u(Ct;￿t) ￿
1 Z
0
v(ht(i);￿t)di
3
5
where 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 is the discount factor, Ct is an aggregate of the household￿ s consumption
of a continuum of individual goods which are indexed by i over the unit interval, ￿t is a
vector of exogenous real shocks, namely exogenous shocks to household￿ s impatience to
consume and to the household￿ s willingness to supply labour, and ht(i) is the supply of
type i labour.
Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the consumption aggregate is de￿ned as
(2.2) Ct =
2
4
1 Z
0
ct(i)
(￿￿1)=￿di
3
5
￿=(￿￿1)
where ct(i) is the consumption of good i and ￿ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution
between goods. For any given realisation of ￿t, the period utility function, u(Ct;￿t),
is assumed to be concave and strictly increasing in Ct whereas the period disutility of25
supplying labour of type i, v(ht(i);￿t), is assumed to be convex and increasing in ht(i).
We assume speci￿c labour markets in the sense that type i labour is only used in the
production of good i. Moreover, the representative household is assumed to simultaneously
supply all types of labour. Considering di⁄erentiated labour inputs, as we shall see below,
has the advantage of delivering a model with labour markets that is equivalent to the
frequently used yeoman farmers model, in which households are assumed to supply goods
directly. Moreover, if one were to replace speci￿c labour markets with a single homogenous
labour market, our results would not change qualitatively but only quantitatively. On the
one hand, the assumption on the structure of the labour market a⁄ects the way in which
the output gap enters the Phillips curve. On the other hand, as we shall see below,
what matters for our results is that the aggregate-supply relation implies the existence
of a positively sloped long-run trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation and the output gap. As shown
in Woodford (2003, Ch. 3), a positively sloped Phillips-curve long-run trade-o⁄ obtains
under both assumptions about the structure of the labour market.
Financial markets are assumed to be complete, such that, through risk sharing, house-
holds face the same budget constraint, which is given by
(2.3)
1 Z
0
pt(i)ct(i)di + Et [Qt;t+1Bt+1] ￿ Bt +
1 Z
0
Wt(i)ht(i)di +
1 Z
0
￿t(i)di ￿ Tt
where pt(i) is the price of good i, Bt is the nominal value of ￿nancial wealth brought into
the period, Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one period ahead payo⁄s, Tt is net
nominal tax collection by the government, Wt(i) is the nominal wage for labour of type
i, and ￿t(i) is the nominal pro￿ts from sales of good i. The government is not modelled
endogenously and it is assumed to run a balanced budget at all times. Gt is the exogenous
process that describes government purchases of the aggregate good. Speci￿cally, denoting
with gt(i) the government￿ s consumption of good i, Gt takes the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
aggregate form, namely26
(2.4) Gt =
2
4
1 Z
0
gt(i)
(￿￿1)=￿di
3
5
￿=(￿￿1)
The budget constraint states that, in any period, ￿nancial wealth carried into the
subsequent period plus consumption cannot be worth more than the value of ￿nancial
wealth brought into the period plus after-tax non￿nancial income earned during the period.
Note that we assume that every household owns an equal share of all the ￿rms operating
in the economy. The assumption of complete ￿nancial markets implies that the assumed
￿rms￿ownership and the assumption that the representative household supplies all types of
labour directly are innocuous; dropping these assumptions would not change the conditions
that determine equilibrium prices and quantities.
The household￿ s optimal behaviour is described by three sets of conditions.
First, households face a decision in each period about how much to consume of each
individual good. They adjust the share of a particular good in their consumption bundle
so to exploit any di⁄erences in relative prices. Minimising the level of total expenditure,
given the consumption aggregate in (2.2), yields the demand for each individual good
(2.5) ct(i) =
￿
pt(i)
Pt
￿￿￿
Ct
where the aggregate price level, Pt, is given by
(2.6) Pt =
2
4
1 Z
0
pt(i)
1￿￿di
3
5
1=1￿￿
This speci￿cation of the price index has by construction the property that PtCt gives the
minimum price for which an amount Ct of the aggregate consumption can be purchased.
Market clearing implies that the total non￿nancial income, that is the economy-wide
sales revenues, can be written as PtYt. Here, Yt is the economy￿ s total output, which is the
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregate of the quantities supplied of the various di⁄erentiated27
goods, denoted with yt(i), namely
(2.7) Yt =
2
4
1 Z
0
yt(i)
(￿￿1)=￿di
3
5
￿=(￿￿1)
The household￿ s budget constraint can thus be rewritten as
(2.8) PtCt + Et [Qt;t+1Bt+1] ￿ Bt + PtYt ￿ Tt
The absence of arbitrage opportunities implies that there exists a unique stochastic dis-
count factor, Qt;t+1. The riskless short-term nominal interest rate, it, has a simple repre-
sentation in terms of the stochastic discount factor, namely
(2.9)
1
1 + it
= Et [Qt;t+1]
A complete description of the household￿ s budget constraint requires ruling out Ponzi
schemes. The implied constraint for ￿nancial wealth carried into the subsequent period,
Bt+1, is given by
(2.10) Bt+1 ￿ ￿
1 X
T=t+1
Et+1 [Qt+1;T (PtYt ￿ Tt)] < 1
with certainty, that is, in each state of the world that may be reached in the subsequent
period. Here Qt;T discounts nominal income received in period T back to period t, Qt;T =
T Q
s=t+1
Qs￿1;s. Equation (2.10) implies that a household￿ s debt in any state of the world is
bounded by the present value of future after-tax non￿nancial income, which is assumed to
be ￿nite. Furthermore, preventing unlimited consumption also requires that the nominal
interest rate satis￿es the zero lower bound, it ￿ 0, at all times: a negative nominal interest
rate would in fact allow households to ￿nance unbounded consumption by selling enough
bonds. The entire in￿nite series of ￿ ow budget constraints and borrowing constraints in28
turn de￿nes the lifetime budget constraint for the household
(2.11) E0
1 X
t=0
Q0;t [PtCt] ￿ B0 + E0
1 X
t=0
Q0;t [(PtYt ￿ Tt)]
We can now complete the description of optimal household behaviour. Maximising
utility (2.1) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (2.11) yields the optimal allo-
cation of consumption across time
(2.12)
uc (Ct;￿t)
uc
￿
Ct+1;￿t+1
￿ =
￿
Qt;t+1
Pt
Pt+1
and the optimal supply of labour of type i
(2.13)
vh(ht(i);￿t)
uc (Ct;￿t)
=
Wt(i)
Pt
where uc and vh denote respectively the partial derivative of u with respect to the level of
consumption and the partial derivative of v with respect to the supply of labour. Substi-
tuting for the riskless short-term nominal interest rate, as given by (2.9), in the optimal
intertemporal allocation of consumption delivers the familiar Euler equation for consump-
tion
(2.14) ￿Et
"
uc
￿
Ct+1;￿t+1
￿
uc (Ct;￿t)
Pt
Pt+1
#
=
1
1 + it
Allowing for tilting due to interest rates di⁄ering from the household￿ s discount factor,
rational consumers are thus attempting to smooth consumption over time such that the
marginal utility of consumption is equal across periods.
2.2. Firms
We assume that each good i has the linearly homogeneous production function
(2.15) yt(i) = Atht(i)29
where At is a time-varying exogenous technology factor. It follows that the nominal
marginal cost of supplying a quantity yt(i) of good i is given by
(2.16) MCt(i) = Wt(i)A
￿1
t
Note that the assumption of speci￿c labour markets does not imply that each price
setter is a monopsonist in their labour market. The possibility of ￿rms having any market
power in their labour market is ruled out by assuming that price setters that change
their prices at the same time also hire labour from the same market2. Speci￿cally, this is
achieved by assuming a double continuum of di⁄erentiated goods, indexed by (I , j) with
an elasticity of substitution of ￿ between any two goods. Goods belonging to the same
industry I are then assumed to change their prices at the same time and to be produced
using the same type of labour, namely type I labour. The fact that now a continuum
of price setters demand type I labour eliminates the possibility of market power in their
labour market without any change for the degree of market power of each price setter in
their product market.
Combining the optimal supply of labour of type i (2.13) and the nominal marginal
cost speci￿cation (2.16), the real marginal cost is given by
(2.17) mc(yt(i);Ct;e ￿t) =
vh(yt(i)=At;￿t)
uc (Ct;￿t)At
where labour is expressed in terms of output and e ￿t denotes the vector of exogenous dis-
turbances, which includes exogenous real shocks to technology, to household￿ s impatience
to consume, and to the household￿ s willingness to supply labour.
2.3. Market Clearing
Market clearing requires, for each good i and at all times
(2.18) yt(i) = ct(i) + gt(i)
2The Calvo lottery is over industries￿prices rather than goods￿prices.30
equivalently, in aggregate terms
(2.19) Yt = Ct + Gt
Substituting the market clearing condition into the Euler equation for consumption
(2.14) yields
(2.20) ￿Et
"
e uc(Yt+1;e ￿t+1)
e uc(Yt;e ￿t)
Pt
Pt+1
#
=
1
1 + it
with
(2.21) e u(Yt;e ￿t) = u(Yt ￿ Gt;￿t)
Equivalently, substituting the market clearing condition into the real marginal cost speci-
￿cation (2.17) yields
(2.22) mc(yt(i);Yt;e ￿t) =
e vy(yt(i);e ￿t)
e uc(Yt;e ￿t)
with
(2.23) e v(yt(i);e ￿t) = v(yt(i)=At;￿t)
Equations (2.21) and (2.23) are the indirect utility functions3. The former, which is in-
creasing and concave in Yt for each possible realisation of vector e ￿t, indicates the utility
￿ ow to the representative household as a function of its aggregate demand for resources,
where aggregate demand adds the household￿ s share of government purchases to the house-
hold￿ s private consumption. Under the assumption of Gt being exogenously determined,
variations in the level of government expenditure are simply another source of exogenous
3Note that we use the same notation as in Woodford (2003). Subscript c denotes partial derivatives of
the indirect utility function e u with respect to the level of production, as these derivatives are identical to
the partial derivatives of the direct utility function with respect to the level of aggregate consumption.31
variation in the Euler equation for consumption4. The latter, which is increasing and
convex in yt(i) for each possible realisation of vector e ￿t, converts the household￿ s disutility
of supplying labour used for the production of good i into the household￿ s disutility of
directly supplying good i. Accordingly, the model laid out here is identical to the one
that obtains under the assumption of a single yeoman farmer (i.e. continuum of yeoman
farmers), which is used in both Steinsson (2003) and Amato and Laubach (2003). The
representative household￿ s discounted sum of utility can in fact be rewritten solely as a
function of all yt(i)
(2.24) E0
1 X
t=0
￿
tUt = E0
1 X
t=0
￿
t
2
4e u(Yt;e ￿t) ￿
1 Z
0
e v(yt(i);e ￿t)di
3
5
with the period utility Ut being concave in the level of production of each of the di⁄eren-
tiated goods.
2.4. Price Setting Behaviour
We now turn to the description of price setting behaviour. Following Calvo (1983),
we assume that only a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of industries￿prices are reset in each period. The
probability of not resetting the price in each period, 0 < ￿ < 1, is independent of both
the time that has gone by since the last price revision and the misalignment between the
actual price and the price that would be optimal to charge, namely pricing decisions in
any period are independent of past pricing decisions. Furthermore, we assume that pro￿ts
are discounted using a stochastic discount factor that equals on average ￿.
We now depart from full rationality by introducing backward-looking rule-of-thumb
behaviour by price setters. Following Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), we assume that only a
fraction 1 ￿ ! of industries behave optimally (i.e. in a forward-looking manner) when
setting the price, the remaining fraction of industries use the same backward-looking rule-
of-thumb when revising their prices. The degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour, 0 ￿ ! < 1,
4Henceforth, the vector e ￿t includes exogenous real shocks to technology, to Government purchases, to
household￿ s impatience to consume, and to the household￿ s willingness to supply labour.32
is thus constant over time and price setters cannot switch between backward-looking and
forward-looking behaviour.
If follows that in each period all forward-looking price setters will set the same price,
which we denote with p
f
t, and all backward-looking price setters will as well charge a
common price, which we denote with pb
t. The aggregate price level in (2.6) hence evolves
according to
(2.25) Pt =
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(p
￿
t)
1￿￿ + ￿P
1￿￿
t￿1
￿ 1
1￿￿
where
(2.26) p
￿
t = (1 ￿ !)p
f
t + !p
b
t
denotes the overall reset price.
The ￿rms allowed to change their price at time t choose p
f
t so to maximise expected
future pro￿ts subject to the demand they face. The price setter￿ s objective is given by
(2.27) Et
1 X
s=0
(￿￿)
s￿(pt(i);p
I
t+s;Pt+s;Yt+s;e ￿t+s)
The price setter￿ s nominal pro￿t function, ￿, is linearly homogeneous in its ￿rst three
arguments (i.e. good￿ s price, industry￿ s price, pI
t, and aggregate price level) and, for any
value of the industry price and the aggregate price level, single-peaked for some positive
value of the good￿ s price5. The common forward-looking reset price, p
f
t, is implicitly
de￿ned by the relation
(2.28) Et
1 X
s=0
(￿￿)
s￿1(p
f
t;p
f
t;Pt+s;Yt+s;e ￿t+s) = 0
5Under yt(i) = Atht(i), the nominal pro￿t function is given by
￿(pt(i);pI
t;Pt;Yt;e ￿t) = pt(i)
￿
pt(i)
Pt
￿￿￿
Yt ￿
vh(
￿
pI
t=Pt
￿￿￿
Yt=At);￿t)
uc (Ct;￿t)
Pt
￿
pt(i)
Pt
￿￿￿ Yt
At33
Here ￿1(p
f
t;p
f
t;Pt+s;Yt+s;e ￿t+s) = 0 implicitly de￿nes what Woodford (2003, Ch. 3) labels
the notional short-run aggregate supply curve, which indicates how relative prices would
be set if there was no constraint on the frequency of price setting.
The common rule-of-thumb backward-looking reset price, pb
t, is speci￿ed as in Steinsson
(2003)
(2.29) p
b
t = p
￿
t￿1
Pt￿1
Pt￿2
￿
Yt￿1
Y n
t￿1
￿￿
where Y n
t￿1 denotes the natural level of output, which we precisely de￿ne below, and 0 ￿
￿ ￿ 1 is the degree of indexation to past demand conditions. Rule-of-thumb price setters
thus index the previous period overall reset price to past in￿ ation, fully, and past demand
conditions, according to ￿. In the case of zero indexation to past demand conditions, the
rule-of-thumb collapses to the speci￿cation in Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), pb
t = p￿
t￿1
Pt￿1
Pt￿2.
2.5. Flexible Price Equilibrium and E¢ cient Equilibrium
We now consider an environment in which all ￿rms can adjust prices optimally each
period, taking the path of aggregate variables as given. Pro￿t-maximising behaviour
under perfectly ￿ exible prices then implies that ￿rms will operate at the point at which
the relative price is a mark-up over the real marginal cost
(2.30)
pt(i)
Pt
= mc(yt(i);Yt;e ￿t)￿
where ￿ = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) > 1 is the desired constant mark-up, which is common to all ￿rms.
The relative supply of good i thus satis￿es
(2.31)
￿
yt(i)
Yt
￿￿1=￿
= mc(yt(i);Yt;e ￿t)￿
Given identical prices and demand conditions the equilibrium under perfectly ￿ exible
prices is symmetric: each good is produced and consumed in the same quantity. Within
New Keynesian economics, the natural level of output in Friedman (1968), which we34
denote with Y n
t (e ￿t), has a precise meaning: it is simply the equilibrium level of output
under perfectly ￿ exible prices. It follows from (2.31) that the natural level of output is
implicitly de￿ned by
(2.32) mc(Y
n
t ;Y
n
t ;e ￿t) = ￿
￿1
In the case of fully ￿ exible prices, equilibrium output thus equals the natural level of
output at all times, Yt = Y n
t (e ￿t). The natural level of output in turn depends only on the
exogenous real shocks, which entails that the equilibrium output under perfectly ￿ exible
prices is completely independent of monetary policy.
In the case of sticky prices, equilibrium output can instead di⁄er from the natural
level of output. The concept of output gap in fact plays a major role in New Keynesian
economics, both as a force bringing about ￿ uctuations in in￿ ation as well as a target for
monetary policy. Speci￿cally, the output gap, which we denote with xt, has a precise
meaning: it is the deviation of actual output from the natural level of output, namely
xt = b Yt ￿ b Y n
t = log(Yt=Y n
t ).
The natural steady-state level of output is the equilibrium level of output that obtains
in the presence of fully ￿ exible prices and in the absence of exogenous real shocks, that is
e ￿t = 0 at all times. We denote a variable￿ s value at steady state with a bar. The natural
steady-state level of output, Y , is implicitly de￿ned by
(2.33) mc(Y ;Y ;0) = ￿
￿1
Note that we do not use the superscript n in denoting the natural steady-state level of
output. This is because, if e ￿t = 0 and Yt = Y at all times, (2.25) has a solution with
zero in￿ ation at all times. In other words, in the presence of zero steady-state in￿ ation,
the steady state of the economy with sticky prices coincides with the natural steady-state
level of output. Indeed, we later log-linearise the model around a steady-state with zero
in￿ ation and the natural steady-state level of output, Y .35
We must stress that the natural level of output is not Pareto e¢ cient. The e¢ cient
level of output is in fact the equilibrium level of output under both perfectly ￿ exible prices
and perfect competition. The e¢ cient level of output, Y ￿
t (e ￿t), is thus implicitly de￿ned by
(2.34) mc(Y
￿
t ;Y
￿
t ;e ￿t) = 1
Accordingly, the e¢ cient steady-state level of output, Y
￿
, is implicitly de￿ned by
(2.35) mc(Y
￿
;Y
￿
;0) = 1
2.6. Log-linearised Model
Log-linearising requires choosing the steady state around which the log-linear approxi-
mation is taken. We log-linearise the model around a steady-state with zero in￿ ation and
the natural steady-state level of output.
We denote a variable￿ s log-deviation from its steady-state value, which is denoted with
a bar, with a hat. Taking a ￿rst-order Taylor series expansion to e uc (Yt;￿t) yields
(2.36) b e uc
￿
Yt;e ￿t
￿
=
e uccY
e uc
￿
b Yt +
e uc￿
e uccY
e ￿t
￿
where b Yt = log(Yt=Y ) and all partial derivatives are evaluated at steady state6. Similarly,
taking a ￿rst-order Taylor series expansion to e vy(yt(i);e ￿t) gives
(2.37) b e vy
￿
yt(i);e ￿t
￿
=
e vyyY
e vy
￿
b yt(i) +
e vy￿
e vyyY
e ￿t
￿
where b yt(i) = log(yt(i)=Y ).
Log-linearising the Euler equation for consumption (2.20) yields
(2.38) b it = b rt + Et￿t+1
6In what follows we use the notation in Woodford (2003). subscript ￿ denotes partial derivatives of the
indirect utility functions with respect to all exogenous real disturbances in vector e ￿t.36
where b it = log[(1 + it)=(1 + i)] and ￿t = b Pt ￿ b Pt￿1 = log(Pt=Pt￿1). Here the log-deviation
in the ex ante short-term real interest rate, b rt, is a process given by
(2.39) b rt = ￿
￿1
h
Et(b Yt+1 ￿ gt+1) ￿ (b Yt ￿ gt)
i
where the constant coe¢ cient
(2.40) ￿ = ￿
e uc
e uccY
> 0
measures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of aggregate expenditure and the
disturbance term
(2.41) gt = ￿
e uc￿
e uccY
e ￿t
indicates the percentage variation in output required to keep the marginal utility of ex-
penditure at its natural steady-state level, given shocks to government purchases and to
household￿ s impatience to consume. Equation (2.38) can be reformulated as an intertem-
poral expectational IS relation of the form
(2.42) b Yt = Etb Yt+1 ￿ ￿
h
b it ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ ￿
￿1(gt ￿ Etgt+1)
i
The expectational IS relation, (2.42), can be expressed in terms of output gap as
(2.43) xt = Etxt+1 ￿ ￿
￿
b it ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ b r
n
t
￿
where
(2.44) b r
n
t = ￿
￿1
h
(gt ￿ b Y
n
t ) ￿ Et(gt+1 ￿ b Y
n
t+1)
i
is the natural real rate of interest, namely the real interest rate that would obtain if all
prices were perfectly ￿ exible.37
Log-linearising the real marginal cost speci￿cation (2.22) yields
(2.45) c mct(i) = $(b yt(i) ￿ qt) + ￿
￿1(b Yt ￿ gt)
where c mct(i) = log(mct(i)=￿). Here the constant coe¢ cient
(2.46) $ =
e vyyY
e vy
> 0
measures the elasticity of real marginal cost with respect to own output and the distur-
bance term
(2.47) qt = ￿
e vy￿
e vyyY
e ￿t
indicates the percentage variation in output required to keep the marginal disutility of
labour supply at its natural steady-state level, given shocks to technology and to the
household￿ s willingness to supply labour.
Under perfectly ￿ exible prices, (2.45) reduces to
(2.48) log
￿
￿￿1
￿￿1
￿
= $
￿
b Y
n
t ￿ qt
￿
+ ￿
￿1(b Y
n
t ￿ gt)
Solving for b Y n
t = log(Y n
t =Y ) yields
(2.49) b Y
n
t =
$qt + ￿￿1gt
$ + ￿￿1
Using (2.45), percentage ￿ uctuations in the e¢ cient level of output are given by
(2.50) b Y
￿
t =
$qt + ￿￿1gt
$ + ￿￿1
which is the same as (2.49). On the one hand, percentage ￿ uctuations in the e¢ cient
level of output are equal, to second order, to percentage ￿ uctuations in the natural level
of output. On the other hand, monopolistic competition brings about a constant wedge
between the natural steady-state level of output and the e¢ cient steady-state level of38
output. The natural steady-state level of output, Y , can in fact be rewritten as
(2.51) mc(Y ;Y ;0) = ￿
￿1 = 1 ￿ ￿y
where the parameter ￿y summarises the distortions in the natural steady-state level of
output due to monopolistic competition. When ￿y is small enough, the steady-state
e¢ ciency gap, x￿ = log(Y
￿
=Y ), can be log-linearised as
(2.52) log(Y
￿
=Y ) =
￿y
$ + ￿￿1 + O
￿
k￿yk
2￿
2.7. Hybrid Phillips Curves
We can now turn to the aggregate supply function. Under rule of thumb behaviour ￿ la
Steinsson (2003), the in￿ ation rate and the output gap in any period satisfy an aggregate
supply relation of the form
(2.53) ￿t = ￿f￿Et￿t+1 + ￿b￿t￿1 + ￿2xt + ￿3xt￿1
Appendix A reports a detailed derivation of the hybrid Phillips curve. The coe¢ cients on
the terms in in￿ ation are given by
(2.54) ￿f =
￿
￿
; ￿b =
!
￿
; ￿ = ￿ + ! ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)!￿
The coe¢ cients on the terms in output gap are given by
(2.55) ￿2 =
(1 ￿ !)￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿!￿
￿
; ￿3 =
(1 ￿ ￿)!￿
￿
with
(2.56) ￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)(￿￿1 + $)
(1 + $￿)￿
The parameters reported in Steinsson (2003) (p. 1451-1452) are the same as above
apart from ￿2. As acknowledged by the author, the mistake in the coe¢ cient on the term39
in current output gap is due to an incorrect speci￿cation for the elasticity of the notional
short-run aggregate supply curve. This mistake implies that, once the possibility of rule-
of-thumb behaviour by price setters is ruled out (i.e. ! = 0), the hybrid Phillips curve
in Steinsson (2003) does not collapse to the NKPC in Woodford (2003, 2:12 and 2:13, p.
187), namely
(2.57) ￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿xt
where ￿ is given as in (2.56). On the contrary, absent rule-of-thumb behaviour by price
setters, our speci￿cation for the hybrid Phillips curve, namely (2.53), is easily seen to
collapse to the NKPC in Woodford
If the fraction ! is reset according to backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la
Gal￿-Gertler (1999) (i.e. ￿ = 0 in (2.53)), the aggregate supply relation is of the form
(2.58) ￿t = ￿f￿Et￿t+1 + ￿b￿t￿1 + ￿1xt
The parameters on the terms in in￿ ation are de￿ned as in (2.54). The parameter on the
term in output gap is given by
(2.59) ￿1 =
(1 ￿ !)￿￿
￿
where ￿ is de￿ned as in (2.56). Of course, absent rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters,
(2.58) collapses to the NKPC in Woodford (2003), namely (2.57).
Rule-of-thumb behaviour is indeed capable of providing a rationale for the dependence
of current values of in￿ ation on past as well as expected in￿ ation conditions. Under rule-
of-thumb behaviour, current in￿ ation depends on a convex combination of expected future
in￿ ation and lagged in￿ ation. Moreover, the weights on the expected future in￿ ation and
lagged in￿ ation are functions of the model￿ s structural parameters.
Both the hybrid Phillips curves (2.53) and (2.58) have the property that they nest the
NKPC. Additionally, Steinsson (2003) shows how (2.53) has the property that it also nests40
a purely backward-looking Phillips curve (i.e. ￿t = ￿t￿1 +(1￿￿)￿xt￿1) in the limit when
! ! 1.
On the one hand, the property displayed by (2.53) of collapsing to the purely backward-
looking Phillips curve is certainly appealing. Nonetheless, empirical studies (e.g. Fuhrer
and Moore (1995), Fuhrer (1997), Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), and Roberts (2005), and Sbor-
done (2005)) are not only able to reject the purely forward-looking Phillips curve but
also the purely backward-looking Phillips curve. On the other hand, an implication, not
previously noted in the literature, of allowing rule-of-thumb price setters to index their
prices to lagged output gap is that the long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄ is a⁄ected.
Indeed, all Phillips curves imply a positively sloped long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄.
Denoting with ￿ and x the steady-state values of in￿ ation and output gap, the NKPC
(2.57) implies an upward sloping relation of the form
(2.60) x =
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿
The long-run relation between in￿ ation and output gap is in fact due to the smaller
coe¢ cient on the expected-in￿ ation (i.e. ￿) term relative to that on current in￿ ation (i.e.
1).
On the one hand, rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) desirably im-
plies that all price setters behave identically once shocks are eliminated from the economy.
In other words, Gal￿-Gertler￿ s backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour does not alter
the steady state that would obtain under forward-looking behaviour by all price setters.
The long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄ is in fact not a⁄ected by the presence of rule-of-
thumb price setters: (2.58) evaluated at steady state results in (2.60). On the other hand,
the same is not true under rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003). The fact that
rule-of-thumb price setters index their prices to the lagged output gap alters the long-run
Phillips-curve trade-o⁄ that obtains in the purely forward-looking model. Indeed, the41
hybrid Phillips curve (2.53) evaluated at steady state yields
(2.61) x =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ !)￿
(1 ￿ !)￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)!￿
￿ = ￿￿
which collapses to (2.60) under ￿ = 0. As we shall see below, this will have important con-
sequences once we consider what constitutes the optimal in￿ ation rate under a particular
type of commitment policy.CHAPTER 3
Policy Objective Functions
In this chapter, we specify objective functions for the central bank. The general equi-
librium foundations of New Keynesian models allow deriving the objective a central bank
should pursue starting from the utility of the representative household. Woodford (2003,
Ch. 6) provides a detailed analysis of the utility-based framework for the evaluation of
monetary policy. Accordingly, the central bank￿ s objective is the discounted sum of utility
of the representative household, which is approximated to second order by the discounted
sum of central bank￿ s single-period loss function. The central bank￿ s single-period loss
function in turn depends on the details of the price setting.
We extend the analysis in Woodford (2003) by allowing a fraction of price setters to
behave in a backward-looking rule-of-thumb manner. The backward-looking behaviour is
speci￿ed in two ways. First, following Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) we allow the rule-of-thumb
price setters to index their prices to lagged in￿ ation. Second, following Steinsson (2003)
we allow the rule-of-thumb price setters to index their prices to both lagged output gap
and lagged in￿ ation.
The case of rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003) contains an original contri-
bution to the literature1. Speci￿cally, we correct the utility-based objective function of
the central bank reported in the original paper. The mistake in Steinsson (2003) relates
to his reported ￿4 coe¢ cient in the single-period central bank￿ s loss function. It has been
acknowledged by the Steinsson in the Erratum to Optimal Monetary Policy in an Economy
with In￿ation Persistence, available on the author￿ s webpage.
1The hybrid Phillips curve in the case of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999) coincides with the one reported in Amato and Laubach (2003).
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Correcting the mistake allows us to show how the quadratic terms that stem from the
presence of rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters can be combined in a single quadratic
term. As a result, rule-of-thumb behaviour, regardless of its speci￿cation, can now be seen
as introducing a single extra term in the central bank￿ s single-period loss function relative
to the case of purely forward-looking price setting. Interestingly, this single extra term has
a precise economic interpretation: it penalises variations in the di⁄erence between general
in￿ ation and rule-of-thumb price increases.
We ￿rst review the conditions that guarantee the validity of the utility-based approach
to monetary policy analysis in the presence of a linear approximation to the model￿ s
structural relations. We then proceed to compute a second-order approximation to the
period utility of the representative household. Finally, we specify the objective functions
for the central bank. Appendix B reports a detailed derivation of the objective function
that obtains in the presence of rule-of-thumb ￿ la Steinsson (2003).
3.1. Theoretical Background
The problem at hand is how to evaluate expected utility, E[U(x;￿)], under alterna-
tive policies on the basis of a log-linear approximation to ￿ uctuations in the endogenous
variables. Here, x denotes a vector of endogenous variables, ￿ is a vector of stochastic
exogenous shocks, and the utility function U(x;￿) is concave for each realisation of ￿ and
at least twice di⁄erentiable.
The model￿ s structural equations are log-linearised around the deterministic steady
state, x, which is the vector of steady-state values of the endogenous variables in the
absence of shocks, ￿ = 0. The model is then closed by an approximate policy rule, which
can either be assumed or, as we will do in the next chapter, optimally derived by specifying
a loss function for the central bank.44
Supposing that the linear approximate model is determinate2, a ￿rst-order approxima-
tion to the equilibrium ￿ uctuations of the endogenous variables for any given policy rule
is given by
(3.1) x = x
0 + A￿ + O
￿
k￿;%k
2￿
where x0 is the policy-driven deterministic steady state, A is a matrix of coe¢ cients, and
the second-order residual is a function of the bound on the size of the exogenous shocks,
k￿k, and of the bound on the policy-driven deterministic steady state, k%k.
The deterministic steady state x does not need to correspond to x0. The parameter
vector % in fact indexes aspects of the policy rule that a⁄ect the steady state. A single
linear approximate general equilibrium model can thus be used for the evaluation of any
policy provided that the policy-driven deterministic steady state is close enough to the
steady state around which the model￿ s structural equations are log-linearised. Precisely,
the residual in (3.1) is of order O
￿
k￿;%k
2￿
independently of the policy rule only if e x0 = x0￿
x = O(k%k).
Taking a second-order approximation to the utility function delivers
(3.2) U(x;￿) = U + Uxe x + U￿￿ +
1
2
e x
0
Uxxe x + e x
0
Ux￿￿ +
1
2
￿
0
U￿￿￿ + O
￿
k￿;%k
3￿
where U = U(x;0), e x = x￿ x, and all partial derivatives of U are evaluated at steady
state. The third-order residual stems from (3.1), which implies that x￿x = x0￿x+A￿ =
O(k￿;%k). Given that the shocks are normalised to zero, namely E [￿] = 0, taking the
expected value of the second-order approximation to the utility function (3.2) yields the
2The issue of whether a linear approximate general equilibrium model is determinate, namely the system
has a unique bounded solution in the case of bounded disturbances, is discussed in Blanchard and Kahn
(1980), Klein (2000), and Soderlind (1999).45
approximate welfare criterion
E[U(x;￿)] = U + UxE [e x] +
1
2
trfUxxvar[e x]g + trfUx￿cov(￿;x)g (3.3)
+
1
2
trfU￿￿var[￿]g + O
￿
k￿;%k
3￿
where E [e x] is the expectation of the random vector e x, var[e x] and var[￿] are respectively
the variance-covariance matrices of the random vectors e x and ￿, and cov(￿;x) is the matrix
of covariances between the random vectors e x and ￿.
We can now consider the validity of the welfare criterion for a given policy rule sat-
isfying (3.1). Substituting the ￿rst-order approximation to equilibrium ￿ uctuations (3.1)
in e x delivers e x = e x0 + A￿, which implies that E [e x] = e x0. Accordingly, the approximate
welfare criterion (3.3) is now given by
(3.4) U
0 = U+Uxe x
0+
1
2
trfUxxvar[e x]g+trfUx￿cov(￿;x)g+
1
2
trfU￿￿var[￿]g+O
￿
k￿;%k
3￿
Comparing the approximate welfare criteria, (3.4) and (3.3), we note that
(3.5) E[U(x;￿)] ￿ U
0 = UxE
￿
e x ￿ e x
0￿
+ O
￿
k￿;%k
3￿
Equation (3.5) implies that U0 cannot correctly rank alternative policies, even in the
case of a small bound on the amplitude of the disturbances, unless
(3.6) UxE
￿
e x ￿ e x
0￿
= O
￿
k￿;%k
3￿
Condition (3.6) shows that the problem at hand here is one of a general nature. That
is the inaccuracy of evaluating welfare in terms of a second-order approximation to utility
on the basis of a linear approximation to the model structural equations given that the
residual in a linear approximation is only of second order and not of third order. Indeed,
the problem arises from the presence of the linear term in the second-order approximation
to the utility function: there may be second-order terms that are left as part of the46
second order-residual in a linear approximation but that may make a nonzero second
order contribution to the left-hand side of condition (3.6) thus spoiling the validity of the
approximate welfare criterion (3.3). Moreover, the issue whether such terms are nonzero
or not cannot generally be addressed unless considering a second-order approximation for
the model￿ s structural equations3.
Nonetheless, the inaccuracy of the linear approximation for the purpose of policy eval-
uation can also be overcome without having to discard the linear approximation to the
model￿ s structural relations. The validity of welfare ranking on the basis of log-linear ap-
proximation to the model structural equations can be gained by restricting Ux so to make
condition (3.6) hold.
The easiest restriction on Ux one can think of is the zero restriction
(3.7) Ux(x;0) = 0
so that condition (3.6) necessarily holds and the approximate welfare criterion (3.3) does
not contain linear terms. Accordingly, comparisons of the value of U0 provide a correct
welfare ranking of alternative policies under the conditions that assure the determinacy
of rational expectation equilibrium. Equation (3.7) guarantees that in order to avoid the
inaccuracy of the log-linearised equations one should linearise the model￿ s structural equa-
tions around the Pareto e¢ cient steady state. Indeed, this is the widespread practice in the
New Keynesian literature: the steady-state distortions due to monopolistic competition in
the goods￿markets are eliminated by assuming the existence of a subsidy to production.
This assumption is uncompelling for two main reasons. First, there is no evidence of the
existence of the kind of subsidies needed to assume away steady-state distortions. Second,
it is not clear whether a policy that is optimal for an economy with an e¢ cient steady
3Second-order solution methods are discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2005), Collard and Juillard
(2001), Jin and Judd (2002), and Schmitt-GrohŁ and Uribe (2004b).47
state remains optimal in an economy where the steady state is distorted. With this lat-
ter respect, we will indeed show how maintaining steady-state distortions has important
consequences on the characterisation of the optimal in￿ ation rate for monetary policy.
The accuracy of ￿rst-order approximations to correctly evaluate welfare up to second
order does not necessarily require for the steady state to be e¢ cient. Condition (3.7) can
in fact be weakened by imposing only that
(3.8) Ux(x;0) = O(k￿yk)
where the parameter ￿y, introduced in Chapter 2, summarises the distortions in the
natural steady-state level of output due to monopolistic competition. If condition (3.7)
provides a benchmark for the steady state in order to gain the accuracy of the linear
approximation for the purpose of welfare evaluation, condition (3.8) simply requires the
steady state be near such a benchmark, namely not to be too ine¢ cient. Imposing con-
dition (3.8) thus amounts to binding the equilibrium ine¢ ciency. The additional bound
introduced in turns guarantees that
(3.9) UxE
￿
e x ￿ e x
0￿
= O
￿
k￿y;￿;%k
3￿
which entails that the approximate welfare criterion (3.3) does not contain linear terms,
namely
(3.10) E[U(x;￿)] = U
0 + O
￿
k￿y;￿;%k
3￿
To summarise, it is possible to use ￿rst-order approximations to evaluate welfare ac-
curately up to second order as long as: I) the exogenous disturbances are small enough,
II) the policy-driven steady state is close enough to the steady-state around which the
log-linearisations are taken, and III) the steady-state distortions are small enough.48
3.2. Utility-based Welfare Criterion
We consider the scenario of small steady-state distortions discussed in the previous
section. Substituting the indirect utility functions, the period utility of the representative
household in (2.1) can be rewritten as a function solely of all yt(i) as given by (2.24). For
convenience, we report here the period utility
(3.11) Ut = e u(Yt;e ￿t) ￿
Z 1
0
e v(yt(i);e ￿t)di
This change of variables matters because the small ine¢ ciency of the steady state is never
in terms of the endogenous variables in the utility function per se. In other words, neither
the marginal disutility of labour nor the marginal utility of consumption is small enough at
steady state. The small ine¢ ciency of the steady state is rather in terms of the structural
relationship relating labour to consumption. This structural relationship characterises
feasible consumption-work outcomes as a result of the production function. Accordingly,
we need to express utility as a function of the level of production, an endogenous variable
for which the marginal utility is close enough to zero.
A second-order Taylor approximation of the ￿rst term in the period utility (3.11) is
given by
(3.12) e u(Yt;e ￿t) = u + e uce Yt + e u￿e ￿t +
1
2
e ucce Y
2
t + e uc￿e Yte ￿t +
1
2
e ￿
0
te u￿￿e ￿t + O
￿￿ ￿ ￿e ￿;%
￿ ￿ ￿
3￿
where u = e u(Y ;0) and e Yt = Yt ￿ Y . e Yt is related to b Yt through the second-order Taylor
approximation, Yt = Y (1 + b Yt + 1
2 b Y 2
t ) + O(
￿ ￿
￿e ￿;%
￿ ￿
￿
3
). Substituting accordingly for e Yt yields
e u(Yt;e ￿t) = u + e ucY (b Yt +
1
2
b Y
2
t ) + e u￿e ￿t +
1
2
e uccY
2
￿
b Yt +
1
2
b Y
2
t
￿2
(3.13)
+e uc￿Y (b Yt +
1
2
b Y
2
t )e ￿t +
1
2
e ￿
0
te u￿￿e ￿t + O
￿￿ ￿
￿e ￿;%
￿ ￿
￿
3￿49
Dropping the terms that are higher than second order and collecting terms that are inde-
pendent of policy in the term t:i:p, we obtain
(3.14) e u(Yt;e ￿t) = Y e uc
￿
b Yt +
1
2
(1 ￿ ￿
￿1)b Y
2
t + ￿
￿1gtb Yt
￿
+ t:i:p + O
￿￿ ￿
￿e ￿;%
￿ ￿
￿
3￿
where ￿ and gt are respectively given by (2.40) and (2.41).
The second term in the period utility (3.11) can be approximated to second order by
(3.15) e v(yt(i);e ￿t) = v + e vye yt(i) + e v￿e ￿t +
1
2
e vyye y
2
t(i) + e vy￿e yt(i)e ￿t +
1
2
e ￿
0
te v￿￿e ￿t + O
￿￿ ￿
￿e ￿;%
￿ ￿
￿
3￿
where v = e v(Y ;0) and e yt(i) = yt(i) ￿ Y . e yt(i) is related to b yt(i) through the second-order
Taylor approximation, yt(i) = Y (1+b yt(i)+ 1
2b y2
t(i))+O(
￿ ￿ ￿e ￿;%
￿ ￿ ￿
3
). Substituting accordingly
for e yt(i) yields
e v(yt(i);e ￿t) = v + e vyY (b yt(i) +
1
2
b y
2
t(i)) + e v￿e ￿t +
1
2
e vyyY
2
(b yt(i) +
1
2
b y
2
t(i))
2 (3.16)
+e vy￿Y (b yt(i) +
1
2
b y
2
t(i))e ￿t +
1
2
e ￿
0
te v￿￿e ￿t + O
￿￿ ￿ ￿e ￿;%
￿ ￿ ￿
3￿
Dropping the terms that are higher than second order and collecting terms that are inde-
pendent of policy in the term t:i:p, we obtain
(3.17) e u(Yt;e ￿t) = Y e vy
￿
b yt(i) +
1
2
(1 + $)b yt(i)
2 ￿ $qtb yt(i)
￿
+ t:i:p + O
￿￿
￿ ￿e ￿;%
￿
￿ ￿
3￿
where $ and qt are respectively given by (2.46) and (2.47). Using the real marginal cost
speci￿cation (2.22) evaluated at steady state and the de￿nition of the natural steady-state
level of output as given by (2.51), it is possible to substitute e uc(1 ￿ ￿y) for e vy, with ￿y
being an expansion parameter. Accordingly, equation (3.17) can be rewritten as
(3.18) e v(yt(i);e ￿t) = Y e uc
8
> <
> :
(1 ￿ ￿y)b yt(i)
+1
2(1 + $)b yt(i)2 ￿ $qtb yt(i)
9
> =
> ;
+ t:i:p + O
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿y;e ￿;%
￿ ￿ ￿
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Integrating this over the di⁄erentiated goods i gives
Z 1
0
e v(yt(i);e ￿t)di = Y e uc
8
> <
> :
(1 ￿ ￿y)Eib yt(i) ￿ $qtEib yt(i)
+1
2(1 + $)[(Eib yt(i))2 + varib yt(i)]
9
> =
> ;
(3.19)
+t:i:p + O
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿y;e ￿;%
￿ ￿ ￿
3￿
where Eib yt(i) and varib yt(i) denote respectively the mean value and the variance of b yt(i)
across all di⁄erentiated goods i at date t. Using a second-order approximation to the
Dixit-Stiglitz output index, b Yt = Eib yt(i) + 1
2(1 ￿ ￿
￿1)varib yt(i) + O(
￿ ￿
￿e ￿;%
￿ ￿
￿
3
), to substitute
for Eib yt(i) yields
Z 1
0
e v(yt(i);e ￿t)di = Y e uc
8
> <
> :
(1 ￿ ￿y)b Yt + 1
2(1 + $)b Y 2
t ￿ $qtb Yt
+1
2(￿
￿1 + $)varib yt(i)
9
> =
> ;
(3.20)
+t:i:p + O
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿y;e ￿;%
￿ ￿ ￿
3￿
Putting back together the second-order approximations to the two terms entering the
period utility function, (3.14) and (3.20), a second-order approximation to the period
utility function is given by
(3.21) Ut = ￿
Y e uc
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where we use equations (2.49) and (2.52) to express the period utility function in terms
of the percentage ￿ uctuations in the natural level of output, b Y n
t , and the steady-state
e¢ ciency gap, x￿.
Recalling that each supplier faces a constant elasticity demand as given by (2.5) , it
follows that the variance of yt(i) across all di⁄erentiated goods i at date t is related to the
variance of prices across all di⁄erentiated goods i at date t according to vari logyt(i) =
￿
2vari logpt(i). Using this and noting that (xt ￿ x￿)2 = b Y 2
t ￿ 2x￿b Yt + ￿2b Y n
t b Yt + t:i:p, we51
obtain
(3.22) Ut = ￿
Y e uc
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which coincides with Woodford (2003, 2:13, p. 396).
There are two main points to take from (3.22). First, absent the steady-state distortions
due to monopolistic competition (i.e. x￿ = 0), the welfare-relevant measure of output gap
is precisely the same that enters the aggregate supply curve. The monetary authority
should stabilise the output gap, xt, that is it should stabilise the actual level of output
around the natural level of output, which would be e¢ cient. In the presence of steady-state
distortions, the monetary authority should instead try to stabilise the output gap around
the steady-state e¢ ciency gap, x￿. In other words, the combination of general equilibrium
foundations and steady-state distortions provides a microfoundation for targeting a level
of output above the ine¢ cient natural level of output.
Second, it is also appropriate for monetary policy to aim to curb price dispersion. In
the presence of sticky prices, price dispersion is costly because it reduces the utility of the
representative household. This happens for two reasons. First, the representative house-
hold￿ s utility depends on the consumption of an aggregate good. Faced with dispersion
of prices for the individual goods produced in the economy, the household consumes more
of the relatively cheaper goods and less of the relatively more expensive goods. Given
diminishing marginal utility, the loss in utility due to consuming less of the relatively
more expensive goods is greater than the increase in utility due to consuming more of the
relatively cheaper goods. Second, the representative household￿ s utility depends on the
supply of each individual labour type. Given increasing marginal disutility of supplying
labour, the loss in utility due to producing more of the relatively more expensive goods is
greater than the increase in utility due to producing less of the relatively cheaper goods.
For these reasons, price dispersion reduces utility. When prices are sticky, price dispersion
is caused by in￿ ation. However, how ￿ uctuations in the general price level a⁄ect price52
dispersion, hence the central bank￿ s objective function, depend upon the details of price
setting.
3.3. Utility-based Objective Functions
We can now specify the utility-based objective functions for monetary policy. The
central bank￿ s objective is the discounted sum of utility of the representative household,
which is approximated to second-order by the discounted sum of central bank￿ s single-
period loss function. The central bank￿ s single-period loss function, denoted with Lt,
depends on the details of price setting. Denoting with W the central bank￿ s objective
function, we have
(3.23) W =
1 X
t=0
￿
tUt = ￿￿
1 X
t=0
￿
tLt + t:i:p + O
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where the constant ￿ is given by ￿ = Y e uc(￿￿1 + $)￿=2￿. Appendix B reports a de-
tailed derivation of the central bank￿ s objective function in the presence of rule-of-thumb
behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003).
Under rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003), the single-period central bank￿ s
loss function takes the form
(3.24) Lt = ￿
2
t + ￿1(xt ￿ x
￿)
2 + ￿2 [￿t ￿ (￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿xt￿1)]
2
The coe¢ cients ￿1 and ￿2 are given by
(3.25) ￿1 =
￿
￿
and ￿2 =
!
(1 ￿ !)￿
where ￿ is de￿ned as in (2.56).
The single-period central bank￿ s loss function (3.24) constitutes an original contribution
to the literature4. As acknowledged by Steinsson, the mistake in his derivation relates to
4The hybrid Phillips curve in the case of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999) coincides with the one reported in Amato and Laubach (2003).53
the coe¢ cient he denotes with ￿4. Correcting the mistake allows us to show, as we detail
in Appendix B, how the quadratic terms that stem from the presence of rule-of-thumb
behaviour by price setters can be combined in a single quadratic term. As a result, rule-
of-thumb behaviour by price setters ￿ la Steinsson (2003), can now be seen as introducing
a single extra term in the central bank￿ s single-period loss function relative to the case
of purely forward-looking price setting. Interestingly, as we discuss below, we can give a
clear and intuitive interpretation to this single extra term.
In the presence of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿-Gertler (1999)
(i.e. ￿ = 0), the single-period central bank￿ s loss function is given by
(3.26) Lt = ￿
2
t + ￿1(xt ￿ x
￿)
2 + ￿2 (￿t ￿ ￿t￿1)
2
with ￿1 and ￿2 de￿ned as in (3.25).
Absent rule-of-thumb behaviour, ! = 0, (3.24) and (3.26) collapse to the loss function
in Woodford (2003, 2:22, p. 400), namely
(3.27) Lt = ￿
2
t + ￿1(xt ￿ x
￿)
2
with ￿1 de￿ned as in (3.25).
A loss function similar to (3.27) has indeed been widely assumed in the literature on
optimal monetary policy evaluation. Walsh (2003, Ch. 8) provides a survey of earlier
works on optimal monetary policy that assume a quadratic loss function closely related to
(3.27). As discussed in Woodford (2003, Ch. 6) the main advantage of the utility-based
approach to monetary policy analysis lies in providing a theoretical justi￿cation, namely
a microfoundation, for such widely used loss function. There are two critical di⁄erences
between the utility-based loss function (3.27) and the nonmicrofounded loss functions
assumed by the earlier literature on optimal monetary policy. First, the output gap is
measured relative to the natural level of output, namely the equilibrium level of output
under perfectly ￿ exible prices. In the earlier literature, the output variable was instead54
interpreted as being output relative to trend or output relative to an unspeci￿ed natural
level of output. Second, as described above, in￿ ation enters the loss function because
of sticky prices: price dispersion reduces the utility of the representative household and,
when ￿rms cannot adjust their prices every period, price dispersion is brought about by
in￿ ation. Moreover, the relative weights on in￿ ation and output gap stabilisation are
again determined by the model￿ s structural parameters. Speci￿cally, the relative weight
on output variations depends linearly on the slope of the purely forward-looking Phillips
curve.
An evident implication of allowing for rule-of-thumb behaviour is that it a⁄ects the
objective that monetary policy seeks to pursue. Rule-of-thumb behaviour implies that
the single-period central bank￿ s loss function includes an extra term with respect to the
single-period loss function in the purely forward-looking model.
Indeed, the extra terms in the single-period loss function due to the presence of
backward-looking rule-of-thumb ￿ la Steinsson (2003) can now be combined in a single
quadratic term. Interestingly, this extra term can now be seen as penalising variations in
the di⁄erence between general in￿ ation and rule-of-thumb price increases. In the presence
of Gal￿-Gertler￿ s rule-of-thumb behaviour, rule-of-thumb price setters index their prices
to lagged in￿ ation, which is re￿ ected in the term in in￿ ation acceleration, ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1.
In the presence of Steinsson￿ s rule-of-thumb behaviour, rule-of-thumb price setters index
their prices to both lagged in￿ ation and lagged output gap, which is re￿ ected in the term
￿t ￿ (￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿xt￿1).
Moreover, an implication of allowing rule-of-thumb price setters to index their prices to
lagged output gap is that the steady-state loss function is a⁄ected. Gal￿ and Gertler (1999)
rule-of-thumb behaviour does not alter the steady-state loss function that would obtain
under forward-looking behaviour by all price setters as the term in in￿ ation acceleration
in (3.26) does not matter at steady state. The same is not true under rule-of-thumb
behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003): the fact that rule-of-thumb price setters index their prices
to the lagged output gap entails that the additional, with respect to (3.27), term in (3.24)55
matters at steady state. As we shall see below, this will have important consequences
once we consider what constitutes the optimal in￿ ation rate under a particular type of
commitment policy.CHAPTER 4
Optimal Monetary Policy: Optimal Long-run In￿ ation Rates
In this chapter, we study what constitutes optimal monetary policy in our theoretical
economies, which are all characterised by the existence of a long-run Phillips-curve trade-
o⁄ and by an ine¢ cient natural level of output. Speci￿cally, we concentrate on what
constitutes the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate. Throughout the chapter we assume that
the central bank is able to act under commitment. We consider di⁄erent types of optimal
commitment policy that have been proposed in the literature: the zero-optimal policy, the
timeless perspective commitment policy in Woodford (1999), and the alternative timeless
perspective commitment policy put forward by Blake (2001), Jensen and McCallum (2002),
and Damjanovic et al. (2008). Our preference for commitment is based on our focus on
analysing the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate when the steady-state is distorted1.
The analysis we carry out in this chapter is entirely about steady-state outcomes.
Certainty equivalence guarantees that the results we obtain in the purely deterministic
setting hold in the presence of random disturbances. While we initially characterise the
steady state of our theoretical economies, the dynamic nature of the three models derived
in the previous chapters is later employed for the analysis of stochastic outcomes, such as
the dynamic analysis of responses to shocks and the welfare costs due to the stabilisation
of shocks.
Within New Keynesian literature, Woodford (2003) studies the optimal long-run rate of
in￿ ation in the basic NK model and its extension where in￿ ation inertia is due to backward-
looking price indexation by price setters, which is considered by, among others, Christiano
et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003). This chapter provides the ￿rst derivation of
1Of course, discretionary conduct of monetary policy would result in the well-known in￿ ation bias stressed
by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
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the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate in a small New Keynesian model where in￿ ation inertia
is due to backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters speci￿ed either ￿ la
Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) or ￿ la Steinsson (2003).
In the standard New Keynesian framework, the optimality of a monetary policy that
pursues complete price stability is well-known. Price stability is complete as it charac-
terises both the deterministic and the stochastic component of optimal monetary policy:
zero in￿ ation is optimal in the steady state and in￿ ation should not vary in response
to the shocks bu⁄eting the economy. The intuition for zero OLIR, as ￿rstly stressed by
Goodfriend and King (1997) is neat. The welfare-theoretical loss function re￿ ects the two
distortions in a basic NK model: distortions due to monopolistic competition in products
markets and distortions due to relative-price distortions. Under the widespread assump-
tion of a subsidy to production aimed at eliminating the long-run distortions originating
from monopolistic competition, zero steady-state in￿ ation is optimal as it allows to fully
stabilise the distortions due to relative-price distortions. Zero long-run in￿ ation remains
optimal even in the presence of the steady-state distortions due to monopolistic competi-
tion: the central bank ￿nds optimal to fully stabilise the distortions due to relative-price
distortions whereas it does not intervene on the distortions due to monopolistic compe-
tition. Woodford (2003) thus concludes "It is sometimes supposed that the existence of
a long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄, together with an ine¢ cient natural rate, should imply
that the Phillips curve should be exploited to some extent, resulting in positive in￿ation
forever, even under commitment. But here that is not true because the smaller coe¢ -
cient on the expected in￿ation-term relative to that on current in￿ation-which results in
the long-run trade-o⁄- is exactly the size of the shift term in the aggregate supply that is
needed to precisely eliminate any long-run incentive for nonzero in￿ation under an opti-
mal commitment." Woodford (2003, p. 415). Moreover, as shown in Woodford (2003),
zero OLIR is robust to in￿ ation inertia due to backward-looking price indexation by price58
setters, regardless of the assumption about the distortions originating from monopolistic
competition in products market2.
This is the ￿rst study of the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate in a small NK model
where in￿ ation inertia is due to backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters,
speci￿ed either ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) or ￿ la Steinsson (2003).
We show how backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour, speci￿ed either ￿ la Gal￿ and
Gertler (1999) or ￿ la Steinsson (2003), breaks the optimality of zero long-run in￿ ation. In
other words, backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour brings about a long-run incentive
for nonzero in￿ ation. This is because the stimulative e⁄ect of higher in￿ ation is generally
greater than the output cost of higher in￿ ation. Optimal steady-state in￿ ation collapses
to zero in the absence of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour, in the absence of a
long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄, and in the absence of steady-state distortions.
Positive optimal long-run in￿ ation also obtains in the purely forward-looking New Key-
nesian model under a type of timeless perspective commitment policy that has recently
been proposed in the literature. Blake (2001), Jensen and McCallum (2002), and Dam-
janovic et al. (2008) propose considering a timeless perspective policy which is based on
the optimisation of the unconditional value of the central bank￿ s objective function. More-
over, the alternative timeless perspective commitment policy is robust to the introduction
of backward-looking rule-of thumb behaviour, when this is characterised as in Gal￿ and
Gertler (1999), with the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate being invariant to the degree of
rule-of-thumb behaviour.
Overall, of the six optimal long-run in￿ ation rates we derive, ￿ve are positive. In
all the theoretical cases considered, optimal steady-state in￿ ation collapses to zero in the
absence of a long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄and in the absence of steady-state distortions.
Taking together the basic message of our results is that the widespread practice in the
New Keynesian literature of restricting the attention to the case of an e¢ cient natural
2The only consequence of introducing in￿ ation inertia due to backward-looking price indexation is that
the existence of a positive rate of in￿ ation before the adoption of the optimal commitment policy a⁄ects
the rate at which the central bank brings in￿ ation back to the zero long-run optimal target.59
level of output is not innocuous. A policy that is optimal for an economy with an e¢ cient
steady state di⁄ers from what is optimal in an economy where the subsidies that achieve
Pareto e¢ ciency are unavailable.
We ￿rst review di⁄erent types of optimal commitment policy that have been proposed
in the literature. We then proceed to set up the policy problem faced by the central
bank. Finally, we evaluate what constitutes optimal long-run in￿ ation in our theoretical
economies. Table 1 summarises the six optimal long-run in￿ ation rates we derive.
4.1. Di⁄erent Perspectives on Optimal Monetary Policy
The past few years have been characterised by a large body of literature on the topic
of optimal monetary policy. However, there is disagreement as to which is the appro-
priate perspective for monetary policy optimality. Following the work of Kydland and
Prescott (1977), the literature has focused on two main approaches to monetary policy
analysis: commitment and discretion. These two approaches correspond to two di⁄erent
assumptions about central bank behaviour. The di⁄erence of the two approaches in fact
lies in the central bank￿ s ability to precommit about its future actions. As Kydland and
Prescott (1977) ￿rstly pointed out, commitment is not time consistent. That is, the be-
haviour which the central bank would like to commit itself to carrying out at a future date
does not generally remain optimal for the bank when that future date actually arrives.
Conversely, discretion is time consistent as the central bank is free to choose at any date
the best policy given the conditions existing in the economy.
On the one hand, the New Keynesian literature has emphasised that discretionary
conduct of policy leads, in addition to the well-known in￿ ation bias stressed by Kydland
and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), to the so-called stabilisation bias3.
Woodford (1999, 2003, Chapter 7) and Clarida et al. (1999) discuss how a central bank
that is able to credibly commit can in￿ uence private sector expectations in a way that leads
to more favorable responses to shocks. In particular, Woodford (1999, 2003, Chapter 7)
3Earlier papers which discuss this e⁄ect include Jonsson (1997) and Svensson (1997).60
shows that optimal policy under commitment is history dependent whereas discretionary
policy is purely forward-looking. The logic behind the optimality of history dependence
is quite intuitive. In an economy where private sector expectations are formed rationally,
commitment by the central bank can in￿ uence these expectations only if the central bank￿ s
earlier commitments are sustained in later periods. Hence, successful steering of private
sector expectations requires that the central bank￿ s conduct in later periods depends not
only on the current state of the economy but also on the state of the economy in earlier
periods.
On the other hand, within the commitment class of policy, the literature has proposed
three types of policy strategy, which represent di⁄erent perspectives on the concept of
optimal monetary policy.
First, there is full commitment on the basis of the initial conditions at an arbitrary date
zero, when the policy is implemented. Following the terminology in Woodford (2003), we
refer to this type of strategy as being the zero-optimal commitment. This strategy entails
that existing expectations need not to be ful￿lled as they are taken as given at date
zero. The exploitation of existing expectations implies that zero-optimal policy is not
time invariant. The central bank￿ s behaviour is in fact not described by a time invariant
rule but rather by a set of rules: one rule for date zero and one rule for all subsequent
dates. In other words, the policy chosen at later dates is not a continuation of the policy
selected at date zero. With this respect, we must stress that by rule we mean an optimal
targeting rule, namely a target criterion for in￿ ation that is derived by combining the
optimality conditions with respect to in￿ ation and output gap.
Second, there is timeless perspective commitment, which, originally introduced by
Woodford (1999), has subsequently received a great deal of attention. This strategy seeks
to overcome the lack of continuation that characterises the zero-optimal policy. Indeed,
the timeless perspective re￿ ects a type of commitment that, unlike the zero-optimal com-
mitment, constraints the central bank￿ s rule to be time invariant. It does so by relying
upon optimality conditions that would have been chosen under a commitment regime if61
this had been adopted in the distant past. In other words, by ignoring the temptation to
exploit the expectations existing in the economy, the initial conditions prevailing at date
zero are not the ones utilised, but the economy￿ s initial evolution is constrained to be the
the one associated with the policy. The zero-optimal policy and the timeless perspective
policy in fact di⁄er only with respect to the central bank￿ s posited behaviour in the initial
period. Given the intertemporal nature of the aggregate-supply relation, it follows that
the two policies imply di⁄erent transition paths for in￿ ation and output gap to the same
optimal long-run values.
Third, Blake (2001), Jensen and McCallum (2002), and Damjanovic et al. (2008) argue
that timeless perspective commitment, as usually described, is not thoroughly timeless.
The timeless perspective developed by Woodford is in fact based on optimality conditions
obtained from a conditional optimality calculation. The authors thus propose considering
an alternative timeless perspective policy which is based on optimisation of the uncondi-
tional value of the central bank￿ s objective function. In this sense, the rule they obtain
is globally optimal in the sense of Taylor (1979). Taylor (1979) proposes adopting a
monetary policy that, given complete knowledge, in terms of both structural equations
and exogenous shock processes, of the structure of an economy characterised by rational
expectations, is optimal on average. Monetary policy is optimal on average if it yields
the smallest unconditional expectation of the central bank￿ s objective function. The rule
implied by this third perspective is both timelessly optimal and globally optimal with
respect to the unconditional variance. In what follows, we refer to this third approach as
implying an alternative timeless perspective policy to the standard timeless perspective
policy in Woodford (1999).
Here we concentrate on the optimal long-run in￿ ation rates entailed by these alternative
commitment policies. We consider the forward-looking canonical New Keynesian economy
and its alterations due to backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by a fraction of price
setters, speci￿ed either ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) or ￿ la Steinsson (2003). In so doing,
we consider the empirically realistic case of an economy where the deterministic steady62
state is ine¢ cient as the distortions due to monopolistic competition are not o⁄set by
subsidies to production.
4.1.1. The Policy Problem
Before analysing the optimal long-run in￿ ation rates under the di⁄erent commitment
policies, we present the problem faced by the central bank. Following the theoretical
literature on optimal monetary policy, we assume that the central bank￿ s policy instrument
is the short-term nominal interest rate. The combination of cashless economy, which entails
that there are no costs associated with varying the nominal interest rate, and central￿ s
bank control of the nominal interest rate implies that the intertemporal expectational IS
relation imposes no real constraint on the central bank. Given the central bank￿ s optimal
choices for in￿ ation and output gap, the expectational IS equation simply determines the
path of nominal interest rate necessary to achieve the optimal path for the output gap.
As a consequence, it is more convenient to treat output gap as if it were the central bank￿ s
policy instrument.
The economy is thus fully described by the aggregate-supply relation and the central
bank￿ s objective function. This model of central bank behaviour allows determining the
long-run in￿ ation rate corresponding to a given policy. In particular, as stressed by Wood-
ford (2008) "The fact that the equations are log-linearized does not mean that one simply
assumes an average in￿ation rate; the equations allow one to derive the average in￿ation
rate corresponding to a given policy".
As described in the previous chapters, both the central bank￿ s single-period loss func-
tion, Lt, and the aggregate-supply relation depend upon the details of price setting. How-
ever, regardless of the details of price setting, a central bank able to precommit faces a
constrained minimisation problem. That is, the central bank chooses a path for current and
future in￿ ation and a path for current and future output gap to minimise its objective
function subject to the aggregate-supply relation. Speci￿cally, the utility-based central
bank￿ s objective function at an arbitrary time t = 0, is here taken to be the expected63
discounted sum of central bank￿ s loss function. In other words, we drop the constant ￿￿,
which multiplies the discounted sum of central bank￿ s loss function in (3.23), as it does
not matter for the constrained minimisation problem.
The commitment policies then di⁄er as for expected value of the central bank￿ s objec-
tive function being unconditional or conditional on information available at date 0.
A central bank acting under zero-optimal or timeless perspective commitment faces
the problem of minimising the expected value of its objective function conditional on
information available at date 0, namely
(4.1) E0
1 X
t=0
￿
tLt
where E0 denotes the expectation operator conditional on information available at date 0.
The two commitment policies then di⁄er because the timeless perspective policy ignores
the conditions actually prevailing in the economy at the policy￿ s implementation date.
Conversely, a central bank acting under the alternative timeless perspective commit-
ment faces the problem of minimising the unconditional expected value of its objective
function. Denoting with E the unconditional expectation operator, the law of iterated
expectations implies that
(4.2) E
 
E0
1 X
t=0
￿
tLt
!
= (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1E(Lt)
Except for discounting, the unconditional expectation of the expected value of the central
bank￿ s objective function conditional on information available at date zero corresponds
to the unconditional expectation of the single-period central bank￿ s loss function, E(Lt).
The optimality conditions under the alternative timeless perspective policy are obtained
as done in Blake (2001). Blake (2001) describes the rule under the alternative timeless
perspective policy as being implied by the expected undiscounted minimisation problem64
conditional on information available at date zero, under which the central bank minimises
E0
1 P
t=0
Lt.
In what follows, superscripts FL, GG, and S denote respectively the purely forward-
looking New Keynesian model, the model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and
Gertler (1999), and the model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003). Su-
perscript Z0 denotes the zero-optimal commitment policy, superscript TP designates the
standard timeless perspective policy, and superscript ATP indicates the alternative time-
less perspective policy. We can now proceed to characterise each commitment policy in
terms of target criterion and optimal long-run in￿ ation rate.
4.2. Basic New Keynesian Model
A central bank acting under commitment faces the problem of choosing paths for
in￿ ation and the output gap, f￿t;xtg
1
t=0, to minimise the expected discounted sum of
central bank￿ s loss function, with the single period-loss given by (3.27), conditional on
information available at date zero subject to the constraint that the sequences must satisfy
(2.57) each period. The Lagrangian associated with this problem is of the form
(4.3) L
FL
0 = E0
1 X
t=0
￿
t
￿
1
2
￿
2
t +
￿1
2
(xt ￿ x
￿)
2 + ’t [￿t ￿ ￿￿t+1 ￿ ￿xt]
￿
where ’t is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with period t aggregate-supply relation.
Di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿t and xt, we get the optimality conditions
(4.4)
@LFL
0
@￿t
= 0 ) ￿t + ’t ￿ ’t￿1 = 0
(4.5)
@LFL
0
@xt
= 0 ) ￿1(xt ￿ x
￿) ￿ ￿’t = 0
Under zero-optimal commitment policy, there is no ful￿llment of the expectations existing
at the time of the policy implementation, that is (4.4) in period 0 holds with ’￿1 = 0.
Hence, zero-optimal commitment policy is characterised by the output gap optimality65
condition (4.5) for all t ￿ 0 and two in￿ ation optimality conditions: one for period zero
and one for all subsequent periods
(4.6) ￿t + ’t = 0 t = 0
(4.7) ￿t + ’t ￿ ’t￿1 = 0 t ￿ 1
Combining the optimality conditions (4.5) and (4.6) delivers the central bank￿ s target
criterion in period 0
(4.8) ￿0 = ￿
￿1
￿
(x0 ￿ x
￿)
whereas combining the optimality conditions (4.5) and (4.7), the central bank in any
period t ￿ 1 behaves according to the rule
(4.9) ￿t = ￿
￿1
￿
(xt ￿ xt￿1)
Woodford (2003) hence concludes "Thus it is optimal (from the point of minimizing dis-
counted losses from date zero onward) to arrange an initial in￿ation, given that the decision
to do so can have no e⁄ect upon expectations prior to date zero (if one is not bothered by
the non-time-consistency of such a principle of action). The optimal policy involves pos-
itive in￿ation in subsequent periods as well, but there should be a commitment to reduce
in￿ation to its optimal long-run value of zero asymptotically" Woodford (2003, p. 414￿5).
Despite the ine¢ ciency of the nonstochastic steady state, namely x￿ > 0, and the
existence of a positively sloped long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄, as implied by (2.60)
evaluated at steady state, there is an advantage for having positive in￿ ation only in period
0, whereas there is no long-run incentive for positive in￿ ation. This is because the increase
in output in any period caused by higher in￿ ation in the same period, ’t, is exactly o⁄set
by the cost of the reduction in output in the previous period as a result of expected higher66
in￿ ation, ’t￿1. The steady-state e¢ ciency gap thus enters (4.8), but it does not appear
in (4.9). Hence, the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate is zero.
Alternatively, the same result can be illustrated without having to rely on the optimal-
ity conditions of the minimisation problem. Integrating forward the NKPC (2.57) entails
that, regardless of policy, the expected discounted sum of future output gaps conditional
on information available at date 0 can be rewritten as a function solely in￿ ation at time
0, ￿0 = ￿E0
P1
t=0 ￿
txt. Accordingly, the central bank￿ s objective function in (4.1) can be
rewritten as
(4.10) E0
(
1 X
t=0
￿
tLt
)
= ￿1E0
(
1 X
t=0
￿
tx
￿2
)
￿
2x￿
￿
￿0 + E0
(
1 X
t=0
￿
t ￿
￿
2
t + ￿1x
2
t
￿
)
The ￿rst term is purely a function of steady-state e¢ ciency gap, x￿. The other terms are
minimised by choosing ￿t = 0 each period, which, given the NKPC, implies xt = 0 each
period, except the one that is function of the initial rate of in￿ ation ￿0. The presence
of this term implies a welfare gain from an initial positive rate of in￿ ation, but because
it only applies to in￿ ation in the initial period, it is optimal to commit to zero long-run
in￿ ation. Moreover, the linear term in ￿0 a⁄ects the zero-optimal commitment policy
for periods later than 0 as the NKPC implies an intertemporal linkage between current
in￿ ation and future in￿ ation. The welfare gain resulting from positive ￿0 can be obtained
with less increase in period 0 output gap, x0, thus resulting in less increase in ￿1x2
0, if it
is associated with an increase in expected in￿ ation at date one, E0￿1. Given that the loss
associated with E0￿1 occurs later in time, and is thus weighted less strongly, the transition
to zero-optimal in￿ ation lasts for more than one period.
Woodford (1999) argues that zero-optimal commitment policy is not attractive as it is
not time invariant. As an alternative to zero-optimal policy, Woodford (1999) puts forward
another commitment policy, which he labels timeless perspective. The policy proposal is
simple to outline. What makes the zero-optimal commitment policy not time invariant is
the separate treatment of initial period and all other periods. At time 0, the central bank67
sets in￿ ation according to the rule (4.8) and promises to follow the rule (4.9) at any later
date. Yet, if a central bank reoptimised in any later period, it would ￿nd optimal to set
in￿ ation according to (4.8), updated to that period. By ignoring the conditions existing
in the economy at the policy￿ s implementation, commitment policy is in fact timeless as it
can be thought of as a policy rule that was chosen in the distant past. The current values of
in￿ ation and output gap are the values chosen form that earlier perspective to satisfy the
two optimality conditions (4.4) and (4.5). Woodford￿ s timeless perspective commitment
policy thus ignores the start-up condition (4.6) and the central bank￿ s rule in all periods
t ￿ 0 is given by (4.9). Hence, despite the steady-state distortions and the existence of
long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄, there is never advantage from having positive in￿ ation.
More recently, it has been recognised that the use of (4.9) in all periods t ￿ 0 is not
optimal within the class of time-invariant policy rules. Speci￿cally, Blake (2001), Jensen
(2001), Jensen and McCallum (2002), and Damjanovic et al. (2008) show that there is a
slightly di⁄erent policy rule that is not only timeless but also globally optimal with respect
to the unconditional expectation of the central bank￿ s objective function. As discussed
above, the optimality conditions under this alternative timeless perspective policy can in
fact be found by considering the expected undiscounted minimisation problem conditional
on information available at date zero. That is, the Lagrangian (4.3) becomes
(4.11) L
FL
0;Undis = E0
1 X
t=0
￿
1
2
￿
2
t +
￿1
2
(xt ￿ x
￿)
2 + ’t [￿t ￿ ￿￿t+1 ￿ ￿xt]
￿
where the subscript Undis indicates that the undiscounted minimisation problem is con-
sidered. Di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿t and xt, the output gap optimality condition
(4.5) is una⁄ected but instead of the in￿ ation optimality condition (4.4) we obtain
(4.12)
@LFL
0;Undis
@￿t
= 0 ) ￿t + ’t ￿ ￿’t￿1 = 0
From a timeless perspective, the central bank sets policy according to optimality conditions
(4.5) and (4.12) in all periods t ￿ 0. Combining these optimality conditions, the central68
bank￿ s rule is given by
(4.13) ￿t = ￿
￿1
￿
(xt ￿ ￿xt￿1) +
(1 ￿ ￿)￿1
￿
x
￿
Comparing the policy rule under the alternative timeless perspective policy (4.13) with
the policy rule under the standard timeless perspective policy (4.9), we note that the alter-
native timeless perspective brings about an incentive for committing to positive in￿ ation.
Speci￿cally, evaluating (4.13) at steady state delivers
(4.14) ￿ +
(1 ￿ ￿)￿1
￿
x =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿1
￿
x
￿
Taking into account the positively sloped relationship between steady-state output gap,
x, and steady-state in￿ ation, ￿, implied by the NKPC (2.60), the alternative timeless
perspective policy entails positive steady-state in￿ ation of the form
(4.15) ￿
FLATP =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)2x
￿
Given k > 0, ￿FLATP is positive and collapses to zero in the absence of long-run Phillips
curve trade o⁄ (i.e. ￿ = 1) or in the absence of steady-state distortions (i.e. x￿ = 0).
The logic behind this result is quite intuitive. If the central bank shares the discount
factor of the private sector, the cost resulting from the anticipation of higher in￿ ation
occurs earlier in time and it is thus weighted more strongly (by a factor 1=￿ > 1) than the
bene￿t stemming from higher in￿ ation (weighted by a factor 1). However, expected future
in￿ ation enters the NKPC with a coe¢ cient ￿ that is smaller than the unitary coe¢ cient
on actual in￿ ation. Hence, as in (4.9), the increase in output in any period caused by
higher in￿ ation in the same period, ’t, is o⁄set by the cost of the reduction in output in
the previous period as a result of expected higher in￿ ation, ’t￿1. Accordingly, there is no
long-run incentive for positive in￿ ation and optimal steady-state in￿ ation is zero.
Under the alternative timeless perspective policy, the private sector￿ s discount factor
appears in the model￿ s structural equations, thus resulting in the long-run Phillips curve69
trade-o⁄. On the other hand, the central bank now equally weighs the increase in output
in any period caused by higher in￿ ation in the same period and the cost of the reduction
in output in the previous period as a result of expected higher in￿ ation. Hence, the
stimulative e⁄ect of higher in￿ ation on output is greater than the output cost of higher
in￿ ation. The long-run Phillips curve trade-o⁄ is then exploited and it is optimal for the
central bank to commit to positive steady-state in￿ ation.
The result can be interpreted as highlighting the e⁄ects of discounting on monetary
policy choices. With this respect, Henry et al. (2006) show how the result derived by
Bean (1998) depends on the central bank not discounting the future. Bean (1998) shows
that the outcomes of monetary policy, in terms of the variances of in￿ ation and output,
are very similar for a wide range of central bank￿ s preferences with respect to in￿ ation and
output stability4.Conversely, Henry et al. (2006) show that when the monetary authority
discounts the future, the outcomes of monetary policy become more sensitive to the central
bank￿ s preferences.
What we show here is that the e⁄ects of discounting on the optimal target for monetary
policy are remarkable. If the central bank shares the same discount factor of the private sec-
tor, there is no long-run incentive for positive in￿ ation and optimal steady-state in￿ ation
is zero. Conversely, if the central bank does not discount the future, positive steady-state
in￿ ation emerges under commitment even in the purely forward-looking model.
4.3. Rule-of-thumb Behaviour
We now proceed to compare the three alternative commitment policies when the
Phillips curve becomes hybrid due to the presence of backward-looking rule-of-thumb
price setters. We consider ￿rst the rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999)
and subsequently turn our attention to Steinsson￿ s (2003) rule-of-thumb behaviour. In
both cases, we formalise the policy problem and we characterise the three commitment
policies in terms of target criterion and optimal long-run in￿ ation rate.
4The model considered by Bean (1998) is a closed-economy monetary policy model that prescribes that
monetary policy acts with a lag. The same model is also considered in Ball (1999) and Svensson (1997).70
4.3.1. Rule-of-thumb Behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler
A central bank acting under commitment faces the problem of choosing paths for in￿ a-
tion and the output gap, f￿t;xtg
1
t=0, to minimise the expected discounted sum of central
bank￿ s loss function, with the single-period loss given by (3.26), conditional on information
available at date zero subject to the constraint that the sequences must satisfy (2.58) each
period. The Lagrangian associated with this problem is of the form
(4.16)
L
GG
0 = E0
1 X
t=0
￿
t
￿
1
2
￿
￿
2
t + ￿1(xt ￿ x
￿)
2 + ￿2(￿t ￿ ￿t￿1)
2￿
+ ’t
￿
￿t ￿ ￿f￿￿t+1 ￿ ￿b￿t￿1 ￿ ￿1xt
￿￿
Di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿t and xt, we get the optimality conditions
(4.17)
@LGG
0
@￿t
= 0 ) ￿t + ￿2(￿t ￿ ￿t￿1) ￿ ￿￿2(￿t+1 ￿ ￿t) + ’t ￿ ￿f’t￿1 ￿ ￿￿b’t+1 = 0
(4.18)
@LGG
0
@xt
= 0 ) ￿1(xt ￿ x
￿) ￿ ￿1’t = 0
Under zero-optimal commitment policy, there is no ful￿llment of the expectations existing
at the time of the policy implementation, that is (4.17) in period 0 holds with ’￿1 = 0.
Hence, zero-optimal commitment policy is characterised by the output gap optimality
condition (4.18) for all t ￿ 0 and two in￿ ation optimality conditions: one for period zero
and one for all subsequent periods
(4.19) ￿t + ￿2(￿t ￿ ￿t￿1) ￿ ￿￿2(￿t+1 ￿ ￿t) + ’t ￿ ￿￿b’t+1 = 0 t = 0
(4.20) ￿t + ￿2(￿t ￿ ￿t￿1) ￿ ￿￿2(￿t+1 ￿ ￿t) + ’t ￿ ￿f’t￿1 ￿ ￿￿b’t+1 = 0 t ￿ 171
Combining the optimality conditions (4.18) and (4.19) delivers the central bank￿ s target
criterion in period 0
(4.21) ￿0 =
1
1 + ￿2(1 + ￿)
￿
￿2￿￿1 + ￿￿2￿1 +
￿1
￿1
[￿￿bx1 ￿ x0 + (1 ￿ ￿￿b)x
￿]
￿
whereas combining the optimality conditions (4.18) and (4.20), the central bank in any
period t ￿ 1 behaves according to a rule of the form
(4.22) ￿t =
1
1 + ￿2(1 + ￿)
8
> <
> :
￿2￿t￿1 + ￿￿2￿t+1
+
￿1
￿1
￿
￿￿bxt+1 + ￿fxt￿1 ￿ xt + (1 ￿ ￿￿b ￿ ￿f)x￿￿
9
> =
> ;
Under the standard timeless perspective commitment policy, the start-up condition
(4.19) is ignored and the central bank￿ s rule in all periods t ￿ 0 is given by (4.22). Given
x￿ > 0, there is an advantage for having positive long-run in￿ ation. Indeed, evaluating
(4.22) at steady state delivers
(4.23) ￿ = ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)!
(1 ￿ !)￿￿
(x ￿ x
￿)
Note that here, and in what follows, all parameters in the hybrid Phillips curve are rewrit-
ten in terms of structural parameters (keeping ￿ implicit).
Rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) desirably implies that all price
setters behave identically once shocks are eliminated from the economy. As we have seen
in the previous chapters, Gal￿-Gertler￿ s backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour does
not alter the steady state that would obtain under forward-looking behaviour by all price
setters. Speci￿cally, the long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄ is not a⁄ected by the presence
of rule-of-thumb price setters: (2.58) evaluated at steady state results in (2.60). Using
this to eliminate x from (4.23), the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate, which equally obtains
under zero-optimal and the standard timeless perspective policy, is given by
(4.24) ￿
GGZOTP =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)!￿
(1 ￿ !)￿￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)2!
x
￿72
Given k > 0 and 0 < ￿ < 1, ￿GGZOTP is positive and collapses to zero in the absence
of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour (i.e. ! = 0), in the absence of long-run
Phillips-curve trade-o⁄ (i.e. ￿ = 1), and in the absence of steady-state distortions (i.e.
x￿ = 0).
The reason behind the optimality of positive steady-state in￿ ation is intuitive. The only
di⁄erence implied by Gal￿-Gertler￿ s rule-of-thumb behaviour, with respect to the purely
forward-looking model, is in terms of the ￿rst-order condition with respect to in￿ ation,
(4.17). Substituting for ￿f and ￿b in terms of structural parameters yields
(4.25) ￿t + ￿2(￿t ￿ ￿t￿1) ￿ ￿￿2(￿t+1 ￿ ￿t) + ’t ￿
￿
￿
’t￿1 ￿
￿!
￿
’t+1 = 0
Higher in￿ ation in any period results in output increase in the same period, ’t, and
reduction in output in both the previous period as a result of expected higher in￿ ation,
(￿=￿)’t￿1, and the subsequent period, (￿!=￿)’t+1. Recalling that ￿ = ￿+! [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)],
(4.25) evaluated at steady state delivers
(4.26) ￿ +
￿
1 ￿
￿ + ￿!
￿ + ! [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿
’ = 0
Checking the relationship between the stimulative e⁄ect of higher in￿ ation on output and
the output cost of higher in￿ ation amounts to solve the inequality
(4.27) 1 ￿
￿ + ￿!
￿ + ! [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
The solution is given by
(4.28) !(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0
Backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour results in the stimulative e⁄ect of higher in-
￿ ation on output being generally greater than the output cost of higher in￿ ation. The
stimulative e⁄ect of higher in￿ ation equals the output cost of higher in￿ ation in the absence
of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour (i.e. ! = 0) or in the absence of long-run73
Phillips curve trade o⁄ (i.e. ￿ = 1). Otherwise, there exists a long-run incentive for
positive in￿ ation. The long-run Phillips curve trade-o⁄is then exploited and it is optimal
for the central bank to commit to positive steady-state in￿ ation.
The optimality conditions under the alternative timeless perspective policy can be
found by considering the expected undiscounted minimisation problem conditional on
information available at date zero. That is, the Lagrangian (4.3) becomes
(4.29)
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1 X
t=0
￿
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2
￿
￿
2
t + ￿1(xt ￿ x
￿)
2 + ￿2(￿t ￿ ￿t￿1)
2￿
+ ’t
￿
￿t ￿ ￿f￿￿t+1 ￿ ￿b￿t￿1 ￿ ￿1xt
￿￿
Di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿t and xt, the output gap optimality condition (4.18) is
una⁄ected but instead of the in￿ ation optimality condition (4.17) we obtain
(4.30)
@LGG
0;Undis
@￿t
= 0 ) ￿t + ￿2(￿t ￿ ￿t￿1) ￿ ￿2(￿t+1 ￿ ￿t) + ’t ￿ ￿f￿’t￿1 ￿ ￿b’t+1 = 0
From a timeless perspective, the central bank sets policy according to optimality conditions
(4.18) and (4.30) in all periods t ￿ 0. Combining these optimality conditions, the central
bank￿ s target criterion is given by
(4.31)
￿t =
1
1 + 2￿2
￿
￿2￿t￿1 + ￿2￿t+1 +
￿1
￿1
￿
￿bxt+1 + ￿f￿xt￿1 ￿ xt + (1 ￿ ￿b ￿ ￿f￿)x
￿￿￿
Evaluating the central bank￿ s rule (4.31) at steady state, we obtain the same steady-
state target criterion that is implied by the alternative timeless perspective in the purely
forward-looking model, namely (4.14). This is because the terms in in￿ ation acceleration
in the in￿ ation optimality condition (4.30) do not matter at steady state. Additionally, the
di⁄erent coe¢ cient on the steady-state Lagrange multiplier, ’, simpli￿es once the output
gap optimality condition, (4.18), is taken into account5.
5The optimality condition for in￿ ation (4.30) implies that at steady state ￿ + [(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ !)￿=￿]’ = 0.
The optimality condition for output gap (4.30) implies that at steady state ￿1(x ￿ x￿) ￿ ￿1’ = 0. Given
the de￿nition of ￿1 = (1 ￿ !)￿￿=￿, it follows that combining (4.30) and (4.30) at steady state yields
(4.14).74
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, the long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄ is not af-
fected by the introduction of rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). There-
fore, the alternative timeless perspective commitment policy is robust to the introduction
of backward-looking rule-of thumb behaviour, when this is characterised as in Gal￿ and
Gertler (1999), with the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate being invariant to the degree of
rule-of-thumb behaviour, namely
(4.32) ￿
FLATP = ￿
GGATP
4.3.2. Rule-of-thumb Behaviour ￿ la Steinsson
A central bank acting under commitment faces the problem of choosing paths for in￿ a-
tion and the output gap, f￿t;xtg
1
t=0, to minimise the expected discounted sum of central
bank￿ s loss function, with the single-period loss given by (3.24), conditional on information
available at date zero subject to the constraint that the sequences must satisfy (2.53) each
period. The Lagrangian associated with this problem is of the form
(4.33) L
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> :
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2￿2
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￿1
2 (xt ￿ x￿)2 +
￿2
2 [￿t ￿ (￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿xt￿1)]
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+’t
￿
￿t ￿ ￿f￿￿t+1 ￿ ￿b￿t￿1 ￿ ￿2xt ￿ ￿3xt￿1
￿
9
> =
> ;
Di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿t and xt, we get the optimality conditions
(4.34)
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@￿t
= 0 )
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
￿t + ’t ￿ ￿f’t￿1 ￿ ￿￿b’t+1
+￿2 [￿t ￿ (￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿xt￿1)]
￿￿￿2 [￿t+1 ￿ (￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿xt)]
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
= 0
(4.35)
@LS
0
@xt
= 0 )
8
> <
> :
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￿￿￿2(1 ￿ ￿)￿ [￿t+1 ￿ (￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿xt)]
9
> =
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= 0
Under zero-optimal commitment policy, there is no ful￿llment of the expectations existing
at the time of the policy implementation, that is (4.34) in period 0 holds with ’￿1 = 0.75
Hence, zero-optimal commitment policy is characterised by the output gap optimality
condition (4.35) for all t ￿ 0 and two in￿ ation optimality conditions: one for period zero
and one for all subsequent periods
(4.36)
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> > > > <
> > > > :
￿t + ’t ￿ ￿￿b’t+1
+￿2 [￿t ￿ (￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿xt￿1)]
￿￿￿2 [￿t+1 ￿ (￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿xt)]
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
= 0 t = 0
(4.37)
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+￿2 [￿t ￿ (￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿xt￿1)]
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= 0 t ￿ 1
Combining the optimality conditions (4.35) and (4.36) delivers the central bank￿ s target
criterion in period 0
￿0(1 + ￿2) = ￿2 (￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿x￿1) +
￿1
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
(x0 ￿ x
￿) (4.38)
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(1 ￿ ￿)￿
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￿’1 ￿ (
￿2
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
+ 1)’0 (4.39)
whereas combining the optimality conditions (4.35) and (4.37), the central bank in any
period t ￿ 1 behaves according to a rule of the form
(4.40) ￿t =
1
1 + ￿2
8
> <
> :
￿2 (￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿xt￿1) +
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(1￿￿)￿(xt ￿ x￿)
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￿
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> =
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It is interesting to note that, in any period, the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the
subsequent period aggregate-supply relation does not enter the target criterion. This is
because, as shown in (4.38), the coe¢ cient on the Lagrangian multiplier associated with
the subsequent period hybrid Phillips curve is constantly equal to zero.76
However, given the intertemporal nature of the output gap optimality condition (4.35),
it is cumbersome to express the central bank￿ s rule as a function of in￿ ation and output gap
only. Hence, when we analyse monetary policy in the presence of rule-of-thumb behaviour
￿ la Steinsson (2003) we consider the two optimality conditions separately. In other words,
the Lagrangian multiplier becomes an additional endogenous variable and we have three
equations for the determination of the three endogenous variables.
Under the standard timeless perspective commitment policy, the start-up condition
(4.36) is ignored and the central bank￿ s rule in all periods t ￿ 0 is given by (4.40). Given
x￿ > 0, there is an advantage for having positive long-run in￿ ation. The two optimality
conditions, (4.34) and (4.35), can be simultaneously satis￿ed only if
(4.41) ￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ !)(￿￿ ￿ 1)￿!￿
(1 ￿ !)￿￿[(1 ￿ !)￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿!￿]
x +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)!￿
￿[(1 ￿ !)￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿!￿]
x
￿
As discussed in Chapter 2, rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003) does not imply
that all price setters behave identically once shocks are eliminated from the economy.
Speci￿cally, the fact that rule-of-thumb price setters index their prices to lagged output
gap alters the long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄ that obtains in the purely forward-looking
model. Using the long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄ in (2.61) so to eliminate x from (4.41),
the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate, which equally obtains under zero-optimal and the
standard timeless perspective policy, is given by
(4.42)
￿
SZOTP =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿1! [(1 ￿ !)￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)!￿] 8
> <
> :
(1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ ￿)(￿
￿1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)2￿!￿+
[(1 ￿ !)￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿!￿][(1 ￿ !)￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)!￿]
9
> =
> ;
x
￿ = ￿x
￿
Given k > 0 and 0 < ￿ < 1, ￿SZOTP is positive and collapses to zero in the absence
of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour (i.e. ! = 0), in the absence of long-run
Phillips-curve trade-o⁄ (i.e. ￿ = 1), and in the absence of steady-state distortions (i.e.
x￿ = 0).77
The reason behind the optimality of positive in￿ ation is the same we have described
above in the case of rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). The reason for
this is quite intuitive. On the one hand, the fact that rule-of-thumb price setters index
their prices to lagged output gap under Steinsson￿ s rule-of-thumb behaviour alters the
relationship between in￿ ation and output gap implied by the optimality conditions. In
particular, the output gap enters the in￿ ation optimality condition and in￿ ation enters the
output gap optimality condition. On the other hand, the indexation to past output gap
does not a⁄ect the way in which current in￿ ation is related to the Lagrange multipliers
through the in￿ ation optimality condition. In other words, the Lagrange multipliers enter
the in￿ ation optimality condition in the same way as under rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la
Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). This can be clearly seen by comparing the in￿ ation optimality
conditions (4.17) and (4.34).
It follows that backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour, regardless of its speci￿ca-
tion, results in the stimulative e⁄ect of higher in￿ ation on output being generally greater
than the output cost of higher in￿ ation. The stimulative e⁄ect of higher in￿ ation equals
the output cost of higher in￿ ation in the absence of backward-looking rule-of-thumb be-
haviour (i.e. ! = 0) or in the absence of long-run Phillips curve trade o⁄ (i.e. ￿ = 1).
Otherwise, there exists a long-run incentive for positive in￿ ation. The long-run Phillips
curve trade-o⁄is then exploited and it is optimal for the central bank to commit to positive
steady-state in￿ ation.
The optimality conditions under the alternative timeless perspective policy can be
found by considering the expected undiscounted minimisation problem conditional on
information available at date zero. That is, the Lagrangian (4.33) becomes
(4.43) L
S
0;Undis = E0
1 X
t=0
8
> <
> :
1
2￿2
t +
￿1
2 (xt ￿ x￿)2 +
￿2
2 [￿t ￿ (￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿xt￿1)]
2
+’t
￿
￿t ￿ ￿f￿￿t+1 ￿ ￿b￿t￿1 ￿ ￿2xt ￿ ￿3xt￿1
￿
9
> =
> ;78
Di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿t and xt, both optimality conditions are a⁄ected. The
in￿ ation optimality condition is now given by
(4.44)
@LS
0;Undis
@￿t
= 0 )
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
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whereas the output gap optimality condition takes the form
(4.45)
@LS
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From a timeless perspective, the central bank sets policy according to optimality conditions
(4.44) and (4.45) in all periods t ￿ 0. Combining the ￿rst order conditions, the central
bank￿ s target criterion is given by
(4.46) ￿t =
1
1 + ￿2
8
> <
> :
￿2 (￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿xt￿1) +
￿1
(1￿￿)￿(xt ￿ x￿)
￿
￿
￿2
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￿
’t + ￿f￿’t￿1
9
> =
> ;
Given x￿ > 0, there is an advantage for having positive long-run in￿ ation. The two
optimality conditions, (4.44) and (4.45), can be simultaneously satis￿ed only if
(4.47)
￿ = ￿
￿
(1 ￿ !)￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿
2￿!
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿[(1 ￿ !)￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)!￿]
x +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ !)￿￿
￿[(1 ￿ !)￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)!￿]
x
￿
Using the long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄(2.61) to eliminate x from (4.47), the alternative
timeless perspective policy implies positive steady-state in￿ ation of the form6
(4.48) ￿
SATP =
[(1 ￿ !)￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)!￿](1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ !)￿￿ 8
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6Under ￿ = 0, ￿SBJM collapses to ￿FLBJM.79
Given k > 0 and 0 < ￿ < 1, ￿SATP is positive and collapses to zero in the absence of long-
run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄(i.e. ￿ = 1) and in the absence of steady-state distortions (i.e.
x￿ = 0). If the rule-of thumb is characterised as in Steinsson (2003), the optimal long-run
in￿ ation rate under the alternative timeless perspective commitment policy ceases to be
the same as in the purely forward-looking New Keynesian model.
4.4. Discussion
Table 1 summarises the results obtained for the optimal long-run in￿ ation rates.
Model/Policy Timeless Perspective Alternative Timeless Perspective
Purely Forward-Looking ￿FLZOTP = 0 ￿FLATP > 0
Gal￿-Gertler rule-of-thumb ￿GGZOTP > 0 ￿GGATP = ￿FLATP
Steinsson rule-of thumb ￿SZOTP > 0 ￿SATP > 0
Table 4.1. Optimal Long-run In￿ ation Rates
Zero long-run in￿ ation is the optimal target for monetary policy only in the purely
forward-looking model under the standard timeless perspective policy (or the zero-optimal
policy).
In all the other cases, it is optimal for the central bank to target a positive in￿ ation
rate. Two di⁄erent reasons emerge as to why the combination of a long-run Phillips
curve trade-o⁄and steady-state distortions results in positive in￿ ation forever, even under
commitment.
First, backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour, speci￿ed either ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999) or ￿ la Steinsson (2003), entails that the stimulative e⁄ect of higher in￿ ation on
output is generally greater than the output cost of higher in￿ ation. The stimulative e⁄ect
of higher in￿ ation equals the output cost of higher in￿ ation in the absence of backward-
looking rule-of-thumb behaviour or in the absence of a long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄.
Otherwise, there exists a long-run incentive for positive in￿ ation. The long-run Phillips80
curve trade-o⁄is then exploited and it is optimal for the central bank to commit to positive
steady-state in￿ ation.
Second, the alternative timeless perspective policy put forward by Blake (2001), Jensen
and McCallum (2002), and Damjanovic et al. (2008) is also capable of delivering optimal
positive steady-state in￿ ation. The result can be interpreted as highlighting the e⁄ects
of discounting on monetary policy choices. If the central bank shares the same discount
factor of the private sector, there is no long-run incentive for positive in￿ ation and optimal
steady-state in￿ ation is zero (i.e. ￿FLZOTP). Conversely, if the central bank does not
discount the future, positive steady-state in￿ ation emerges under commitment even in
the purely forward-looking model (i.e. ￿FLATP). In particular, the alternative timeless
perspective commitment policy is robust to the introduction of backward-looking rule-
of thumb behaviour, when this is characterised as in Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), with the
optimal long-run in￿ ation rate being invariant to the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.
In all theoretical economies, optimal steady-state in￿ ation collapses to zero in the
absence of a long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄and in the absence of steady-state distortions.
Taking together the basic message of our results is that the widespread practice in the
New Keynesian literature of restricting the attention to the case of an e¢ cient natural
level of output is not innocuous. A policy that is optimal for an economy with an e¢ cient
steady state di⁄ers from what is optimal in an economy where the subsidies that achieve
Pareto e¢ ciency are unavailable.CHAPTER 5
Quantitative Analysis and Welfare Analysis
In this chapter we begin by discussing the calibration of the models￿structural para-
meters. The models￿primitives are the average duration that an individual price is ￿xed,
namely the degree of price stickiness, ￿, and the fraction of ￿rms that reset prices in
a backward-looking manner, that is the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour, !. Available
empirical estimates of the degree of price stickiness vary greatly according to whether they
are based on macro or micro data. Similarly, available empirical estimates of the degree
of rule-of-thumb behaviour span over a large range. Hence, we consider ample ranges for
both the average duration that an individual price is ￿xed and the fraction of ￿rms that
reset prices in a backward-looking manner.
We proceed by evaluating the optimal long-run in￿ ation rates derived in Chapter 4.
All optimal long-run in￿ ation rates turn out to be small in magnitude. On the one hand,
the optimal long-run in￿ ation rates we derive are not capable of explaining the observed
in￿ ation rates. On the other hand, the policy-driven steady state is very close to the
steady state around which the models are log-linearised, which is characterised by zero
in￿ ation. It follows that, as discussed in Chapter 3, we can use ￿rst-order approximations
to evaluate welfare accurately up to second order.
We conclude by evaluating welfare under the alternative commitment policies. We ini-
tially characterise welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium to establish whether
steady-state in￿ ation is welfare enhancing with respect to a policy of zero steady-state in-
￿ ation. However, welfare analysis is typically conducted in a stochastic environment so to
quantify the welfare costs due to the stabilisation of shocks. We thus employ the dynamic
nature of the three models derived in the previous chapters. As discussed in Chapter 2,
the monetary authority, in our models, should not respond to movements in output which
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are caused by preference shocks or shocks to productive capabilities. This is because the
movements in output brought about by those shocks are e¢ cient, namely they represent
variations in the e¢ cient level of output. Following Clarida et al. (1999), we hence aug-
ment the aggregate-supply relations with an ine¢ cient shock (i.e. a cost-push shock) and
analyse the welfare costs due to the stabilisation of the cost-push shock. Similarly, if we
were to drop the assumed complete and e¢ cient ￿nancial markets we would then be able
to consider the stabilisation, and the welfare costs associated with it, of ￿nancial shocks.
In performing welfare analysis, our main objective is, as in Jensen and McCallum
(2002), to simply rank the alternative commitment policies. We present robustness analy-
sis for ample ranges of two structural parameters rather than, as in Blake (2001) and
Jensen and McCallum (2002), coe¢ cients that are functions of structural parameters..
On the basis of the deterministic equilibrium, the zero-optimal commitment policy
ranks ￿rst followed by the alternative timeless perspective policy and the standard timeless
perspective policy. Moreover, steady-state in￿ ation is found to be welfare enhancing with
respect to a policy of zero steady-state in￿ ation. The reason for this is that positive
steady-state in￿ ation, by bringing about positive output gap, allows eliminating some of
the steady-state loss due to monopolistic competition. This conclusion is only slightly
a⁄ected in the presence of rule-of-thumb behaviour. Precisely, we ￿nd that the alternative
timeless perspective policy is always superior to a policy of zero in￿ ation at all times
whereas the same it is not always true under the standard timeless perspective policy:
unrealistically high levels of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour would imply that having
positive steady-state in￿ ation, hence a positive degree of price dispersion, would only add
to the steady-state loss due to monopolistic competition.
On the basis of the stochastic equilibrium, we consider both an unconditional welfare
measure and a measure of welfare conditional on initial conditions. When considering
unconditional welfare, the alternative timeless perspective policy ranks ￿rst followed by
the standard timeless perspective policy and the zero-optimal policy. When considering83
welfare conditional on initial conditions, the zero-optimal policy ranks ￿rst followed by
the standard timeless perspective policy and the alternative timeless perspective policy.
5.1. Calibration
Before proceeding to evaluate the optimal long-run in￿ ation rates and welfare under
the alternative commitment policies, we discuss how we calibrate the model. The time unit
is a quarter. Table (5.1) presents our benchmark calibration together with a description
of the structural parameters.
The purely forward-looking model contains ￿ve structural parameters (￿, ￿, ￿, $, and
￿￿1), for which values must be speci￿ed. Allowing for rule-of-thumb behaviour, introduces
the additional parameter !. Finally, under rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003),
there is the further need to calibrate the parameter ￿.
Given that the purely forward-looking model considered here is exactly the basic neo-
Wicksellian model in Woodford (2003), it follows that it is natural to consider the bench-
mark calibration in Woodford (2003, p. 431). The calibration stems from the estimation
results in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), which presents estimates based on quarterly
data for a purely forward-looking New Keynesian model using a moment-matching ap-
proach. Consequently, (￿, ￿, $, and ￿￿1) are given by: ￿ = 0:99, ￿ = 7:88, $ = 0:47,
and ￿￿1 = 0:16. The parameter that summarises steady-state distortions, ￿y, is implied
by the de￿nition of the natural steady-state level of output, as in equation (2.51): given
￿ = 7:88, it follows that ￿y = 0:127. Accordingly, the de￿nition of the the steady-state
e¢ ciency gap, as given by equation (2.52), entails that x￿ is equal to 0:2, which, of course,
is the same value used by Woodford (2003).
In the absence of an empirical estimate for the degree of indexation to lagged output
gap, ￿, by rule-of-thumb price setters, we follow Steinsson (2003) and set it to 0:052.
Steinsson (2003) obtains this value by imposing that the coe¢ cient on xt￿1 in the purely
backward-looking Phillips curve, which as discussed above is implied in the limit when
! ! 1, is equal to the coe¢ cient on xt in the hybrid Phillips curve (2.53) when ! = 0.84
The remaining two structural parameters are in fact the key model￿ s primitives: the
average duration that an individual price is ￿xed, namely the degree of price stickiness,
￿, and the fraction of ￿rms that reset prices in a backward-looking manner, that is the
degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour, !. Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) report estimates of !
between 0:077 and 0:552, with 3 of their 6 estimates between 0:2 and 0:3. As for the
degree of price stickiness, empirically realistic values of the average price duration based
on macroeconomic data vary between 2 and 5 quarters, namely 0:5 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:8. Evidence
on price stickiness based on microeconomic data suggest a much higher frequency of price
changes than the evidence based on macro data. Available empirical estimates using
microeconomic data, as in Bils and Klenow (2004) and Golosov and Lucas (2007), suggest
in fact a lower average price duration of around 1:5 quarters, that is a value of ￿ of about
0:33.
In what follows we want to assess the robustness of our results with respect to alter-
native values for these two parameters. We thus consider 0:33 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:8 and extend the
range for the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour up to 0:7, namely 0:01 ￿ ! ￿ 0:7. This
is because ! = 0:7 implies that the hybrid Phillips curve under rule-of-thumb behaviour,
regardless of its speci￿cation, puts equal weight on future expected in￿ ation and lagged
in￿ ation.
We must stress that, once we assess the robustness of the welfare ranking in the presence
of rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters, we pick ￿ = 0:66, namely an average price
duration of 3 quarters, and ! = 0:3 as our benchmark values This is because they both sit
in the middle of the respective range of available empirical estimates. The results presented
below are una⁄ected if one were to consider di⁄erent benchmark estimates for both ￿ and
!. Speci￿cally, we have considered limiting values for ! (i.e. ! = 0:01 and ! = 0:7)
when analysing robustness with respect to ￿ and limiting values for ￿ (i.e. ￿ = 0:33 and
￿ = 0:8) when studying robustness with respect to !.85
Parameter Value Description
￿ 0:99 Subjective discount factor
￿ 7:88 Elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods
$ 0:47 Elasticity of real marginal cost with respect to own output
￿￿1 0:16 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution of aggregate expenditure
x￿ 0:2 Steady-state e¢ ciency gap
￿ 0:052 Degree of indexation to past output gap
￿ 0:33 ￿ 0:8 Degree of price stickiness
! 0 ￿ 0:7 Degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour
Table 5.1. Benchmark Calibration
5.2. Optimal Long-run in￿ ation rates
We now proceed to evaluate the positive optimal long-run in￿ ation rates. We through-
out present the annualised percentage optimal long-run in￿ ation rates.
Figure (5.1) reports the annualised percentage optimal steady-state in￿ ation which is
implied by the alternative timeless perspective policy in both the purely forward-looking
model and in the model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). Figure
(5.2) presents the annualised percentage optimal steady-state in￿ ation which is implied by
the standard timeless perspective policy in the model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la
Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). Figure (5.3) shows the annualised percentage optimal steady-state
in￿ ation which is implied by the standard timeless perspective policy in the model with
rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003). Finally, Figure (5.4) displays the annu-
alised percentage optimal steady-state in￿ ation which is implied by the alternative timeless
perspective policy in the model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003).
There are two main observations to take from Figures (5.1)-(5.4).
First, the deviation from zero in￿ ation is observed to be minimal. On the one hand, the
optimal long-run in￿ ation rates we derive are thus not capable of explaining the observed86
Figure 5.1. Purely forward-looking model and model with rule-of-thumb
behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). Annualised percentage optimal
steady-state in￿ ation implied by the alternative timeless perspective policy.
Figure 5.2. Model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999). Annualised percentage optimal steady-state in￿ ation implied by
the standard timeless perspective policy.
in￿ ation rates. In e⁄ect, in developed countries in￿ ation rates vary between 2% and 4%
per year whereas slightly higher targets are observed in developing countries. On the other
hand, the policy-driven steady state is, both in terms of in￿ ation and output gap, very close
to the steady state around which the models are log-linearised, which is characterised by
zero in￿ ation and zero output gap. It follows that we can rest assured that it is possible to
use ￿rst-order approximations to evaluate welfare accurately up to second order. Indeed,87
Figure 5.3. Model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003). An-
nualised percentage optimal steady-state in￿ ation implied by the standard
timeless perspective policy.
Figure 5.4. Model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003). An-
nualised percentage optimal steady-state in￿ ation implied by the alternative
timeless perspective policy.
as we shall see below, the di⁄erent commitment policies rank in terms of welfare in line
with the intuition.
Second, the behaviour with respect to the structural parameters is quite robust across
the di⁄erent optimal long-run in￿ ation rates. Table (5.2) presents comparative statics.
The optimal long-run in￿ ation rates are observed to be monotonically decreasing in the
structural parameters. It is only under the standard timeless perspective policy that an88
increasing degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour, regardless of its speci￿cation, is associated
with an increasing in￿ ation rate.
in￿ ation rate Monotonically Decreasing Monotonically Increasing
￿FLATP = ￿GGATP ￿, ￿, ￿, $, and ￿￿1
￿GGZOTP ￿, ￿, ￿, $, and ￿￿1 !
￿SZOTP ￿, ￿, ￿, $, ￿￿1, and ￿ !
￿SATP ￿, ￿, ￿, $, ￿￿1, ￿, and !
Table 5.2. Comparative Statics
5.3. Welfare Analysis
We evaluate the alternative commitment policies both on the basis of the deterministic
equilibrium and on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium, which stems from augmenting
the aggregate-supply with a cost push shock. In so doing, our main objective is, as in
Jensen and McCallum (2002), to simply rank the alternative commitment policies. We
present robustness analysis for ample ranges of two structural parameters rather than,
as in Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002), coe¢ cients that are functions of
structural parameters.
The natural welfare criterion is the discounted sum of utility of the representative
household, which, as shown in Chapter 3, is approximated to second-order by the dis-
counted sum of central bank￿ s single-period loss function. In other words, the welfare
criterion is given by the central bank￿ s objective function (3.23), which we report here for
convenience
(5.1) W = ￿￿
1 X
t=0
￿
tLt
The constant ￿ is given by ￿ = Y e uc(￿￿1 + $)￿=2￿. Following Erceg et al. (2000),
we express welfare as a proportion of steady-state level of output. Moreover, we present
welfare in percent terms. Expressing welfare as a proportion of steady-state level of output89
implies manipulating ￿. Dividing ￿ by Y e uc, welfare would be expressed as a proportion
of one period￿ s steady-state level of output. Applying the perpetuity formula, welfare as
a proportion of steady-state level of output implies that the constant ￿ is given by
(5.2) ￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿1 + $)￿
2￿
The level of welfare that obtains in the deterministic equilibrium, denoted with W,
takes the form
(5.3) W = ￿
￿L
(1 ￿ ￿)
= ￿
(￿￿1 + $)￿
2￿
L
where L is the steady-state loss function.
On the basis of the stochastic equilibrium, we report two measures of welfare. First,
we consider welfare conditional on information available at date zero, which is given by
W = ￿￿E0
1 X
t=0
￿
tLt
with ￿ given as in (5.2). In evaluating welfare conditional on information available at
date zero, we assume that the economy￿ s initial condition is the steady state implied by
the policy under consideration.
Second, we report average values of the central bank￿ s objective function so to abstract
from initial conditions. That is, we evaluate alternative policies by taking the uncondi-
tional expectation of the welfare criterion in (5.1). The unconditional welfare measure
is the most commonly employed in the literature. Opposite to the conditional welfare
measures, that is conditional on the initial point, the unconditional one by design ￿ inte-
grates away￿the role of the initial state. Denoting with E the unconditional expectation
operator, the law of iterated expectations then implies that welfare is proportional to the90
unconditional expectation of the single-period loss function.
(5.4) E(W) = E
 
￿￿
1 X
t=0
￿
tLt
!
= ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿1E(Lt) = ￿
(￿￿1 + $)￿
2￿
E(Lt)
Here, as in Woodford (2003, Ch. 7), the measure of variability of any random variable z
entering the single-period loss function is given by V [z] = (1 ￿ ￿)
1 P
t=0
￿
tvar(zt).
5.3.1. Welfare on the basis of the Deterministic Equilibrium
We ￿rst consider welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium. The purposes of
this exercise are twofold.
First, we want to establish the ranking of the alternative commitment policies. In-
tuitively, the zero-commitment policy should rank ￿rst followed by the two timeless per-
spective policies. The intuition follows from two observations. First, it is only under the
zero-optimal policy that we observe a transition toward the steady state whereas under
the timeless perspective policies the economy is already at steady state and remains there
forever. Second, the transition toward the steady state is always welfare-enhancing. The
presence of the linear term in the steady-state e¢ ciency gap, x￿, in the single-period cen-
tral bank￿ s loss function implies a welfare gain from rate of in￿ ation that, at least initially,
di⁄ers from the steady-state rate of in￿ ation. This welfare gain can only be achieved if
there is transition toward the steady-state rate of in￿ ation, which only happens under
zero-optimal policy.
Second, we can compare whether a positive long-run in￿ ation improves welfare relative
to a policy of zero in￿ ation at all times. In other words, we want to assess whether steady-
state in￿ ation is welfare reducing due to its e⁄ects on relative price dispersion. In the
purely forward-looking model the comparison is straightforward as the standard timeless
perspective policy implies zero steady-state in￿ ation whereas the alternative timeless per-
spective policy implies positive steady-state in￿ ation. In the models with rule-of-thumb
behaviour, the steady-state loss function can instead be seen as the sum of the loss that91
obtains in the presence of zero in￿ ation at all times and the loss attributable to positive
optimal long-run in￿ ation. Hence, in all our theoretical models, we are able to address
whether positive long-run in￿ ation improves welfare relative to a policy of zero in￿ ation
at all times.
The results we obtain are in line with the a priori beliefs. First, in all our theoretical
economies, zero-optimal commitment policy delivers the highest level of welfare on the ba-
sis of the deterministic equilibrium followed by the alternative timeless perspective policy
and the standard timeless perspective commitment.
Second, steady-state in￿ ation is welfare enhancing with respect to a policy of zero
steady-state in￿ ation. A positive but small level of in￿ ation, which generates positive
steady-state price dispersion, is thus preferable to a policy of zero in￿ ation at all times,
which implies zero steady-state price dispersion. The reason for this is that positive
steady-state in￿ ation, by bringing about positive output gap, allows eliminating some of
the steady-state loss due to monopolistic competition. This conclusion is only slightly
a⁄ected in the presence of rule-of-thumb behaviour. Precisely, we ￿nd that the alterna-
tive timeless perspective policy is always superior to a policy of zero in￿ ation at all times
whereas the same is not always true under the standard timeless perspective policy. In
other words, under the alternative timeless perspective policy a small but positive level of
in￿ ation, which brings about a positive level of price dispersion, invariably allows elimi-
nating some of the steady-state loss due to monopolistic competition. Conversely, under
the standard timeless perspective policy, unrealistically high levels of the degree of rule-of-
thumb behaviour would imply that having positive steady-state in￿ ation, hence a positive
degree of price dispersion, would only add to the steady-state loss due to monopolistic
competition.
5.3.1.1. Basic New Keynesian Model. Woodford (2003, Ch. 6) shows that under
the zero-optimal commitment policy there exists a unique nonexplosive solution for the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the NKPC. This solution, which is consistent with the
zero-optimal commitment policy not ful￿lling the period-minus-one NKPC (i.e. ’￿1 = 092
in (4.3)), is of the form
(5.5) ’t = ￿(1 ￿ u
t+1
1 )
￿
￿
x
￿
where u1 < 1 depends on the model￿ s structural parameters, namely u1 = [￿ ￿ (￿2 ￿ 4￿)0:5]=2￿
with ￿ = 1 + ￿ + (￿2=￿). Given the optimal path for in￿ ation (i.e. (4.4)), this solution
for the multiplier implies that in￿ ation under the zero-optimal commitment policy evolves
according to
(5.6) ￿t = (1 ￿ u1)
￿
￿
u
t
1x
￿
Similarly, given the optimal path for output gap (i.e. (4.5), output gap under the zero-
optimal commitment policy evolves according to
(5.7) xt = u
t+1
1 x
￿
The single-period loss function, (3.27), can thus be rewritten solely as a function of the
model￿ s structural parameters
(5.8) L
FLZO
t =
￿
1 + (1 ￿ u1)
2 ￿
￿2u
2t
1 + u
2(t+1)
1 ￿ 2u
t+1
1
￿
￿x
￿2
which implies that welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium under the zero-
optimal commitment policy is of the form
(5.9) W
FLZO
= ￿￿￿x
￿2E
1 X
t=0
￿
t
￿
1 + (1 ￿ u1)
2 ￿
￿2u
2t
1 + u
2(t+1)
1 ￿ 2u
t+1
1
￿
Given ￿ < 1 and u1 < 1, all the terms entering the sums to in￿nity are converging
geometric series. Hence, it is possible to eliminate the in￿nite sums, so that (5.9) becomes
(5.10)
W
FLZO
= ￿
(￿￿1 + $)
2
x
￿2￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿1 + $)
2
x
￿2
￿
1
1 ￿ ￿u2
1
￿
u
2
1 +
(1 ￿ u1)2￿
￿2
￿
￿
2u1
1 ￿ ￿u1
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Under the alternative timeless perspective policy, it is optimal to have positive steady-
state in￿ ation. Given the long-run trade-o⁄implied by the NKPC (i.e. (2.60)), combining
the steady-state loss function, L
FL
= ￿2 + ￿(x ￿ x￿)2, with the optimal positive long-run
in￿ ation rate (i.e. (4.15)), yields
(5.11) L
FLATP
=
1
[1 + (1 ￿ ￿)2(￿￿)￿1]
￿x
￿2
which implies that welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium under the alter-
native timeless perspective policy is of the form
(5.12) W
FLATP
= ￿
(￿￿1 + $)
2[1 + (1 ￿ ￿)2(￿￿)￿1]
x
￿2
Under the standard timeless perspective commitment policy, it is optimal to have zero
in￿ ation. The steady-state loss function takes the form
(5.13) L
FLTP
= ￿x
￿2
which implies that welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium under the standard
timeless perspective is invariant to the degree of price stickiness, that is
(5.14) W
FLTP
= ￿
(￿￿1 + $)
2
x
￿2
Welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium under the alternative timeless
perspective policy is thus seen to be always better than the one under the standard timeless
perspective policy, namely
(5.15)
W
FLATP
W
FLTP =
1
[1 + (1 ￿ ￿)2(￿￿)￿1]
< 1
In other words, steady-state in￿ ation is welfare enhancing with respect to a policy
of zero steady-state in￿ ation. A positive but small level of in￿ ation, which generates94
positive steady-state price dispersion, is thus preferable to a policy of zero in￿ ation at all
times, which implies zero steady-state price dispersion. The reason for this is that positive
steady-state in￿ ation, by bringing about positive output gap, allows eliminating some of
the steady-state loss due to monopolistic competition.
Figure (5.5) plots W
FLZO
, W
FLTP
, and W
FLATP
for alternative values of the degree
of price stickiness, 0:33 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:8, with W
FLTP
not depending on ￿. Zero-optimal
commitment policy delivers the highest level of welfare given that, as discussed above, the
transition to the steady state is always welfare-enhancing. Welfare on the basis of the
deterministic equilibrium under both zero-optimal commitment policy and the alternative
timeless perspective commitment policy is monotically increasing in the degree of price
stickiness. This is consistent with the results presented in Blake (2001) and Jensen and
McCallum (2002), which show that a greater weight on output ￿ uctuations is welfare-
worsening. In the present framework, the output gap coe¢ cient, ￿, hence the coe¢ cient on
output ￿ uctuation ￿, is monotically decreasing in the degree of price stickiness. Therefore,
a higher average price duration results in better welfare on the basis of the deterministic
equilibrium.
Figure 5.5. Purely forward-looking model. Welfare on the basis of the de-
terministic equilibrium.95
It is relevant to note that using Soderlind￿ s (1999) method, with the time horizon set
to 1000 periods1, to derive welfare under the zero-optimal policy delivers the same level of
welfare that obtains under the analytical solution, as given by (5.10), up to the seventh
decimal ￿gure, namely up to the ￿fth decimal ￿gure when, as done here, welfare levels are
expressed in percent terms.
5.3.1.2. Rule-of-thumb Behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler. We do not attempt to
analytically derive the evolution of in￿ ation and output gap under the zero-optimal com-
mitment policy, hence welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium, W
GGZO
, but
we resort to Soderlind￿ s (1999) method. In doing so, we assume that economy is at the
steady state.
Under both timeless perspective policies, the steady-state loss function, namely L
FL
=
L
GG
, can be seen as the sum of the loss that obtains in the presence of zero in￿ ation
at all times, L
FLTP
, and the loss attributable to positive optimal long-run in￿ ation ,
￿2 + ￿1x2 ￿ 2￿1x￿x. Hence, we are able to address whether positive long-run in￿ ation
improves welfare relative to a policy of zero in￿ ation at all times, which implies W
FLTP
.
As described above, the alternative timeless perspective policy is robust to the intro-
duction of backward-looking rule-of thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). It
follows that W
GGATP
= W
FLATP
, which in always better than W
FLTP
.
Under the standard timeless perspective policy, it is also optimal to have positive
steady-state in￿ ation. Given the long-run trade-o⁄ implied by the hybrid Phillips curve
(i.e. (2.60)), combining the steady-state loss function, L
GG
, with the optimal positive
long-run in￿ ation rate (i.e. (4.24)), yields
(5.16) L
GGTP
= ￿1x
￿2+￿1
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)2!
8
> <
> :
￿￿[! + ￿(! ￿ 2)]
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)2!
9
> =
> ;
[(1 ￿ !)￿￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)2!]
2 x
￿2 = ￿1x
￿2(1+￿)
1Whenever we employ Soderlind￿ s method, the time horizon is set to 1000 periods.96
which implies that welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium is of the form
(5.17) W
GGTP
= ￿
(￿￿1 + $)
2
(1 + ￿)x
￿2
The standard timeless perspective policy is hence not always superior to a policy of a
policy of zero steady-state in￿ ation. The condition that guarantees W
GGW
> W
FLW
is
easily seen to be ￿ < 0, where the sign of ￿ is determined by the term in curly brackets
in (5.16). Solving in terms of ! yields
(5.18) !
￿
(1 + ￿)￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2￿
￿ 2￿￿￿ , ! ￿
2￿￿￿
[(1 + ￿)￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)2]
If one plotted condition (5.18), holding with equality, for the full range of the degree of
price stickiness, 0:01 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:99, the values of ! that imply W
GGTP
< W
FLTP
would
be observed to be well outside the estimates of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour
reported in Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), especially when limiting the range of the degree of
price stickiness to 0:33 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:8.
The alternative timeless perspective policy is thus always superior, in terms of welfare
on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium, to a policy of zero in￿ ation at all times
whereas the same it is not always true under the standard timeless perspective policy. In
other words, under the alternative timeless perspective policy a small but positive level of
in￿ ation, which brings about a positive level of price dispersion, invariably allows elimi-
nating some of the steady-state loss due to monopolistic competition. Conversely, under
the standard timeless perspective policy, unrealistically high levels of the degree of rule-of-
thumb behaviour would imply that having positive steady-state in￿ ation, hence a positive
degree of price dispersion, would only add to the steady-state loss due to monopolistic
competition.
Figure (5.6) plots W
GGZO
, W
GGTP
, and W
GGATP
for alternative values of the degree
of price stickiness, 0:33 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:8. Given the relationship between ￿ and ￿, welfare on the
basis of the deterministic equilibrium under all commitment policies is increasing in the97
degree of price stickiness. Zero-optimal commitment policy ranks ￿rst. The alternative
timeless perspective commitment policy entails welfare on the basis of the deterministic
equilibrium that is always better than the one implied by the standard timeless perspective
policy.
Figure 5.6. Model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999). Welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium for alterna-
tive values of the degree of price stickiness.
As for the relation between welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium and the
degree of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour, Figure (5.7) plots W
GGZO
, W
GGTP
,
and W
GGATP
for 0:01 ￿ ! ￿ 0:7. The alternative timeless perspective policy implies the
same level of welfare that obtains in the purely forward-looking model, which is invariant
to the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour. Welfare on the basis of the deterministic equi-
librium under zero-optimal policy is observed to be monotonically decreasing in the degree
of rule-of-thumb behaviour. The standard timeless perspective policy instead implies that
a larger fraction of ￿rms resetting prices in a backward-looking rule-of-thumb manner is
initially welfare-enhancing, although never delivering better welfare levels than the alterna-
tive timeless perspective commitment policy, and subsequently becomes welfare-worsening.
Once again, zero-optimal policy is better than the two timeless perspective policies, with
the alternative timeless perspective policy being always superior to the standard timeless
perspective policy.98
Figure 5.7. Model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999). Welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium for alterna-
tive values of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.
5.3.1.3. Rule-of-thumb Behaviour ￿ la Steinsson. We do not attempt to analyti-
cally derive the evolution of in￿ ation and output gap under the zero-optimal commitment
policy, hence welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium, W
SZO
, but we resort
to Soderlind￿ s (1999) method. In doing so, we assume that economy is at the steady state.
Steinsson￿ s (2003) rule-of-thumb behaviour alters both the long-run trade-o⁄ between
output gap and in￿ ation and the steady-state loss function (i.e. L
S
= L
FL
+ ￿2(1 ￿
￿)2￿
2)x2) that obtain in the purely forward-looking New Keynesian model. Under both
timeless perspective policies, the steady-state loss function can again be seen as the sum of
the loss that obtains under zero in￿ ation at all times, L
FLTP
, and the loss due to positive
long-run in￿ ation, ￿2 + (￿1 + ￿2(1 ￿ ￿)2￿
2)x2 ￿ 2￿1x￿x.
Given the long-run trade-o⁄ implied by the hybrid Phillips curve (i.e. (2.61)) and the
optimal positive long-run in￿ ation rate (i.e. (4.42)), the standard timeless perspective
policy involves a steady-state loss function of the form
(5.19) L
STP
= ￿1x
￿2 + ￿x
￿2 ￿
￿ ￿ 2￿1￿ + (￿1 + ￿2(1 ￿ ￿)
2￿
2)￿
2￿
￿99
which implies that welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium is given by
(5.20) W
STP
= ￿
(￿￿1 + $)￿
2￿
L
STP
Similarly, the alternative timeless perspective policy, under which the optimal positive
long-run in￿ ation rate is given by (i.e. (4.48), entails a steady-state loss function of the
form
(5.21) L
SATP
= ￿1x
￿2 + ￿x
￿2 ￿
￿ ￿ 2￿1￿ + (￿1 + ￿2(1 ￿ ￿)
2￿
2)￿
2￿
￿
which implies that welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium is given by
(5.22) W
SATP
= ￿
(￿￿1 + $)￿
2￿
L
SATP
As under Gal￿-Gertler￿ s rule-of-thumb behaviour, we can compare welfare under positive
steady-state in￿ ation at all times vis-a-vis welfare under a policy of zero steady-state
in￿ ation at all times. The derivation of the condition that guarantees an increase in
welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium is cumbersome. However, quantitative
analysis con￿rms that the alternative timeless perspective is always superior to a policy
of zero in￿ ation at all times, whereas the same it is not always true under the standard
timeless perspective policy. Under the alternative timeless perspective policy a small
but positive level of in￿ ation, which brings about a positive level of price dispersion,
invariably allows eliminating some of the steady-state loss due to monopolistic competition.
Conversely, under the standard timeless perspective policy, unrealistically high levels of the
degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour would imply that having positive steady-state in￿ ation,
hence a positive degree of price dispersion, would only add to the steady-state loss due to
monopolistic competition.
Figure (5.8) plot respectively W
SZO
, W
STP
, and W
SATP
for alternative values of the
degree of price stickiness, 0:33 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:8. Given that the coe¢ cient on output ￿ uctu-
ation is monotically decreasing in the degree of price stickiness, welfare on the basis of100
the deterministic equilibrium under all commitment policies is increasing in the degree
of price stickiness. Zero-optimal commitment policy ranks ￿rst. The alternative timeless
perspective commitment policy is con￿rmed to entail welfare on the basis of the deter-
ministic equilibrium that is always better than the one implied by the standard timeless
perspective policy.
Figure 5.8. Model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003). Wel-
fare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium for alternative values of
the degree of price stickiness.
As for the relation between welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium and
the degree of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour, Figure (5.9) plot respectively
W
SZO
, W
STP
, and W
SATP
for 0:01 ￿ ! ￿ 0:7. Welfare on the basis of the deterministic
equilibrium under both zero-optimal policy and the alternative timeless perspective policy
is observed to be monotonically decreasing in the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour. The
standard timeless perspective policy implies that a larger fraction of ￿rms resetting prices
in a backward-looking rule-of-thumb manner is associated initially with improvements in
welfare and subsequently becomes welfare-worsening. Once again, zero-optimal policy
is better than the the two timeless perspective policies, with the alternative timeless
perspective policy being always superior to the standard timeless perspective policy.101
Figure 5.9. Model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003). Wel-
fare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium for alternative values of
the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.
5.3.2. Welfare on the basis of the Stochastic Equilibrium
Having shown how the alternative commitment policies unequivocally rank on the basis
of the deterministic equilibrium, we proceed to describe the performance of these policies
in the face of shocks. Indeed, we now evaluate policies on the basis of the stochastic
equilibrium. As discussed in Chapter 2, the monetary authority, in our models, should
not respond to movements in output which are caused by preference shocks or shocks
to productive capabilities. This is because the movements in output brought about by
those shocks are e¢ cient, namely they represent variations in the e¢ cient level of output.
Following Clarida et al. (1999), we hence augment the aggregate-supply relations with
an ine¢ cient shock (i.e. a cost-push shock) and analyse the welfare costs due to the
stabilisation of the cost-push shock. which stems from augmenting the aggregate-supply
relation with a cost-push shock. For instance, the NKPC is now given by
(5.23) ￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿xt + ￿t
where, using the terminology in Clarida et al. (1999), ￿t represents a cost-push shock,
which is assumed to be autoregressive of order one with AR parameter ￿ and innovation102
shock ￿t being i.i.d, namely ￿t = ￿￿t￿1 + ￿t
2. We calibrate the standard deviation of the
cost-push shock innovation to 0:016, which is the value estimated in Smets and Wouters
(2003) and we set the AR parameter, ￿, to 0. The same remark in Jensen and McCallum
(2002) applies here, changing the standard deviation of the mark-up shock innovation
would only scale welfare values up or down proportionately3.
Augmenting the aggregate-supply relation with a cost-push shock does not alter the
central bank￿ s target criterion, but it implies that the monetary authority should react to
movements in output which are caused by a cost-push shock while it should not react to
movements in output which are caused by any other shocks.
The experiment we undertake in order to rank the alternative commitment policies on
the basis of the stochastic equilibrium is simple to illustrate. We consider a draw of 100
cost-push shocks, which we maintain across all the theoretical cases studied4. For each
(￿;!) pair we calculate welfare as the mean value that obtains across the 100 shocks. From
this initial level of welfare we then subtract the corresponding welfare on the basis of the
deterministic equilibrium. The levels of welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium
we report thus abstract from consideration of steady-state outcomes as they do not take
into account steady-state welfare. We do so as we want to analyse welfare that is purely
due to the stabilisation of the cost-push shock.
It is important to note that Soderlind￿ s (1999) method solves for the evolution of
endogenous variables under zero-optimal commitment policy. However, it can be used
for the evolution of the endogenous variables under timeless perspective policy on the
provision that a dummy control variable is introduced into the system. That is, while
under zero-optimal policy the output gap is the control variable and the central bank￿ s only
constraint is the aggregate-supply relation, under timeless perspective policy the control
2Of course, (2.58) and (2.53) are also augmented with ￿t.
3The results we present are robust to the possibility of a positive AR parameter. Speci￿cally, we have
considered ￿ = 0:5 and ￿ = 0:8.
4The results we report are not altered when considering a larger number of shocks. Speci￿cally, we have
considered a draw of 1000 positive cost-push shocks.103
variable equals zero at all times and the central bank is constrained by the aggregate-
supply relation and the target criterion5.
We report two measures of welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium. We
consider both unconditional welfare and welfare conditional on information available at
date zero. When the criterion is unconditional welfare, the a priori beliefs suggest that the
alternative timeless perspective policy should rank ￿rst followed by the standard timeless
perspective policy and the zero-optimal policy. This is because, by construction, the alter-
native timeless-perspective commitment policy optimises the unconditional expectation of
the central bank￿ s objective function. Similarly, the standard timeless-perspective com-
mitment policy is expected to perform better than the zero-optimal policy as the latter
responds best to one particular shock. In evaluating welfare conditional on information
available at date zero, we assume that the economy￿ s initial condition is the steady state
implied by the policy under consideration. Second, we report average values of the cen-
tral bank￿ s objective function so to abstract from initial conditions. When considering
welfare conditional on information available at date zero, the a priori beliefs suggest that
the zero-commitment policy should rank ￿rst followed by the two timeless perspective
policies. This is because, as discussed in the previous chapter, the zero-optimal policy
is truly the optimal policy from a conditional perspective. Indeed, timelessness imposes
an extra condition on the optimal evolution of in￿ ation and output gap so as to obtain
continuation of policy.
The results we obtain are in line with the a priori beliefs. First, in all our theoretical
economies, zero-optimal commitment policy delivers the highest level of welfare conditional
on information available at date zero followed by the alternative timeless perspective pol-
icy and the standard timeless perspective commitment. Second, in all our theoretical
5As described above, under rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003), the target criterion is replaced
by the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to in￿ ation and output gap104
economies, the alternative timeless perspective policy delivers the highest level of uncon-
ditional welfare followed by the standard timeless perspective policy and the zero-optimal
policy.
5.3.2.1. Basic New Keynesian Model. Figure (5.10) plots unconditional welfare on
the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for alternative values of the degree of price stickiness,
0:33 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:8. Under all policies, welfare is monotonically decreasing in the degree of
price stickiness. This is contrary to the relation between welfare on the basis of the
deterministic equilibrium and degree of price stickiness, but the logic for this result is
quite intuitive. In an economy where price setting is staggered, a higher degree of price
stickiness implies a higher degree of price dispersion, which is in fact costly as it brings
about dispersion of output levels across goods6. Hence, a higher average price duration
results in larger losses associated with the stabilisation of the cost-push shock. The policies
rank according to the a priori beliefs. Zero-optimal policy ranks last. The two timeless
perspective policies imply nearly the same welfare levels, but if one plotted the di⁄erence
in welfare levels between the two policies, the alternative timeless perspective policy would
invariably deliver better welfare than the standard timeless perspective policy.
Figure (5.11) plots conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for
alternative values of the degree of price stickiness, 0:33 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:8. Under all policies,
welfare is monotonically decreasing in the degree of price stickiness. The three policies
imply nearly the same welfare levels. Yet, if one plotted the di⁄erence in welfare levels
between any pair of policies, the zero-optimal policy would invariably rank ￿rst, followed
by the standard and the alternative timeless perspective policies.
6The degree of price dispersion at time t in the purely forward-looking model is given by ￿t = ￿￿t￿1 +
￿
(1￿￿)￿2
t + O
￿￿ ￿
￿￿
1=2
￿1 ;e ￿;%
￿ ￿
￿
2￿
, which is easily seen to be increasing in ￿.105
Figure 5.10. Purely forward-looking model. Unconditional welfare on the
basis of the stochastic equilibrium.
Figure 5.11. Purely forward-looking model. Conditional welfare on the basis
of the stochastic equilibrium.
5.3.2.2. Rule-of-thumb Behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler. Figure (5.12) plots un-
conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for alternative values of the
degree of price stickiness, 0:33 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:8. Under all policies, welfare is monotonically de-
creasing in the degree of price stickiness. The ranking across the alternative commitment
policies is univocal. The alternative timeless perspective policy ranks ￿rst, followed by
the standard timeless perspective policy and the zero-optimal policy.
Figure (5.13) plots conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for
alternative values of the degree of price stickiness, 0:33 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:8. Under all policies,
welfare is monotonically decreasing in the degree of price stickiness. The three policies106
imply nearly the same welfare levels. Yet, if one plotted the di⁄erence in welfare levels
between any pair of policies, the zero-optimal policy would invariably rank ￿rst, followed
by the standard and the alternative timeless perspective policies.
Figure (5.14) plots unconditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for
alternative values of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour, 0:01 ￿ ! ￿ 0:7. Under all
policies, welfare is monotonically decreasing in the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour. A
larger fraction of ￿rms resetting prices in a backward-looking is indeed associated with
higher degree of price dispersion, hence larger losses associated with the stabilisation of
the cost-push shock7. The ranking across the alternative commitment policies is univocal.
The alternative timeless perspective policy ranks ￿rst, followed by the standard timeless
perspective policy and the zero-optimal policy.
Figure (5.15) plots conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for
alternative values of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour, 0:01 ￿ ! ￿ 0:7. Under all
policies, welfare is monotonically decreasing in the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour. The
three policies imply nearly the same welfare levels. Yet, if one plotted the di⁄erence in
welfare levels between any pair of policies, the zero-optimal policy would invariably rank
￿rst, followed by the standard and the alternative timeless perspective policies.
Note that backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour implies inferior welfare on the
basis of the stochastic equilibrium than in the purely forward-looking model. Intuitively,
backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour invariably increases the degree of price disper-
sion, which results in additional welfare losses associated with the stabilisation of the
cost-push shock.
5.3.2.3. Rule-of-thumb Behaviour ￿ la Steinsson. Figure (5.16) plots unconditional
welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for alternative values of the degree of
price stickiness, 0:33 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:8. Under all policies, welfare is monotonically decreasing in
7The degree of price dispersion at time t in the model with rule-of-thumb ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) is
given by ￿t = ￿￿t￿1 + ￿
(1￿￿)￿2
t + !
(1￿!)(1￿￿)(￿t ￿￿t￿1)2 +O
￿￿
￿
￿￿
1=2
￿1 ;e ￿;%
￿ ￿
￿
2￿
, which is easily seen to be
increasing in both ￿ and !.107
Figure 5.12. Model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999). Unconditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium
for alternative values of the degree of price stickiness.
Figure 5.13. Model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999). Conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for
alternative values of the degree of price stickiness.
the degree of price stickiness. The ranking across the alternative commitment policies is
univocal. The alternative timeless perspective policy ranks ￿rst, followed by the standard
timeless perspective policy and the zero-optimal policy.
Figure (5.17) plots conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for
alternative values of the degree of price stickiness, 0:33 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:8. Under all policies,
welfare is monotonically decreasing in the degree of price stickiness. The three policies
imply nearly the same welfare levels. Yet, if one plotted the di⁄erence in welfare levels108
Figure 5.14. Model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999). Conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for
alternative values of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.
Figure 5.15. Model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999). Conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for
alternative values of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.
between any pair of policies, the zero-optimal policy would invariably rank ￿rst, followed
by the standard and the alternative timeless perspective policies.
Figure (5.18) plots unconditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for
alternative values of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour, 0:01 ￿ ! ￿ 0:7. Under all
policies, welfare is monotonically decreasing in the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour. A
larger fraction of ￿rms resetting prices in a backward-looking is indeed associated with
higher degree of price dispersion, hence larger losses associated with the stabilisation of109
the cost-push shock8. The ranking between the alternative commitment policies is univo-
cal. The ranking across the alternative commitment policies is univocal. The alternative
timeless perspective policy ranks ￿rst, followed by the standard timeless perspective policy
and the zero-optimal policy.
Figure (5.19) plots conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for
alternative values of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour, 0:01 ￿ ! ￿ 0:7. Under all
policies, welfare is monotonically decreasing in the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour. The
three policies imply nearly the same welfare levels. Yet, if one plotted the di⁄erence in
welfare levels between any pair of policies, the zero-optimal policy would invariably rank
￿rst, followed by the standard and the alternative timeless perspective policies.
Note that backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003) implies
superior welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium than under rule-of-thumb be-
haviour ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). Intuitively, indexation to lagged output gap curbs
the degree of price dispersion, which results in smaller welfare losses associated with the
stabilisation of the cost-push shock.
Figure 5.16. Model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (1999). Un-
conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for alternative
values of the degree of price stickiness.
8The degree of price dispersion at time t in the model with rule-of-thumb ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) is
given by ￿t = ￿￿t￿1 + ￿
(1￿￿)￿2
t + !
(1￿!)(1￿￿)(￿t ￿￿t￿1)2 +O
￿￿
￿
￿￿
1=2
￿1 ;e ￿;%
￿ ￿
￿
2￿
, which is easily seen to be
increasing in both ￿ and !.110
Figure 5.17. Model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (1999).
Conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for alternative
values of the degree of price stickiness.
Figure 5.18. Model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003). Un-
conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for alternative
values of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.111
Figure 5.19. Model with rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003).
Conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for alternative
values of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.CHAPTER 6
Optimal in￿ ation rate in a Medium-Scale Macroeconomic Model
with Rule-of-thumb Price Setters
In this chapter we characterise the optimal steady-state in￿ ation rate of the Ram-
sey planner in the medium-scale macroeconomic model developed in Altig et al. (2005).
The model emphasises the importance of combining nominal as well as real rigidities in
explaining business-cycle ￿ uctuations. Speci￿cally, the model features four nominal rigidi-
ties, sticky prices, sticky wages, a transactional demand for money by households, and a
cash-in-advance constraint on the wage bill of ￿rms, and four real rigidities, investment
adjustment costs, variable capacity utilisation, habit formation, and imperfect competi-
tion in product and labour markets. We extend the model by allowing a fraction of price
setters to behave in a backward-looking rule-of-thumb manner. In other words, we extend
the analysis in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) to an economy where in￿ ation persistence
is due to rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), rather
than backward-looking price indexation.
The quali￿cation Ramsey is worthy to note. The origin of the quali￿cation traces
back to the seminal work by Ramsey (1927). The policy problem in Ramsey￿ s study takes
the form of an allocation problem, in which the policymaker can be thought of choosing
directly a feasible allocation subject to those constraints that summarise the evolution of
the economy. Studies of optimal policy in dynamic economies (e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976), Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1992)) have employed
the same approach, labelling it Ramsey-type approach. Speci￿cally, the Ramsey planner,
maximises the household￿ s utility subject to a resource constraint, to the constraints de-
scribing the equilibrium in the private sector economy, and via an explicit consideration
of all the distortions that characterise the economy. In what follows, we conform to this
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practice in the literature. We employ a Ramsey-type approach to characterise optimal
monetary policy and we use the quali￿cation Ramsey for both steady-state outcomes (i.e.
Ramsey steady state) and dynamic outcomes (i.e. Ramsey impulse response functions).
We must stress that the linear-quadratic approach, which we have employed in the ￿rst
part of this thesis, and the Ramsey-type approach rely on the same kind of intertemporal
optimisation by the policymaker. However, while in the linear-quadratic approximation
the objective of the policymaker is a quadratic approximation to the utility of the repre-
sentative household, the Ramsey planner is concerned with the maximisation of the utility
of the representative household per se.
Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest for a Ramsey-type approach in dy-
namic general equilibrium models with nominal rigidities. Khan at al. (2003) analyse
optimal monetary policy in a closed economy where the relevant distortions are imperfect
competition, staggered price setting and monetary transaction frictions. Schmitt-GrohØ
and Uribe (2004a, 2005), and Siu (2004) focus on the joint optimal determination of mon-
etary and ￿scal policy in an economy with sticky prices, imperfect competition,and money
demand. The key policy problem faced by the central bank in setting the optimal rate
of in￿ ation is the trade-o⁄ between the stabilisation of the degree of price dispersion,
which calls for zero in￿ ation, and the stabilisation of transactional frictions, which calls
for the Friedman rule, namely a de￿ ation which is consistent with a zero nominal interest
rate. These studies ￿nd that the Friedman prescription for de￿ ation governs the optimal
steady-state in￿ ation: the average level of the nominal interest rate should be su¢ ciently
low so that there should be de￿ ation on average. Speci￿cally, the level of optimal in￿ ation
varies with the degree of price stickiness: the Ramsey-optimal steady-state in￿ ation can
range from close to the Friedman rule to close, but below, price stability.
Our main goal in characterising the optimal rate of in￿ ation in the Ramsey steady
state is the investigation of whether the features that deliver optimal positive long-run
in￿ ation in the linear-quadratic framework are capable to overturn the Friedman rule. In
characterising the optimal in￿ ation rate, we in fact consider again the case of an ine¢ cient114
deterministic steady state. Nonetheless, the steady-state distortions are assumed not to be
small as in the linear-quadratic framework. Considering a model with large steady-state
distortions implies that, as we discussed in Chapter 3, to obtain a second-order accurate
measure of welfare it does not su¢ ce any longer to approximate the model￿ s equilibrium
conditions up to ￿rst order1. In this chapter, we characterise the long-run state of the
Ramsey equilibrium in an economy without uncertainty, namely the Ramsey steady state.
Given the complexity of the model, the Ramsey steady state cannot be characterised
analytically. We thus employ the algorithm in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007). The
algorithm characterises and numerically solves the Ramsey steady-state in medium-scale
macroeconomic models. Speci￿cally, it yields an exact numerical solution for the Ramsey
steady-state
We ￿nd that the results in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) generally hold. Rule-of-
thumb behaviour by price setters does not alter the sensitivity of the long-run in￿ ation
rate with respect to the degree of price stickiness. Indeed, the optimal long-run in￿ ation
is always negative and it varies between the level implied by the Friedman rule and a level
close to price stability.
We depart from the analysis in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) and consider the case
of a cashless medium-scale macroeconomic model. The motivation for this is twofold.
First, maintaining the cashless quali￿cation of the economy, we seek to establish a link
between the analysis of optimal steady-state in￿ ation carried out in the previous chapters
within a basic New Keynesian model and its counterpart in a much richer theoretical
nonlinear economy. Second, we want to study the case of large steady-state distortions
in order to assess whether dropping the assumptions of small steady-state distortions is
capable of delivering larger positive in￿ ation rates.
1Indeed, when we consider the implementation of optimal monetary policy in the next chapter we are
forced to solve the model up to second order. We use the methodology and the algorithm developed
in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004b) for second-order accuarate approximations to policy functions of
dynamic and stochastic models.115
We ￿nd that the Ramsey-optimal steady-state in￿ ation in the cashless model with rule-
of-thumb behaviour by price setters is positive. However, as found in the linear-quadratic
framework, the in￿ ation rate is still observed to be small. Moreover, the in￿ ation rate
is again observed to be monotonically decreasing in the degree of price stickiness and
monotonically increasing in the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.
We proceed to analyse the social planner allocation. The social planner decides how to
allocate the consumption and the production of goods within the economy regardless of
the details of the price and wage mechanisms and the nature of the factors￿markets and
goods￿markets. Indeed, in chapter 4 we have shown that in the linear-quadratic framework
the steady-state in￿ ation rate is directly proportional to the steady-state e¢ ciency gap,
which is the constant gap between the steady-state level of output and the e¢ cient steady-
state level of output. Solving the social planner￿ s problem allows us to derive the e¢ cient
steady-state level of output. We subsequently compute its log-di⁄erence with the Ramsey
steady-state level of output so to obtain a measure of the gap between the two steady-state
levels of output. We ￿nd that this steady-state gap is only slightly larger than in the case
of small steady-state distortions assumed in the linear quadratic framework. Speci￿cally,
while the steady-state e¢ ciency gap in the linear-quadratic framework is equal to 0:2 under
benchmark calibration, the steady-state e¢ ciency gap in the medium-scale model is found
to be in the region of 0:26 both in the model with money and in its cashless counterpart.
We ￿rst present the theoretical model. We then describe how to solve for the Ramsey
steady state and present the calibration of the model. We characterise the Ramsey steady
state in both the model with money and its cashless counterpart. Finally, we characterise
the social planner allocation.
6.1. The model
The theoretical economy is the neoclassical growth model augmented with a number
of real and nominal frictions developed in Altig et al. (2005), which is taken in its setup
from Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007). This model has been estimated econometrically and116
shown to account fairly well for business-cycle ￿ uctuations in the postwar United States.
We extend the model by allowing a fraction of price setters to behave in a backward-
looking rule-of-thumb manner, speci￿ed as in Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). The equilibrium
conditions of the model are presented in their nonlinear recursive form.
The theoretical framework emphasizes the importance of combining nominal as well
as real rigidities in explaining the propagation of macroeconomic shocks. The nominal
rigidities include price and wage stickiness ￿ la Calvo (1983) and money demands by both
households and ￿rms. On the one hand, di⁄erently from Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007),
prices are not indexed to past in￿ ation, but two types of price setters are assumed to exist.
Given Calvo-type constraints on price setting, one type of ￿rms acts rationally, the other
type sets prices according to a backward-looking rule-of-thumb. On the other hand, wages
are still assumed to be indexed to past in￿ ation. The real frictions stem from internal
habit formation in consumption, monopolistic competition in both factors￿and goods￿
markets, investment adjustment costs, and variable costs of adjusting capacity utilisation.
Aggregate ￿ uctuations are driven by three shocks: a permanent neutral technology
shock, a permanent investment-speci￿c technology shock, and temporary variations in
government spending. Altig et al. (2005) and Christiano et al. (2005) argue that the
theoretical economy for which we study optimal monetary policy is in fact capable of
explaining the observed responses of in￿ ation, real wages, nominal interest rates, money
growth, output, investment, consumption, labor productivity, and real pro￿ts to neutral
and investment-speci￿c productivity shocks and monetary shocks in the postwar United
States. The model we derive in this Chapter thus di⁄ers, relative to the small-scale New
Keynesian models employed in the ￿rst part of this thesis, for one important respect: the
ability to replicate business cycle ￿ uctuations. The medium-scale model retains all the
features of the basic New Keynesian framework, but builds on it so as to improve its
empirical ￿t. While the basic New Keynesian model has become the workhorse for the
analysis of optimal policy and welfare, the models of last generation improve on the basic
framework in the direction of better empirical realism and are thus more suitable for an117
explicit consideration of the business cycle ￿ uctuations. Indeed, in the next Chapter, we
employ the medium-scale model to study business cycle dynamics and we study the impulse
response functions to the three macroeconomic shocks driving aggregate ￿ uctuations.
6.1.1. Households and Market Structure
The economy is assumed to be populated by a large representative household with a
continuum of members that are identical as for consumption and hours worked. The
representative household seeks to maximise a discounted sum of utility with the period
utility depending on per capita consumption, ct, and per capita labour e⁄ort, ht, namely
(6.1) E0
1 X
t=0
￿
tU (ct ￿ bct￿1;ht)
where E0 is the mathematical operator that denotes expectation conditional on informa-
tion available at time 0, 0 < ￿ < 1 measures the subjective discount factor, and 0 ￿ b < 1
denotes the degree of internal habit formation in consumption. The period utility func-
tion, U, is assumed to be strictly increasing in ct, strictly decreasing in ht, and strictly
concave. Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), per capita consumption is de￿ned in terms
of a composite good made of a continuum of di⁄erentiated goods indexed by i over the
unit interval
(6.2) ct =
￿Z 1
0
c
1￿1=￿
it di
￿1=(1￿1=￿)
where cit is the consumption of good i and ￿ > 1 measures the constant elasticity of
substitution between di⁄erent varieties of consumption goods.
The household faces a decision in each period about how much to consume of each
variety of consumption goods. Denoting the nominal price of good i with Pit, the household
adjusts the share of each di⁄erentiated good in the consumption bundle so to exploit any
relative price di⁄erences. Minimising the level of total expenditure,
R 1
0 Pitcitdi, given the118
consumption aggregate in (6.2), yields the demand for each di⁄erentiated good
(6.3) cit =
￿
Pit
Pt
￿￿￿
ct
where the aggregate price level, Pt, is given by
(6.4) Pt =
￿Z 1
0
P
1￿￿
it di
￿1=(1￿￿)
This speci￿cation of the price index has by construction the property that Ptct gives the
minimum expenditure for which an amount ct of the composite consumption good can be
purchased.
The labour input used in the production of good i, hit, is correspondingly assumed to
be a composite quantity made of a continuum of di⁄erentiated labour inputs indexed by
j over the unit interval
(6.5) hit =
￿Z 1
0
h
j 1￿1=e ￿
it dj
￿1=(1￿1=e ￿)
where e ￿ > 1 measures the constant elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent varieties
of labour inputs and the aggregate labour demand, hd
t, satis￿es hd
t =
R 1
0 hitdi. Denoting
the nominal wage paid to labour of variety j with W
j
t , the ￿rm adjusts the share of
each di⁄erentiated labour service in the composite labour input so to exploit any relative
wage di⁄erences. Minimising the level of total labour cost,
R 1
0 W
j
t h
j
itdj, given the labour
aggregate in (6.5), yields the demand for each di⁄erentiated labour service
(6.6) h
j
it =
 
W
j
t
Wt
!￿e ￿
hit
where the aggregate nominal wage level, Wt, is given by
(6.7) Wt =
￿Z 1
0
W
j 1￿e ￿
t dj
￿1=(1￿e ￿)119
This speci￿cation of the wage index has by construction the property that Wthit gives the
minimum cost for which an amount hit of the composite labour input can be hired.
The labour decisions are assumed to be made by a union within the household, which
monopolistically supplies labour to the continuum of labour markets. Note that we assume
that the household supplies all types of labour. In each labour market, the union is here
regarded not to be powerful enough as to in￿ uence aggregate labour variables. Taking Wt
and hd
t as given, the union is assumed to supply enough labour in each market j, h
j
t , to
satisfy demand, namely
(6.8) h
j
t =
Z 1
0
 
W
j
t
Wt
!￿e ￿
hitdi =
 
w
j
t
wt
!￿e ￿
h
d
t
where w
j
t = W
j
t =Pt and wt = Wt=Pt denote respectively the real wage paid to labour of
variety j and the aggregate real wage level. Moreover, the aggregate labour supply, ht,
satis￿es ht =
R 1
0 h
j
tdj, which, combined with the supply of labour of type j in (6.8), implies
that aggregate labour supply and aggregate labour demand are related through
(6.9) ht = h
d
t
Z 1
0
 
w
j
t
wt
!￿e ￿
dj
The household is assumed to own physical capital, kt, which accumulates according to
(6.10) kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + it
￿
1 ￿ S
￿
it
it￿1
￿￿
where it denotes gross investment and ￿ measures the rate at which physical capital de-
preciates. The function S introduces investment adjustment costs, which are assumed to
be zero up to ￿rst order in the neighbourhood of the deterministic steady state, namely
S = S0 = 0 and S00 > 0.
As in Fisher (2006) and Altig et al. (2005), investment is subject to exogenous per-
manent investment-speci￿c shocks, which are denoted with ￿t. Permanent investment-
speci￿c shocks are shown by Fisher (2006) to account for a large share of business cycle
￿ uctuations in the United States of America in the period after World War II. Goods120
can either be consumed or transformed in investment goods. Speci￿cally, ￿
￿1
t units of
the composite consumption good yield one unit of investment good, which is accord-
ingly assumed to be a composite good made of a continuum of di⁄erentiated goods as in
(6.2). It follows that the demand for each di⁄erentiated good for investment is given by
iit = (Pit=Pt)
￿￿ ￿
￿1
t it. Denoting with ￿￿ the growth rate of ￿t in the deterministic steady
state, the percentage deviation of the gross growth rate of ￿t, ￿￿;t = ￿t=￿t￿1, from its
steady-state value, b ￿￿;t = ln
￿
￿￿;t=￿￿
￿
, is assumed to be autoregressive of order one with
AR parameter ￿￿￿ and innovation shock "￿￿;t, namely b ￿￿;t = ￿￿￿b ￿￿;t￿1 + "￿￿;t:
The household can control the intensity at which physical capital is utilised with ￿t
measuring the capacity utilisation. Using the stock of capital with intensity ￿t is assumed
to imply a cost of ￿
￿1
t a(￿t)kt units of the composite consumption good. The function
a is assumed to satisfy a(1) = 0, a0(1) > 0, and a00(1) > 0, meaning that overutilising
physical capital entails a strictly convex cost in terms of composite consumption good.
The household rents physical capital to ￿rms at the real rental rate rk
t per unit of capital,
which implies that the total real revenue that accrues to the household from the rental of
capital is rk
t￿tkt.
Demand for money by the household is rationalised by assuming that purchasing con-
sumption goods entails a proportional transaction cost that is increasing in the velocity
of money, vt, which is of the form
(6.11) vt =
ct
mh
t
Money velocity is thus based on consumption, being the ratio of consumption to real
money balances in the hands of the household, denoted by mh
t. Speci￿cally, purchasing a
unit of composite consumption good implies a cost given by ‘(vt), where the transaction
cost function satis￿es four assumptions. First, ‘(v) is non negative and twice continu-
ously di⁄erentiable, which means that money changing hands does not generate resources.
Second, there exists a positive ￿nite value of money velocity, 0 < v < 1, such that121
‘(v) = ‘0 (v) = 0. This ensures that the level of real money balances associated with v sa-
tiates the household￿ s demand for money so that the Friedman rule, namely a zero nominal
interest rate, is not connected with an in￿nite demand for money. Third, (v ￿ v)‘0 (v) > 0
for v 6= v, which guarantees that in equilibrium money velocity is never smaller than the
satiation level v. Fourth, 2‘0 (v)+v‘00 (v) > 0 for all v ￿ v, which implies that demand for
money is decreasing in the nominal interest rate.
The household can access a complete set of nominal state-contingent assets. Formally,
consumers in any period t ￿ 0 can purchase any nominal state-contingent payment in
the subsequent period, denoted by Xh
t+1. Denoting with rt;t+1 the stochastic nominal
discount factor for one period ahead payo⁄s, the cost of purchasing Xh
t+1 is thus given by
Etrt;t+1Xh
t+1. The absence of arbitrage opportunities in ￿nancial markets implies that there
exists a unique stochastic nominal discount factor and the gross riskless short-term nominal
interest rate, Rt, has a simple representation in terms of rt;t+1, namely Et [rt;t+1] = 1=Rt.
The household￿ s budget constraint expressed in real terms is then of the form
(6.12)
Etrt;t+1xh
t+1 + mh
t + ct[1 + ‘(vt)]
+￿
￿1
t (it + a(ut)kt)
=
￿t +
xh
t +mh
t￿1
￿t + rk
tutkt
+
R 1
0 w
j
t
￿
w
j
t
wt
￿￿e ￿
hd
tdj ￿ ￿t
where xh
t = Xh
t =Pt denotes the real payo⁄ of a state-contingent payment bought in the
previous period, ￿t measures the real dividends from the ownership of ￿rms, ￿t = Pt=Pt￿1 is
the gross in￿ ation rate, and ￿t indicates real lump-sum taxes. The budget constraint states
that, in any period, ￿nancial wealth carried into the subsequent period plus consumption,
either genuine or for investment purposes, cannot be worth more than the value of ￿nancial
wealth brought into the period plus after-tax non￿nancial income earned during the period.
Following Calvo (1983), in each period, the union within the household can optimally
set the nominal wage in a fraction 1 ￿ e ￿ of randomly chosen labour markets. The prob-
ability of not resetting the nominal wage in each period, 0 < e ￿ < 1, is independent of
both the time that has gone by since the last nominal wage revision and the misalignment
between the actual wage and the wage that would be optimal to charge, namely wage122
decisions in any period are independent of past wage decisions. In those e ￿ markets, the
nominal wage is postulated to be indexed to both average real wage growth, ￿z￿, and to
the previous period￿ s in￿ ation rate, according to W
j
t = W
j
t￿1 (￿z￿￿t￿1)
e ￿, where 0 ￿ e ￿ ￿ 1
measures the degree of wage indexation.
The household chooses processes for ct, xh
t+1, ht, kt+1, it, mh
t, ut, and w
j
t so to maximise
the discounted sum of utility (6.1) subject to (a) (6.9)-(6.12); (b) the wage stickiness; and
(c) a no-Ponzi-scheme condition, taking as given (a) the processes wt, rk
t, hd
t, rt;t+1, ￿t, ￿t,
and ￿t; and (b) the initial conditions xh
0, k0, and mh
￿1. Combining (6.11) with (6.12) and
denoting with ￿twt=e ￿t, ￿tqt, and ￿t the Lagrangian multipliers associated with constraints
(6.9), (6.10), and (6.12), we form the following Lagrangian
L
h = E0
1 X
t=0
￿
t
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
U (ct ￿ bct￿1;ht) + ￿twt=e ￿t
￿
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dj
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(1 ￿ ￿)kt + it
h
1 ￿ S
￿
it
it￿1
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i
+￿t
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6
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t +mh
t￿1
￿t + ￿t + +rk
tutkt + hd
t
R 1
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t
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dj ￿ ￿t
￿rt;t+1xh
t+1 ￿ mh
t ￿ ct
h
1 + ‘
￿
ct
mh
t
￿i
￿ ￿￿1 (it + a(ut)kt)
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The ￿rst-order conditions are given by
(6.13)
@Lh
@ct
= 0 ) Uc (ct ￿ bct￿1;ht)￿b￿EtUc (ct+1 ￿ bct;ht+1) = ￿t [1 + ‘(vt) + vt‘
0 (vt)]
(6.14)
@Lh
@xh
t+1
= 0 ) ￿trt;t+1 = ￿￿t+1
Pt
Pt+1
(6.15)
@Lh
@ht
= 0 ) ￿Uh (ct ￿ bct￿1;ht) =
￿twt
e ￿t
(6.16)
@Lh
@kt+1
= 0 ) ￿tqt = ￿Et￿t+1[r
k
t+1ut+1 ￿ ￿
￿1
t+1a(ut+1) + qt+1 (1 ￿ ￿)]123
(6.17)
@Lh
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￿t
=
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h
1 ￿ S
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it￿1
￿
￿
￿
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it￿1
￿
S0
￿
it
it￿1
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+￿Et￿t+1qt+1
￿
it+1
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￿2
S0
￿
it+1
it
￿
9
> =
> ;
(6.18)
@Lh
@mh
t
= 0 ) v
2
t‘
0(vt) = 1 ￿ ￿Et
￿t+1
￿t￿t+1
(6.19)
@Lh
@ut
= 0 ) r
k
t = ￿
￿1
t a
0 (ut)
@Lh
@w
j
t
= 0 ) w
j
t =
8
> <
> :
e wt if w
j
t is set optimally in t
w
j
t￿1 (￿z￿￿t￿1)
e ￿ =￿t if w
j
t cannot be reset in t
Writing Et [rt;t+1] = 1=Rt, the optimality condition for real state-contingent payments
(6.14) can be rewritten as a standard Euler equation for pricing nominal riskless assets
(6.20) ￿t = ￿RtEt￿t+1
Pt
Pt+1
= ￿RtEt
￿t+1
￿t+1
Combining this with the optimality condition for money holdings (6.18), yields
(6.21) v
2
t‘
0(vt) = 1 ￿ R
￿1
t
On the one hand, 1 ￿ R
￿1
t measures the opportunity cost of holding money, which is
clearly increasing in the nominal interest rate. On the other hand, given the assumptions
on the transaction cost function ‘, v2
t‘0(vt) is increasing in the consumption-based velocity
of money. It follows that the optimality condition for money holdings, (6.18), rewritten
in terms of Rt de￿nes a liquidity preference function, which is decreasing in the nominal
interest rate and unit elastic in consumption.
The variable e wt is the real wage in the 1 ￿ e ￿ labour markets in which the union
can optimally set at time t the nominal wage, accordingly denoted with f Wt. Indeed,
we assume that f Wt is identical across all the 1 ￿ e ￿ labour markets where the union is
allowed to optimally reset nominal wage. Given that the demand for labour faced by124
the union is identical across all labour markets, as given by (6.5), and because the wage
paid is postulated to be the same in all the 1 ￿ e ￿ markets, it follows that the supply of
labour, denoted with e ht = (e wt=wt)￿e ￿hd
t, is also identical across all labour markets in which
nominal wage is reset optimally in period t. Hence, the only distinction that matters is
the one between the 1 ￿ e ￿ labour markets and the remaining e ￿ markets. In any labour
market where the nominal wage is set optimally in period t, the real wage is e wt. If
in the subsequent period the union cannot reoptimise the nominal wage in that labour
market, the new real wage, denoted with e wt;1
2, is given by e wt;1 = f Wt (￿z￿￿t)
e ￿ =Pt+1 =
e wt (￿z￿￿t)
e ￿ =￿t+1. This is because we have postulated that in the e ￿ markets the nominal
wage is indexed, according to e ￿, to both average real wage growth, ￿z￿, and to the previous
period￿ s in￿ ation rate. Generally, if s periods go by without the union being allowed
to reoptimise the nominal wage in a given labour market, the real wage in that labour
market is e wt;s = f Wt
Qs
k=1 (￿z￿￿t+k￿1)
e ￿ =Pt+s = e wt
Qs
k=1
h
(￿z￿￿t+k￿1)e ￿
￿t+k
i
. It follows from the
speci￿cation of the aggregate nominal wage level in (6.7) that the aggregate real wage
level evolves according to
(6.22) w
1￿e ￿
t = (1 ￿ e ￿)(e wt)
1￿e ￿ + e ￿w
1￿e ￿
t￿1
 
(￿z￿￿t￿1)
e ￿
￿t
!1￿e ￿
The union is here assumed to set e wt, taking Wt, hd
t, and ￿t as given. To this end, it is
convenient to report the parts of the household￿ s problem that are relevant for the wage
2The ￿rst subscript refers to the period in which the union is allowed to optimally reset the nominal wage.
The second subscript indicates the number of periods that elapsed since the last optimal updating of the
nominal wage.125
setting problem, namely
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h
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1 X
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￿t+k
i1￿e ￿
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= Et
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e ￿t+s e w
￿e ￿
t
9
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where the discount factor accounts for the probability of not being able to optimally reset
the nominal wage, e ￿. The ￿rst-order condition with respect to e wt is given by
0 = Et
1 X
s=0
(e ￿￿)
s ￿t+sh
d
t+sw
e ￿
t+s
s Y
k=1
"
￿t+k
(￿z￿￿t+k￿1)
e ￿
#e ￿
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
e ￿ ￿ 1
e ￿
e wt
s Y
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￿t+k
(￿z￿￿t+k￿1)
e ￿
#￿1
| {z }
e wt;s
￿
wt+s
e ￿t+s
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
where e ￿=(e ￿￿1) is the markup of wages over marginal cost of supplying labour that would
prevail in a world of perfectly ￿ exible wages. Using the optimal supply of labour in (6.15),
the ￿rst-order condition can be rewritten as
0 = Et
1 X
s=0
(e ￿￿)
s ￿t+sh
d
t+sw
e ￿
t+s
s Y
k=1
"
￿t+k
(￿z￿￿t+k￿1)
e ￿
#e ￿ ￿
e ￿ ￿ 1
e ￿
e wt;s ￿
￿Uh (ct+s ￿ bct+s￿1;ht+s)
￿t+s
￿
The ￿rst-order condition states that, in setting e wt, the union tries to equate future expected
average marginal revenue to future expected average marginal cost of supplying labour. On
the one hand, the marginal revenue s periods after the last nominal wage reoptimisation is
simply the marked up real wage s periods after the last nominal wage reoptimisation. On
the other hand, the marginal cost of supplying labour is the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure, ￿Uh (ct+s ￿ bct+s￿1;ht+s)=￿t+s = wt+s=e ￿t+s. e ￿t thus
represents a wedge between the disutility of supplying labour and the aggregate real wage.
Hence, e ￿t can be regarded as the average markup that the union imposes in the labour126
markets. If relaxing the period-by-period budget constraint by one unit entails a ￿t increase
in utility, supplying an extra unit of labour then achieves a ￿twt=e ￿t increase in utility. The
wage-setting equation can be rewritten in recursive form, namely
(6.23) f
1
t = f
2
t
with
f
1
t =
￿
e ￿ ￿ 1
e ￿
￿
e wtEt
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6.1.2. The Government
We denote government￿ s consumption of the composite good with gt =
hR 1
0 g
1￿1=￿
it di
i1=(1￿1=￿)
.
The government faces a decision in each period about how much to consume of each va-
riety of consumption goods. The government, like the household, adjusts the share of
each di⁄erentiated good in gt so to exploit any relative price di⁄erences. Minimising the
level of total public expenditure,
R 1
0 Pitgitdi, given the consumption aggregate gt, yields
the government￿ s demand for each di⁄erentiated good, namely git = (Pit=Pt)
￿￿ gt.
Recollecting that demand for good i for consumption purposes is given by (6.3), it
follows that aggregate demand for good i, yit, is of the form yit = (Pit=Pt)
￿￿ yt, where
aggregate demand, yt =
hR 1
0 y
1￿1=￿
it di
i1=(1￿1=￿)
, adds government￿ s consumption of the
composite good to the household￿ s consumption, either genuine or for investment purposes,127
namely
(6.26) yt = ct [1 + ‘(vt)] + ￿
￿1
t [it + a(ut)kt] + gt
We postulate that along the balanced-growth path the share of government expen-
diture in total output, gt=yt, is constantly equal to sg, namely limj!1 Etgt+j=yt+j = sg.
Formally, we impose that gt = z￿
tgt where z￿
t denotes a permanent shock, which we precisely
de￿ne below, and gt represents temporary exogenous variations in government expendi-
ture. Denoting with g the level of government expenditure in the deterministic steady
state, the percentage deviation of gt from its steady-state value, b gt = ln(gt=g), is assumed
to be autoregressive of order one with AR parameter ￿g and innovation shock "g;t, namely
b gt = ￿gb gt + "g;t.
The variable m
f
t denotes demand for real money balances by ￿rms, which we rationalise
below. The monetary authority is assumed to issue enough money, with mt measuring
real money balances supply, so to satisfy demand, that is
(6.27) mt = m
f
t + m
h
t
It follows that seigniorage in real terms is of the form mt ￿ mt￿1=￿t. For simplicity, we
postulate that our theoretical economy starts with a zero level of government debt and we
further assume that government never contracts debt. This latter assumption implies that
the ￿scal authority levies real lump-sum taxes, ￿t, so to achieve a balanced government
budget in any period, namely
(6.28) gt = ￿t + mt ￿ mt￿1=￿t
6.1.3. Firms
Each di⁄erentiated good i is produced by a single ￿rm in a monopolistically competitive
environment by means of labour and physical capital. Firms are assumed to rent capital
and hire labour from centralised markets. We assume that each variety of goods has the128
linearly homogeneous production function F (kit;zthit) ￿  z￿
t, where kit denotes physical
capital services, hit denotes labour services, and zt is a permanent neutral technological
shock. For any given realisation of zt, the production function F is assumed to be concave
and strictly increasing in both capital services and labour services. The parameter   > 0
measures ￿xed costs of operating a ￿rm in each period, which entails that the production
function displays increasing returns to scale. Following Altig et al. (2005), we postulate
that ￿xed costs are subject to permanent shocks, z￿
t, and that ￿xed costs do not disappear
along the balanced-growth path, namely z￿
t=zt = ￿
￿
1￿￿
t . Denoting with ￿z the growth
rate of zt in the deterministic steady state, the percentage deviation of the gross growth
rate of zt, ￿z;t = zt=zt￿1, from its steady-state value, b ￿z;t = ln
￿
￿z;t=￿z
￿
, is assumed to
be autoregressive of order one with AR parameter ￿￿z and innovation shock "￿z;t, namely
b ￿z;t = ￿￿zb ￿z;t￿1 + "￿z;t.
On the one hand, each ￿rm expects to sell a quantity of their good in any period given
by yit. On the other hand, each ￿rm produces their own good according to the same
linearly homogeneous production function. The linear homogeneity assumption implies
that aggregate output, yt, can be expressed in terms of aggregate labour, ht, and the stock
of capital, kt =
R 1
0 kitdi, as yt = F (kt;ztht) ￿  z￿
t. Given that z￿
t is postulated to enter
the speci￿cation of gt, it follows that government expenditure and aggregate output are
cointegrated. Moreover, both factor inputs are understood to be homogeneous across all
￿rms. Every ￿rm can thus produce an additional unit of output according to the same
production technology by hiring labour at the real wage wt per unit of labour and renting
capital at the real rate rk
t per unit of capital. It follows that in any period the cost of
production of an extra unit of output is identical across all ￿rms in the economy. We
denote the common marginal cost with mcit
3.
Demand for money by ￿rms is rationalised by assuming that wages are paid before the
￿rm cashes in on the sale of goods. Speci￿cally, we postulate a cash-in-advance constraint
3Indeed, given the postulated common production function, the subscript i could be dropped. We maintain
it here and drop it once we consider market clearing.129
on wage payments of the form
(6.29) m
f
it = vwthit
where m
f
it measures the demand for real money balances by ￿rm producing good i and
v ￿ 0 denotes the fraction of wage payments that must be sustained by monetary assets.
Of course, holding money entails forgoing the riskless nominal interest rate. Recollecting
that the opportunity cost of holding money, 1 ￿ R
￿1
t , is increasing in the nominal inter-
est rate, Rt, the ￿nancial cost incurred by ￿rms is thus given by
￿
1 ￿ R
￿1
t
￿
m
f
it, namely
￿
1 ￿ R
￿1
t
￿
vwthit when m
f
it is substituted for according to (6.29) . Denoting with ￿it the
real pro￿ts that ￿rm i distributes to the shareholders, the budget constraint of ￿rm i
expressed in real terms is of the form
Etrt;t+1x
f
it+1 + m
f
it =
x
f
it + m
f
it￿1
￿t
+
￿
Pit
Pt
￿1￿￿
yt ￿ r
k
tkit (6.30)
￿wthit
￿
1 +
￿
1 ￿ R
￿1
t+s
￿
v
￿
￿ ￿it
where Etrt;t+1x
f
it+1 denotes the real cost of uniperiod state-contingent that the ￿rm carries
into the subsequent period. The budget constraint states that, in any period, ￿rm pro-
ducing good i can carry into the subsequent period ￿nancial wealth that is worth as much
as the ￿nancial wealth brought into the period plus after-dividend non￿nancial income
earned during the period. The ￿rm is understood to be committed to supply whatever
quantity buyers may wish to purchase at the posted price, namely supply of good i at
least equals aggregate demand for good i
(6.31) F (kit;zthit) ￿  z
￿
t ￿
￿
Pit
Pt
￿￿￿
yt
The ￿rm chooses processes for Pit, hit, kit, x
f
it, and m
f
it so to maximise the expected
present discounted value of pro￿ts, namely Et
P1
s=0 rt;t+sPt+s￿it+s, subject to (6.30) and
(6.31), and a no-Ponzi-scheme condition. Here, rt;t+s =
Qs
k=1 rt+k￿1;t+k for s ￿ 1 denotes
the stochastic nominal discount factor for s periods ahead payo⁄, and rt;t = 1. Indeed,130
given that rt;t+s represents both the ￿rm￿ s stochastic discount factor and the market￿ s
pricing kernel for ￿nancial assets and because the ￿rm￿ s budget constraint is linear in
assets holdings, any assets accumulation plan that satis￿es the no-Ponzi game condition
must be optimal. Postulating, without loss of generality, that the ￿rm manages their assets
so to have a nil ￿nancial position at the beginning of each period, that is x
f
it+1 + m
f
it = 0
at all dates t ￿ ￿1 and in all states, implies that the ￿rm￿ s budget constraint can be
rewritten as
(6.32) ￿it =
￿
Pit
Pt
￿1￿￿
yt ￿ r
k
tkit ￿ wthit
￿
1 +
￿
1 ￿ R
￿1
t+s
￿
v
￿
Denoting the Lagrangian multiplier associated with constraint (6.31), holding with
equality, with rt;t+sPt+smcit+s, we form the following Lagrangian
L
f = Et
1 X
s=0
rt;t+sPt+s
8
> <
> :
(Pit+s=Pt+s)
1￿￿ yt+s ￿ rk
t+skit+s ￿ wt+shit+s
￿
1 +
￿
1 ￿ R
￿1
t+s
￿
v
￿
+mcit+s
￿
F (kit+s;zt+shit+s) ￿  z￿
t+s ￿ (Pit+s=Pt+s)
￿￿ yt+s
￿
9
> =
> ;
The ￿rst-order conditions are given by
(6.33)
@Lf
@hit
= 0 ) mcitztF2 (kit;zthit) = wt
￿
1 + v
Rt ￿ 1
Rt
￿
(6.34)
@Lf
@kit
= 0 ) mcitF1 (kit;zthit) = r
k
t
@Lf
@Pit
= 0 ) Pit =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
P
f
t if Pit is set optimally in t
P b
t if Pit is set according to rule-of-thumb behaviour in t
Pit￿1 if Pit cannot be reset in t131
The ￿rst order-conditions (6.33) and (6.34) are the standard cost minimisation condi-
tions, which state that the ratio of factors￿prices is equal to the marginal rate of technical
substitution between the two factors. The postulated cash-in-advance constraint on wage
payments implies that hiring labour also entails a ￿nancial cost, which is increasing in the
nominal interest rate.
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that only a randomly chosen fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of
goods￿nominal prices are reset in each period. The probability of not resetting the price
in each period, 0 ￿ ￿ < 1, is independent of both the time that has gone by since the last
price revision and the misalignment between the actual price and the price that would be
optimal to charge, namely pricing decisions in any period are independent of past pricing
decisions.
We depart from full rationality by introducing backward-looking rule-of-thumb behav-
iour by price setters. Following Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), we assume that only a fraction
1￿! of the 1￿￿ ￿rms behave optimally (i.e. in a forward-looking manner) when setting the
price, the remaining ! fraction of ￿rms use the same backward-looking rule-of-thumb when
revising their prices. The degree of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour, 0 ￿ ! < 1,
is thus constant over time and price setters cannot switch between backward-looking and
forward-looking behaviour.
We thus need to distinguish both between the 1￿￿ goods￿markets and the remaining
￿ markets and, within the 1 ￿ ￿ goods￿markets, between the 1 ￿ ! goods￿markets and
the remaining ! markets. In any good￿ s markets where the nominal price cannot be
reoptimised in period t, ￿rms keep on charging the price posted in period t ￿ 1, Pit￿1.
In any good￿ s market where the nominal price is set optimally in period t, the nominal
forward-looking reset price is denoted with P
f
t , with the real price being given by p
f
t. In
any good￿ s market where the nominal price is set according to rule-of-thumb behaviour in
period t, the nominal backward-looking price is denoted with P b
t , with the real reset price132
being price is pb
t. Hence, the overall reset real price at time t, denoted with e pt, is given by
(6.35) e pt = (1 ￿ !)p
f
t + !p
b
t
It follows that the aggregate price level in (6.4) evolves according to
(6.36) 1 = ￿￿
￿￿1
t + (1 ￿ ￿) e p
1￿￿
t
Following Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), rule-of-thumb price setters are postulated to set
P b
t equal to the previous period overall nominal reset price, e Pt￿1, fully indexed to past
in￿ ation, namely P b
t = e Pt￿1￿t￿1. It follows that pb
t is of the form
(6.37) p
b
t = e pt￿1
￿t￿1
￿t
The price P
f
t is set so to maximise the expected present discounted value of pro￿ts,
namely
L
f
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t
= Et
1 X
s=0
￿
srt;t+sPt+s
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where the discount factor accounts for the probability of not being able to optimally reset
the nominal price, ￿. The ￿rst-order condition with respect to P
f
t is given by
0 = Et
1 X
s=0
￿
srt;t+s
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!
￿ mcit+s
#
where ￿=(￿ ￿1) is the markup of prices over marginal cost of supplying goods that would
prevail in a world of perfectly ￿ exible prices. The ￿rst order-condition states that, in
setting P
f
t , the ￿rm tries to equate future expected average marginal revenue to future
expected average marginal cost. The price-setting equation can be rewritten in recursive
form, namely
(6.38) x
1
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￿ ￿ 1
￿
x
2
t133
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where we use (6.14) to substitute ￿￿t+1Pt=￿tPt+1 for rt;t+1.
6.1.4. Market Clearing
Market clearing in the goods￿markets requires, for each good i and at all times that supply
equals demand, namely
(6.41) F
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Equivalently, in aggregate terms, we obtain
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(6.43) mctztF2 (utkt;ztht) = wt
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Rt ￿ 1
Rt
￿
4Note that we drop the subscript i.134
and
(6.44) mctF1 (kt;ztht) = r
k
t
where the production function is expressed in terms of the aggregate e⁄ective level of
capital, utkt, and (6.43) and (6.44) are the cost minimisation conditions (6.33) and (6.34)
at the aggregate level. The state variable st measures the degree of price dispersion in the
economy brought about by stickiness in the adjustment on goods￿nominal prices, namely
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The state variable st thus summarizes the resource costs stemming from ine¢ cient price
dispersion, with s￿1 given. Indeed, as shown in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007), price
dispersion is always a costly distortion in this model, namely st is bounded below by
1. Denoting with s the level of price dispersion in the deterministic steady state, we
accordingly denote with b st the percentage deviation of st from its steady-state value,
that is b st = ln(st=s). In an economy with zero in￿ ation in the nonstochastic steady
state, that is a unitary level of gross in￿ ation, b st follows, up to ￿rst order, the univariate
autoregressive process b st = ￿b st￿1. Hence, restricting the analysis to linear approximations
to the equilibrium conditions justi￿es neglecting the price dispersion only if the model
features no price dispersion in the deterministic steady state. Indeed, that is always
the case in a model log-linearised around the perfectly ￿ exible prices equilibrium, which,
trivially, implies absence of price dispersion across goods. Yet, st matters up to ￿rst order
when the deterministic steady state features movements in relative prices across goods
varieties. More importantly, even if relative prices are stable in the deterministic steady
state, price dispersion must be taken into account if one is interested in approximations
to the equilibrium conditions that are of order higher than linear.135
Market clearing in the labour markets requires, for each type of labour j and at all
times that supply equals demand, as implied by (6.8). Equivalently, in aggregate terms,
we have equation (6.9). Moreover, as discussed above, the supply of labour is identical
across all labour markets in which nominal wage is reset optimally in period t, namely
e w
e ￿
te ht = w
e ￿
thd
t. Combining this with (6.8) and (6.9), yields
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wage dispersion across di⁄erent types of labour, we obtain
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The state variable e st thus summarizes the resource costs stemming from ine¢ cient wage
dispersion, with e s￿1 given. Indeed, wage dispersion is always a costly distortion in this
model, namely e st is bounded below by 1. Denoting with e s the level of wage dispersion
in the deterministic steady state, we accordingly denote with b e st the percentage deviation
of e s from its steady-state value, namely b e st = ln
￿
e s=e s
￿
. In an economy with zero wage
dispersion in the nonstochastic steady state, b e st follows, up to ￿rst order, the univariate
autoregressive process b e st = e ￿b e st￿1. Hence, restricting the analysis to linear approximations
to the equilibrium conditions justi￿es neglecting the wage dispersion only if the model fea-
tures no wage dispersion in the deterministic steady state. Indeed, that is always the case
in a model log-linearised around the perfectly ￿ exible wages equilibrium, which, trivially,
implies absence of wage dispersion across types of labour. Yet, e st matters up to ￿rst order136
when the deterministic steady state features movements in relative wages across labour
varieties. More importantly, even if relative wages are stable in the deterministic steady
state, wage dispersion must be taken into account if one is interested in approximations
to the equilibrium conditions that are of order higher than linear.
Finally, it follows from pro￿ts at the ￿rm￿ s level, (6.32), that aggregate pro￿ts are
given by
(6.49) ￿t = yt ￿ r
k
tutkt ￿ wth
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t
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and, equations (6.29) and (6.27), imply that real money balances in equilibrium are of the
form
(6.50) mt = vwth
d
t + m
h
t
6.2. Solving the Model
Given the complexity of the theoretical economy, the long-run state of the Ramsey
equilibrium in an economy without uncertainty, that is the Ramsey steady state, can-
not be characterised analytically, but we use the algorithm used in Schmitt-GrohØ and
Uribe (2007). The algorithm numerically solves the Ramsey steady state in medium-scale
macroeconomic models. Speci￿cally, it yields an exact numerical solution for the Ramsey
steady state. The only inputs that need to be provided are the set of equilibrium condi-
tions and the steady-state level of the model￿ s variables and parameters in the competitive
equilibrium.
The solution for the Ramsey steady state is obtained in ￿ve steps. First, we need to
specify functional forms for utility, technology, the investment adjustment cost function,
the transaction cost function, and the cost of higher capacity utilisation. We use the same
functional forms in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007). Second, some variables are not sta-
tionary along the balanced-growth path as the theoretical economy displays two types of
permanent shocks. This requires rescaling those variables so that the model￿ s equilibrium137
conditions are functions of stationary variables only, which we denote with the correspond-
ing capital letters. The nonstationary variables and the respective scaling factors are the
same as in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007). Appendix C presents the functional forms
and reports the complete set of equilibrium conditions in terms of stationary variables.
Third, we need to de￿ne the competitive equilibrium. A stationary competitive equi-
librium is formally de￿ned as being a set of stationary processes Ct, Mh
t , Mt, Wt, f Wt, Yt,
Gt, ￿t, X1
t , X2
t , Tt, Kt+1, It, F 1
t , F 2
t , Qt, Rk
t, ￿t, p
f
t, pb
t, e pt, ut, vt, mct, ht, hd
t, st, e st, and ￿t
satisfying (6.10), (6.11), (6.13), (6.15)-(6.26), (6.28), (6.35)-(6.45), and (6.47)-(6.50) writ-
ten in terms of stationary variables, given I) the exogenous stochastic processes for ￿￿;t,
￿z;t, and gt, II) the policy process Rt, and III) initial conditions c￿1, w￿1, s￿1, e s￿1, ￿￿1,
i￿1, and ￿0. Fourth, we need to derive the steady state of the competitive equilibrium.
In our economy, the equilibrium conditions in terms of stationary variables contain 29
equations and 29 variables, which are listed above. In addition the equilibrium conditions
feature 29 parameters: ￿1, ￿2, ￿3, ￿4, ￿1, ￿2, ￿, ￿, b, ￿, ￿, ￿, ~ ￿, ￿, ~ ￿, !, ~ ￿, ￿,  , ￿I, ￿z,
￿￿,￿￿z, ￿￿￿, ￿￿z, ￿￿￿, ￿g, ￿"g, g. In order to obtain values for the steady-state levels of
all variables and for the structural parameters, we thus need to impose 29 restrictions.
These 29 restrictions come from using the same calibration in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe
(2007), which draws on the estimation results in Altig at al. (2005). In other words, we
￿x all structural parameters and we then ￿nd the steady-state levels of all variables as a
function of the structural parameters. In particular, this entails that, apart from the equa-
tions describing the price setting, the speci￿cation of the steady state of the competitive
equilibrium is the same as the one presented in the technical appendix to Schmitt-GrohØ
and Uribe (2007) (i.e. the one that obtains when all structural parameters are known).
Fifth, we can de￿ne the Ramsey equilibrium. Speci￿cally, we assume that a t = 0 the
Ramsey planner has been operating for an in￿nite number of periods. In choosing the
optimal policy, namely fRtg
1
t=0, the Ramsey planner is assumed to sustain commitments
made in the past. In other words, we study commitment from a timeless perspective. The
Ramsey equilibrium is formally de￿ned as being a set of stationary processes Ct, Mh
t , Mt,138
Wt, f Wt, Yt, Gt, ￿t, X1
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subject to I) the competitive equilibrium conditions (6.10), (6.11), (6.13), (6.15)-(6.26),
(6.28), (6.35)-(6.45), and (6.47)-(6.50) written in terms of stationary variables, and II)
Rt ￿ 1 for t > ￿1 and given: I) the exogenous stochastic processes for ￿￿;t, ￿z;t, and
gt, II) values of the variables listed above dated t < 0 and III) values of the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the constraints listed above dated t < 0. The fact that we
consider commitment from a timeless perspective implies that the optimality conditions
associated with the Ramsey equilibrium are time-invariant. Conversely, under the stan-
dard Ramsey equilibrium de￿nition, the equilibrium conditions in the initial periods are
di⁄erent from the ones applying in later periods. Before characterising the Ramsey steady
state, we describe the calibration of the model.
6.2.1. Calibration
The time unit is a quarter. The calibration in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) draws
most parameters from Altig et al. (2005). To simplify the presentation of the calibration
we partition the parameters￿set into three groups: preferences, technology and shocks and
the market structure. A complete presentation of the calibration is shown in Table (6.1).
6.2.1.1. Preferences. The discount factor ￿ is set equal to 1:03￿1=4 so to match an
annualised real interest rate of 3 percent. Preferences are assumed to be separable in
consumption and labour and logarithmic in habit-adjusted consumption, which implies
that ￿3 = 1. ￿4 is calibrated to match a unit elasticity of labour supply in the competitive
steady state, chosen in this way ￿4 = 0:53. The parameters governing the demand for
money (￿1 and ￿2) are calibrated assuming that the steady-state share of money held by
households is 0:44 percent and that the annualized interest rate semi-elasticity of money139
demand is ￿0:81, as estimated by Altig et al. (2005). This implies that ￿1 = 0:0458 and
￿2 = 0:1257. Additionally, it also follows that the share of the wage bill subject to a cash-
in-advance constraint is 60%, that is ￿ = 0:6011. As for the degree of habit formation,
measured by the parameter b, Altig et al. (2005) estimate it to be 0:69.
6.2.1.2. Technology and Shocks. Altig et al. (2005) assume a steady-state share of
capital income equal to 36 percent (i.e. ￿ = 0:36) and 10 percent rate of depreciation of
capital per year (i.e. ￿ = 0:025 per quarter). The ￿xed cost parameter in the aggregate
production function,  , is set so that in the competitive steady state there are zero pro￿ts
(i.e.   = 0:2503). The parameter in the investment adjustment cost function, ￿, has
been estimated by Altig et al. (2005) to be equal to 2:79. The parameters in the capi-
tal utilisation cost function are calibrated assuming that in competitive steady state the
capital utilisation is full, namely u = 1. This results in ￿1 and ￿2 being respectively given
by 0:0412 and 0:06015. As for the steady-state growth rate of investment, ￿I, we follow
Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) in setting it so that in steady state adjustment costs are
nil, chosen in this way ￿I = 1:028.
The exogenous stochastic processes for the investment speci￿c and the neutral tech-
nology shocks are calibrated using results in Altig et al. (2005). That is, the parameters
of the exogenous stochastic process for the investment speci￿c shock, ￿￿;t, and the neu-
tral technology shock, ￿z;t, are respectively (￿￿;￿￿￿;￿￿￿) = (1:0042;0:0031;0:20) and
(￿z;￿￿z;￿￿z) = (1:00213;0:0007;0:89). The exogenous stochastic process for the govern-
ment spending shock is calibrated as in Ravn (2005), namely (G;￿"g;￿g) = (0:2141;0:008;0:9).
6.2.1.3. Market Structure. Following Altig at al. (2005), we set the steady-state mark-
up of wages over the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption to 5
percent, which implies a value for the elasticity of substitution between labour services, ~ ￿,
equal to 21. The steady state mark-up in product markets is assumed to be 20 percent,
which implies a value for the elasticity of substitution between goods, ￿, equal to 6.
5Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2005) experiment other functional forms for the capacity utilisation cost
function and various calibrations in a model similar to the one in this paper. They ￿nd that the results
about optimal monetary policy are not a⁄ected by these parameters.140
The average duration of wage contracts, about three quarters, has been estimated by
Altig et al. (2005) and implies a value for ~ ￿ of 0:69. In those labour markets in which
households can not set an optimal wage, the old wage is fully indexed to past in￿ ation
(~ ￿ = 1).
As in the linear-quadratic framework, we consider ample ranges for the average du-
ration that an individual price is ￿xed, namely the degree of price stickiness, ￿, and the
fraction of ￿rms that reset prices in a backward-looking manner, that is the degree of
rule-of-thumb behaviour, !. Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) report estimates of ! between 0:077
and 0:552, with 3 of their 6 estimates between 0:2 and 0:3. As for the degree of price stick-
iness, empirically realistic values of the average price duration based on macroeconomic
data vary between 2 and 5 quarters, namely 0:5 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:8. Evidence on price stickiness
based on microeconomic data suggest a much higher frequency of price changes than the
evidence based on macro data. Available empirical estimates using microeconomic data,
as in Bils and Klenow (2004) and Golosov and Lucas (2007), suggest in fact a lower av-
erage price duration of around 1:5 quarters, that is a value of ￿ of about 0:33. In what
follows we want to assess the robustness of our results with respect to alternative values
for these two parameters. We thus consider 0:33 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:8 and extend the range for the
degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour up to 0:7, namely 0:01 ￿ ! ￿ 0:7. This is because, as
discussed in Chapter 5, ! = 0:7 implies that the hybrid Phillips curve under rule-of-thumb
behaviour puts equal weight on future expected in￿ ation and lagged in￿ ation.141
Parameter Value Description
￿ 1:03￿1=4 Subjective discount factor
￿ 0:36 Share of capital in value added
  0:2503 Fixed cost parameter
￿ 0:025 Depreciation rate
￿ 6 Elasticity of substitution of di⁄erent varieties of goods
~ ￿ 21 Elasticity of substitution of labour services
￿ 0:33 ￿ 0:8 Probability of not setting a new price each period
~ ￿ 0:69 Probability of not setting a new wage each period
! 0 ￿ 0:7 Share of rule-of-thumb price setters
b 0:69 Degree of habit persistence
￿1 0:0458 Transaction cost parameter
￿2 0:1257 Transaction cost parameter
￿3 1 Preference parameter
￿4 0:5300 Preference parameter
￿ 0:6011 Share of wage bill subject to CIA constraint
￿ 2:48 Investment adjustment cost parameter
~ ￿ 1 Degree of wage indexation
￿1 0:0412 Capital utilisation cost function parameter
￿2 0:0601 Capital utilisation cost function parameter
￿￿ 1:0042 Growth rate of investment-speci￿c technology shock
￿￿￿ 0:0031 Stad. Dev. of the innovation to the investment-speci￿c tech. shock
￿￿￿ 0:20 Autoregressive parameter in the investment speci￿c tech. shock142
￿z 1:0213 Growth rate of neutral technology shock
￿￿z 0:0007 Stad. Dev. of the innovation to the neutral tech. shock
￿￿z 0:89 Autoregressive parameter in the neutral tech. shock
￿I 1:028 Steady-state growth rate of investment
g 0:2141 Steady-state value of government consumption
￿"g 0:008 Stad. Dev. of the innovation to the government spending process
￿g 0:9 Autoregressive parameter in the government spending process
Table 6.1. Benchmark Calibration
6.3. The Ramsey Steady State
In this section, we characterise the long-run state of the Ramsey equilibrium in an
economy without uncertainty, namely the Ramsey steady state. We ￿rst characterise the
Ramsey steady state in the model with money and subsequently proceed to analyse how
the Ramsey steady state is a⁄ected when demand for money by both households and ￿rms
is assumed away.
In the presence of money, we ￿nd that the results in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007)
generally hold. Figure (6.1) shows the relationship between the optimal long-run rate of
in￿ ation, which is throughout expressed in annualised percentange points, and the degree
of price stickiness. Rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters does not to alter the high
sensitivity of the long-run in￿ ation rate with respect to the degree of price stickiness. In
the absence of rule-of-thumb behaviour, the optimal rate of in￿ ation coincides with the
one presented in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007). Introducing rule-of-thumb behaviour
does not a⁄ect the shape of the relationship between the long-run rate of in￿ ation and the
degree of price stickiness. Speci￿cally, relatively low values for the degree of rule-of-thumb
behaviour imply nearly the same levels for the optimal rate of in￿ ation. If, as we do in
Figure (6.1), a relatively high value for the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour is considered,
the optimal rate of in￿ ation would be only slightly a⁄ected for values of the degree of price143
stickiness that are in line with macroeconomic evidence. However, the optimal long-run
in￿ ation is always negative and it is found to vary between the level implied by the
Friedman rule and a level close to price stability. Moreover, the relationship between the
optimal long-run rate of in￿ ation and the degree of price stickiness is still observed to be
steep for the range of ￿ values that are in line with macroeconomic evidence.
Figure 6.1. Model with money: degree of price stickiness and the Ramsey
steady-state rate of in￿ ation.
As for the relationship between the optimal long-run rate of in￿ ation and the degree of
rule-of-thumb behaviour, Figure (6.2) shows how a larger fraction of ￿rms resetting their
prices in a backward-looking manner is associated with a less negative optimal in￿ ation
rate. In particular, the relationship is observed to be nearly ￿ at for relatively low values
of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.
Finally, to complete the analysis of the Ramsey steady state in the presence of money,
we study the relationship between the long-run rate of infation and the parameters de-
termining the demand of money. Figure (6.3) displays the optimal rate of in￿ ation as a
function of the two structural parameters underpinning the demand of money by house-
holds, ￿1 and ￿2 for two alternative values of the degree of price stickiness (i.e. ￿ = 0:66144
Figure 6.2. Model with money: degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour and the
Ramsey steady-state rate of in￿ ation.
and ￿ = 0:8)6. The results we obtain are again very similar to the ones in Schmitt-GrohØ
and Uribe (2007). Considering an average duration of prices of 5 quarters (i.e. ￿ = 0:8),
the benchmark value of 0:05 for the parameter ￿1 implies that the optimal rate of in￿ a-
tion is ￿0:38 percent per year and money demand is 18 percent of annual output. If ￿1
increases by a factor of 10 to 0:5, the optimal rate of in￿ ation is ￿1 percent per year, but
the demand for money increases to 37 percent of annual output. Finally, if ￿1 increases
by a factor of more than 150 to around 8, the optimal rate of in￿ ation is close to the level
implied by the the Friedman rule. However, at this value of ￿1, the demand for money is
larger than one entire annual output. As stressed by Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007), the
sensitivity of the optimal long-run rate of in￿ ation relative to the parameter ￿1 hinges on
the importance of price stability. This is clearly shown in the ￿rst panel of Figure (6.3). If
we consider a lower degree of price stickiness (i.e. ￿ = 0:66) the optimal rate of in￿ ation
converges faster to the value called for by the Friedman rule. A similar message emerges
as one varies the other transaction cost parameter, ￿2. Considering an average duration
of prices of 5 quarters (i.e. ￿ = 0:8), the benchmark value of 0:126 for the parameter ￿2
implies that the optimal rate of in￿ ation is ￿0:4 percent per year and money demand is
6In producing Figure 3, we set the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour equal to 0:5. Considering alternative
values for the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour does not a⁄ect the results presented.145
Figure 6.3. Model with money: transaction cost parameters and the Ramsey
steady-state rate of in￿ ation.
16 percent of annual output. If ￿2 decreases by a factor of 5 to 0:025, the optimal rate of
in￿ ation is ￿0:7 percent per year, but the demand for money increases to 39 percent of
annual output. Finally, if ￿2 decreases by a factor of 10 to 0:0, the optimal rate of in￿ ation
is close to the level implied by the the Friedman rule. However, at this value of ￿2, the
demand for money is larger than one entire annual output. Moreover, the sensitivity of
the optimal long-run rate of in￿ ation relative to the parameter ￿2 again hinges on the
importance of price stability. This is clearly shown in the second panel of Figure (6.3). If
we consider a lower degree of price stickiness (i.e. ￿ = 0:66) the optimal rate of in￿ ation
converges faster to the value called for by the Friedman rule.
6.3.1. The Cashless Model
Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) go on to analyse the optimal long-run rate of in￿ ation
by taking into account the public ￿nance aspect of the optimal policy problem. They do
so by replacing the assumption of lump-sum taxes with the assumption of distortionary
income taxes. Speci￿cally, they consider the theoretical economy in Schmitt-GrohØ and
Uribe (2005) and analyse the possibility of a social planner setting jointly monetary policy146
and ￿scal policy in a Ramsey-optimal fashion. The optimal long-run in￿ ation, although
remaining always negative, is then found to be much closer to price stability. Moreover, the
high sensitivity of the long-run in￿ ation rate with respect to the degree of price stickiness
disappears thus making mild de￿ ation robust to the uncertainty about the exact degree of
price stickiness. The intutition for this resul is quite neat. The ￿scal authority can ￿nance
government￿ s consumption through seignorage or distortionary taxation. A higher rate of
in￿ ation then allows the social planner to trade revenue due to distortionary taxation for
seignorage revenue. It follows that the trade-o⁄ between price stability and the Friedman
rule is resolved in favour of price stability.
We depart from the analysis in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) and consider the
case of a cashless medium-scale macroeconomic model. The reasons for this are primarily
two. First, maintaining the cashless quali￿cation of the economy, we seek to establish a
link between the analysis of optimal monetary policy carried out in the previous chapters
within a canonical log-linearised New Keynesian model and its counterpart in a much
richer theoretical nonlinear economy. Second, we want to study the case of large steady-
state distortions in order to assess whether dropping the assumptions of small steady-state
distortions is capable of delivering larger positive in￿ ation rates.
In the model at hand money is demanded both by households for transactional reasons
and by ￿rms given the assumed cash-in-advance constraint on wage payments. Considering
the possibility of a cashless medium-scale macroeconomic model thus amounts to drop both
assumptions. The consequences on the equilibrium conditions of the model are as follow.
First, (6.11) ceases to apply. The household￿ s budget constraint expressed in real terms
is then of the form
(6.51) Etrt;t+1x
h
t+1+ct+￿
￿1
t (it + a(ut)kt) =
xh
t
￿t
+￿t+r
k
tutkt+
Z 1
0
w
j
t
 
w
j
t
wt
!￿e ￿
h
d
tdj￿￿t147
which implies that I) (6.18) ceases to apply; II) (6.14)-(6.17) are una⁄ected; III) (6.16)
becomes
(6.52)
@Lh
@ct
= 0 ) Uc (ct ￿ bct￿1;ht)￿b￿EtUc (ct+1 ￿ bct;ht+1) = ￿t [1 + ‘(vt) + vt‘
0 (vt)]
Second, the aggregate resource constraint is now given by
(6.53) yt = ct + ￿
￿1
t [it + a(ut)kt] + gt
which implies that (6.42) becomes
(6.54) F
￿
utkt;zth
d
t
￿
￿  z
￿
t =
￿
ct + gt + ￿
￿1
t [it + a(ut)kt]
￿
st
Third, the government budget constraint is now given by
(6.55) gt = ￿t
Fourth, the absence of a cash-in-advance constraint on the wage payments implies that
the cost minimisation condition with respect to labour becomes
(6.56) mctztF2 (utkt;ztht) = wt
which implies that aggregate pro￿ts are now given by
(6.57) ￿t = yt ￿ r
k
tutkt ￿ wth
d
t
The complete set of equilibrium conditions in the cashless model is then given by 26
equations, namely (6.10), (6.15)-(6.17), (6.19)-(6.25), (6.35)-(6.40), (6.44), (6.45), (6.47),
(6.48), (6.52), (6.53), (6.54), (6.55), (6.56), and (6.57). We use the same functional forms
as in the model with money. Moreover, the nonstationary variables and the respective
scaling factors are the same as in the model with money. The complete set of equilibrium148
conditions in terms of stationary variables is reported in Appendix C. On the one hand,
a stationary competitive equilibrium is a set of stationary processes Ct, Wt, f Wt, Yt, Gt,
￿t, X1
t , X2
t , Tt, Kt+1, It, F 1
t , F 2
t , Qt, Rk
t, ￿t, p
f
t, pb
t, e pt, ut, mct, ht, hd
t, st, e st, and ￿t
satisfying (6.10), (6.15)-(6.17), (6.19)-(6.25), (6.35)-(6.40), (6.44), (6.45), (6.47), (6.48),
(6.52), (6.53), (6.54), (6.55), (6.56), and (6.57) written in terms of stationary variables,
given I) exogenous stochastic processes for ￿￿;t, ￿z;t, and gt, II) the policy process Rt,
and III) initial conditions c￿1, w￿1, s￿1, e s￿1, ￿￿1, i￿1, and ￿0. The equilibrium conditions
in terms of stationary variables contain 26 equations and 26 variables, which are listed
above. In addition the equilibrium conditions feature 26 parameters: ￿1, ￿2, ￿3, ￿4, ￿,
￿, b, ￿, ￿, ￿, ~ ￿, ￿, ~ ￿, !, ~ ￿,  , ￿I, ￿z, ￿￿,￿￿z, ￿￿￿, ￿￿z, ￿￿￿, ￿G, ￿g, G. In order to
obtain values for the steady-state levels of all variables and for the structural parameters,
we thus need to impose 26 restrictions. These 26 restrictions come from using the same
calibration in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007), which is reported in Table (6.1). In other
words, as we do above for the model with money, we ￿x all structural parameters and we
then ￿nd the steady-state levels of all variables as a function of the structural parameters.
In particular, this entails that we only need to modify the speci￿cation of the steady state
of the competitive equilibrium presented in the technical appendix to Schmitt-GrohØ and
Uribe (2007) (i.e. the one that obtains when all structural parameters are known).
On the other hand, the Ramsey equilibrium is formally de￿ned as being a set of
stationary processes Ct, Wt, f Wt, Yt, Gt, ￿t, X1
t , X2
t , Tt, Kt+1, It, F 1
t , F 2
t , Qt, Rk
t, ￿t, p
f
t,
pb
t, e pt, ut, mct, ht, hd
t, st, e st, ￿t, and Rt for t ￿ 0 that maximises
E0
1 X
t=0
￿
t
(z￿
0
Qt
k=1 ￿z￿;s)(1￿￿4)(1￿￿3)
￿￿
Ct ￿ b
Ct￿1
￿z￿;t
￿1￿￿4
(1 ￿ h)
￿4
￿1￿￿3
￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿3
subject to I) (6.10), (6.15)-(6.17), (6.19)-(6.25), (6.35)-(6.40), (6.44), (6.45), (6.47), (6.48),
(6.52), (6.53), (6.54), (6.55), (6.56), and (6.57) written in terms of stationary variables,
and II) Rt ￿ 1 for t > ￿1 and given: I) the exogenous stochastic processes for ￿￿;t,149
￿z;t, and gt, II) values of the variables listed above dated t < 0 and III) values of the
Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints listed above dated t < 0.
Figure (6.4) shows the relationship between the optimal long-run rate of in￿ ation and
the degree of price stickiness. The optimal long-run in￿ ation is observed to be positive.
Speci￿cally, the optimal long-run in￿ ation is observed to spike for extremely low values
of ￿, which are empirically unrealistic. Within the range of empirically realistic values of
the degree of price stickiness, the optimal long-run in￿ ation is instead small.
Figure 6.4. Cashless model: degree of price stickiness and the Ramsey
steady-state rate of in￿ ation.
As for the relationship between the optimal long-run rate of in￿ ation and the degree of
rule-of-thumb behaviour, Figure (6.5) shows how a larger fraction of ￿rms resetting their
prices in a backward-looking manner is associated with an increasingly positive optimal
in￿ ation rate.
We thus ￿nd that the Ramsey-optimal steady-state in￿ ation in the cashless model
with rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters is positive. However, as found in the linear-
quadratic framework, the in￿ ation rate is still observed to be small. Moreover, the in￿ ation150
Figure 6.5. Cashless model: degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour and the
Ramsey steady-state rate of in￿ ation.
rate is again observed to be monotonically decreasing in the degree of price stickiness and
monotonically increasing in the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.
6.4. The Social Planner Allocation
The social planner decides how to allocate the consumption and the production of
goods within the economy regardless of the details of the price and wage mechanisms and
the nature of the factors￿markets and goods￿markets.
The purpose of this analysis is twofold. First, in chapter 4 we have shown that in the
linear-quadratic framework the steady-state in￿ ation rate is directly proportional to the
steady-state e¢ ciency gap, which is the constant gap between the steady-state level of
output and the e¢ cient steady-state level of output. Solving the social planner￿ s problem
allows us to derive the e¢ cient steady-state level of output. We subsequently compute
its log-di⁄erence with the Ramsey steady-state level of output so to obtain a measure
of the gap between the two steady-state levels of output. We ￿nd that this steady-state
gap is only slightly larger than in the case of small steady-state distortions assumed in
the linear quadratic framework. Speci￿cally, while the steady-state e¢ ciency gap in the151
linear-quadratic framework is equal to 0:2 under benchmark calibration, the steady-state
e¢ ciency gap in this model is found to be in the region of 0:26 both in the model with
money and in its cashless counterpart. Moreover, we perform sensitivity analysis in terms
of the degree of price stickiness and the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour. The steady-
state e¢ ciency gap is observed to be highly stable with respect to the degree of rule-of-
thumb behaviour and the degree of price stickiness. Indeed, the di⁄erences in the steady-
state e¢ ciency gap for varying degrees of rule-of-thumb behaviour and price stickiness are
so small that the scale of the di⁄erences may be simply due to numerical approximation
noises related to the numerical solution of the Ramsey steady-state level of output.
Within the economy developed in Altig et al. (2005) and presented above, the social
planner decides how to allocate the consumption and the production of goods within the
economy regardless of the details of the price and wage mechanisms and the nature of the
factors￿and goods￿markets. Here, we report the equations that are relevant for the social
planner problem. The social planner is constrained by the production technology
(6.58) yt = F (utkt;ztht) ￿  z
￿
t
the aggregate resource constraint
(6.59) yt = ct + gt + ￿
￿1
t [it + a(ut)kt]
and the law of motion of physical capital
(6.60) kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + it
￿
1 ￿ S
￿
it
it￿1
￿￿
Subject to these constraints, the social planner chooses processes for ct, ht, kt+1, it, and
ut so to maximise the discounted sum of utility. The Lagrangian is then given by
L
SP = E0
1 X
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￿
t
8
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The ￿rst-order conditions are given by
(6.61)
@Lh
@ct
= 0 ) Uc (ct ￿ bct￿1;ht) ￿ b￿EtUc (ct+1 ￿ bct;ht+1) = ￿t
(6.62)
@Lh
@ht
= 0 ) ￿Uh (ct ￿ bct￿1;ht) = ￿tztF2 (utkt;ztht)
(6.63)
@Lh
@kt+1
= 0 ) ￿tqt = ￿Et￿t+1[ut+1F1 (ut+1kt+1;zt+1ht+1) ￿ ￿
￿1
t+1a(ut+1) + qt+1 (1 ￿ ￿)]
(6.64)
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(6.65)
@Lh
@ut
= 0 ) ktF1 (utkt;ztht) = ￿
￿1
t a
0 (ut)kt
The complete set of equilibrium conditions is given by 8 equations, namely (6.58)-
(6.65). The solution to the social planner￿ s problem is obtained in ￿ve steps. First,
we need to specify functional forms for utility, technology, the investment adjustment
cost function, and the cost of higher capacity utilisation. We use the same functional
forms considered for the Ramsey steady state, which come from Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe
(2007). Second, some variables are not stationary along the balanced-growth path as the
economy displays two types of permanent shocks. This requires rescaling those variables so
that the model￿ s equilibrium conditions are functions of stationary variables only, which
we denote with the corresponding capital letters. The nonstationary variables and the
respective scaling factors are the same as in the Ramsey economy. Appendix D presents
the functional forms and reports the complete set of equilibrium conditions in terms of
stationary variables. The equilibrium conditions in terms of stationary variables contain 8153
equations (not counting the law of motion of the exogenous variables) and 8 variables (not
counting the exogenous variables): Ct, Yt, Kt+1, It, Qt, ￿t, ut, and ht. The equilibrium
conditions feature 11 parameters (￿3, ￿4, ￿1, ￿2, ￿, ￿, b, ￿, ￿,  , ￿I). The three exogenous
processes feature 9 parameters (￿z, ￿￿,￿￿z, ￿￿￿, ￿￿z, ￿￿￿, ￿G, ￿g, G). This means that in
order to obtain values for the e¢ cient steady-state levels of all variables and deep structural
parameters we need to impose 20 calibration restrictions, namely we have 8 equations and
28 between variables and parameters. The 20 restrictions come from imposing that all the
deep structural parameters are identical to those that obtain in the competitive steady
state of the theoretical economy, which are given Table (6.1). Given the 20 restrictions,
we can proceed to analytically derive the steady state of the social planner equilibrium.
Under the restriction ￿3 = 1, the nonstochastic steady state of the e¢ cient equilibrium
is described by
(6.66) Y =
￿
uK￿
￿1
I
￿￿ (h)
1￿￿ ￿  
(6.67) Y = C +
￿
I + a(u)Kt￿
￿1
I
￿
+ G
(6.68) I = K
￿
1 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿I
￿
(6.69) ￿4 (1 ￿ h)
￿1 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(uK￿
￿1
I )
￿(h)
￿￿
(6.70) (1 ￿ ￿4)[C(1 ￿ b=￿z￿)]
￿1 (1 ￿ b￿￿￿) = ￿154
(6.71) Q = ￿
￿￿
￿￿
2
6
4
￿￿￿(K￿
￿1
I )￿￿1(h)1￿￿
￿a(u) + Q(1 ￿ ￿)
3
7
5
(6.72) Q = 1
(6.73) ￿(uK￿
￿1
I )
￿￿1(h)
1￿￿ = ￿1
Equation (6.72) determines Q. Substituting (6.72) and (6.73) in (6.71), delivers
(6.74) 1 = ￿
￿￿
￿￿
[￿￿1 ￿ a(u) + (1 ￿ ￿)]
In the competitive steady state, the numerical value for the parameter ￿1 was chosen such
that 1 = ￿
￿￿
￿￿ [￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)]: Hence, equation (6.74) entails that u = 1: in both the steady
state of the e¢ cient equilibrium and the competitive steady state capacity utilisation is
full. On the one hand, the steady-state values for Q and u in the steady state of the
e¢ cient equilibrium are the same that obtain in the competitive steady state. On the
other hand, the steady-state values for C, Y , K, I, ￿, and h di⁄er as the social planner
is not constrained by the details of the price and wage mechanisms and the nature of the
factors￿and goods￿markets. To determine the steady-state values for C, Y , K, I, ￿, and
h we have 6 equations, namely (6.66)-(6.70) and (6.73), which under u = 1 take the form
(6.75) Y =
￿
K￿
￿1
I
￿￿ (h)
1￿￿ ￿  
(6.76) Y = C + I + G155
(6.77) I = K
￿
1 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿I
￿
(6.78) ￿4 (1 ￿ h)
￿1 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(K￿
￿1
I )
￿(h)
￿￿
(6.79) (1 ￿ ￿4)[C(1 ￿ b=￿z￿)]
￿1 (1 ￿ b￿￿￿) = ￿
(6.80) ￿(K￿
￿1
I )
￿￿1(h)
1￿￿ = ￿1
Rewriting equation (6.80), the capital to labour ratio is given by
(6.81)
K
h
=
￿￿1
￿
￿ 1
￿￿1
￿I
Accordingly, equations (6.75) and (6.78) can be rewritten as
(6.82) Y =
￿
￿1
￿￿I
￿
K ￿  
(6.83) ￿4 (1 ￿ h)
￿1 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿1
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿1
Substituting equation (6.79) in equation (6.83) and solving for C yields
(6.84) C =
(1 ￿ ￿4)(1 ￿ b￿￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿1
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿1
￿4(1 ￿ b=￿z￿)
(1 ￿ h)
Using (6.81), the steady-state consumption can be rewritten as
(6.85) C =
(1 ￿ ￿4)(1 ￿ b￿￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿1
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿1
￿4(1 ￿ b=￿z￿)
(1 ￿ K
￿￿1
￿
￿￿ 1
￿￿1
￿
￿1
I )156
Substituting equations (6.77), (6.82), and (6.85) into equation (6.76), we note that we can
now ￿nd K as a function solely of the deep structural parameters
￿
￿1
￿￿I
￿
K ￿   =
(1 ￿ ￿4)(1 ￿ b￿￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿1
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿1
￿4(1 ￿ b=￿z￿)
(1 ￿ K
￿￿1
￿
￿￿ 1
￿￿1
￿
￿1
I ) (6.86)
+K
￿
1 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿I
￿
+ G
Solving for K delivers
(6.87) K =
(1 ￿ ￿4)(1 ￿ b￿￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿1
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿1 + (G +  )￿4(1 ￿ b=￿z￿)
(1 ￿ ￿4)(1 ￿ b￿￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿1
I + ￿4(1 ￿ b=￿z￿)(￿1￿
￿1￿
￿1
I ￿ 1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿1
I )
Equation (6.87) gives the steady-state value of the level of capital in the social planner
equilibrium as a function solely of the deep structural parameters. Given K, the steady-
state values of C, Y , I, and h are respectively given by equations (6.85), (6.82), (6.77),
and (6.81). Given C, the steady-state value of ￿ is given by equation (6.79).
We proceed to compare the log-di⁄erence between the level of output in the social
planner steady state and the level of output in the Ramsey steady state. We consider
both the cashless economy and the economy with money. Figure (6.6) and Figure (6.7)
plot the steady-state output gap in the model with money for alternative values of the
degree of price stickiness and the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour. Figure (6.8) and
Figure (6.9) plot the steady-state output gap in the cashless model for alternative values
of the degree of price stickiness and the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.
There are two main points to take from these ￿gures. First, the steady-state output
gap is larger than its equivalent in the linear-quadratic framework, which is obtained under
the assumption of small steady-state distortions, although the di⁄erence between the two
is observed to be small. Speci￿cally, the steady-state output gap is observed to be in the
region of 0:26 whereas the steady-state output gap in the linear-quadratic framework, as
given in equations (2.51) and (2.52), is found to be equal to 0:2. Second, the steady-
state e¢ ciency gap is observed to be highly stable with respect to both the degree of157
Figure 6.6. Model with money: the steady-state output gap for alternative
values of the degree of price stickiness.
Figure 6.7. Model with money: the steady-state output gap for alternative
values of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.
rule-of-thumb behaviour and the degree of price stickiness. Indeed, the di⁄erences in
the steady-state e¢ ciency gap for varying degrees of rule-of-thumb behaviour and price
stickiness are so small that the scale of the di⁄erences may be simply due to numerical158
Figure 6.8. Cashless model: the steady-state output gap for alternative val-
ues of the degree of price stickiness.
Figure 6.9. Cashless model: the steady state output gap for alternative
values of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.
approximation noises related to the numerical solution of the Ramsey steady-state level
of output.
On the one hand, as shown in Chapter 4, the in￿ ation rates in the linear-quadratic
framework are directly proportional to the steady-state output gap. On the other hand,159
the steady-state output gap in the medium-scale economy is found to be only slightly larger
that its counterpart in the linear-quadratic framework. This could explain the reason as
to why the in￿ ation rate in the cashless medium-scale model is again positive but only
slightly di⁄ers from the one that obtains in the linear-quadratic framework. Indeed, the
steady-state level of in￿ ation in the Ramsey equilibrium is greater than the the optimal
steady state-state in￿ ation that obtains in the linear-quadratic framework, as given by
(4.24), albeit the di⁄erence between the two in￿ ation rates is small.CHAPTER 7
Ramsey Dynamics and Optimal Operational Interest-rate Rules
In this chapter, we study Ramsey dynamics and address the question of implementation
of optimal monetary policy by characterising optimal, simple, and implementable interest-
rate rules.
First, we study the business cycle dynamics that arise in the stochastic steady state of
the Ramsey equilibrium. In doing so, we are interested in addressing two issues. First, we
want to assess whether the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate constitutes an
impediment to optimal monetary policy. Indeed, one argument against setting a negative
in￿ ation rate, as recommended by the model in the presence of money demand by house-
holds and ￿rms, or a near-zero in￿ ation rate, as recommended by the cashless model, is
that at negative or near-zero rates of in￿ ation the risk of incurring in the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rate would restrict the central bank￿ s ability to stabilise the economy.
We ￿nd that this argument is of no relevance in the context of both the model with money
and its cashless counterpart. The reason for this is that under the Ramsey-optimal pol-
icy, the zero lower bound poses an impediment to monetary policy only in the case of an
adverse shock that forces the interest rate to be more that 8 standard deviations below its
mean. The probability of this happening is so small that, as in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe
(2007), the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate does not impose an econom-
ically important constraint on the conduct of optimal monetary policy. We proceed to
characterise the Ramsey-optimal responses to the three shocks that drive aggregate ￿ uc-
tuations: the permanent neutral technological shock, the permanent investment-speci￿c
technological shock, and temporary variations in government expenditure. Speci￿cally, we
present the responses of key macroeconomic variables and we focus on how the Ramsey
planner uses monetary policy to respond to each of the three shocks. We show how the
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Ramsey-optimal stabilisation policy is robust to the presence/absence of money in the
model.
Second, we study the implementation of optimal monetary policy by characterising op-
timal, simple, and implementable interest-rate rules. Insofar as equilibrium distortions are
neither nil nor small, it no longer su¢ ces to approximate the equilibrium of the model to
￿rst order to obtain a second-order accurate measure of welfare. We use the methodology
and the algorithm developed in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004b) for second-order approx-
imations to policy functions of dynamic and stochastic models. Initially, we show how the
implementation of optimal monetary policy is virtually una⁄ected by the presence-absence
of money. We characterise the operational interest-rate rule, which is de￿ned exactly as
in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007), in both the medium-scale model with money and its
cashless counterpart. In both cases, the optimal operational interest-rate rule is con￿rmed
to be active in price and wage in￿ ation, mute in output growth and moderately inertial.
However, in the cashless economy the coe¢ cients on price and wage in￿ ation are greater
than in the model that features transactional frictions.
Finally, we also consider a modi￿cation of the operational interest-rate rule, which
prescribes a concern not for output growth per se but for stabilisation of output around a
welfare-relevant measure of output, namely the gap between the Ramsey level of output
and the e¢ cient level of output. We ￿nd that the optimal operational interest-rate rule
remains active in price and wage in￿ ation and moderately inertial, but also implies a
positive coe¢ cient on the output gap. This is true in both the model with money and its
cashless counterpart.
We ￿rst characterise Ramsey dynamics in both the model with money and its cashless
counterpart. We then proceed to study optimal operational interest-rate rules.
7.1. Ramsey Dynamics
In this section, we describe the business cycle dynamics that arise in the stochastic
steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium, namely the Ramsey dynamics. The Ramsey162
dynamics are approximated by solving a ￿rst-order approximation to the Ramsey equilib-
rium conditions. The literature provides evidence that ￿rst-order approximations to the
Ramsey equilibrium conditions deliver dynamics that are close to those implied by the
exact solution. For instance, Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004c) compute the exact solu-
tion to the Ramsey dynamics in a model characterised by ￿ exible prices and monopolistic
competition. Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004b) instead compute Ramsey dynamics in the
same model using a ￿rst-order approximation to the Ramsey equilibrium conditions. They
conclude that the dynamics implied by the exact solution and the ones obtained under the
￿rst-order approximation are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent. Moreover, Benigno and Woodford
(2006) show that, within the context of optimal taxation in the standard Real Business
Cycle model, the ￿rst-order approximation to the Ramsey equilibrium conditions implies
second moments that are very similar to the second moments computed from the exact
solution.
In addressing the characterisation of Ramsey dynamics we are concerned with two is-
sues. First, we want to study how the Ramsey planner resolves the stabilisation of volatility
in the endogenous variables. In doing so, we want to analyse whether the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rate imposes an economically important constraint on the conduct of
monetary policy. With this respect, an argument against setting a negative in￿ ation rate,
as recommended by the model in the presence of money demand by households and ￿rms,
or a near-zero in￿ ation rate, as recommended by the cashless model, is that at negative or
near-zero rates of in￿ ation the risk of incurring in the zero lower bound on nominal inter-
est rate would restrict the central bank￿ s ability to stabilise the economy. This argument
is in fact advocated by Summers (1991), among others, as the main reason for setting a
positive in￿ ation rate. Second, we want to characterise the Ramsey-optimal responses to
the three shocks that drive aggregate ￿ uctuations: the permanent neutral technological
shock, the permanent investment-speci￿c technological shock, and temporary variations in
government expenditure. Speci￿cally, we focus on how the Ramsey planner uses monetary163
policy to respond to each of the three shocks. In addressing these questions we consider
both the model with money and its cashless counterpart1.
In the model with money, the Ramsey planner faces a three-way trade-o⁄ in deter-
mining the optimal degree of volatility in the endogenous variables. First, the distortion
due to sticky prices calls for minimising in￿ ation volatility. Second, the distortion due to
transactional frictions calls for minimising volatility in the nominal interest rate. Third,
the distortion due to sticky wages implies that minimisation of wage in￿ ation net of lagged
price in￿ ation, given full indexation to past price in￿ ation, is also Ramsey optimal. Table
(7.1) reports the standard deviations, measured in percentage point per year, of some
macroeconomic variables under the Ramsey-optimal policy in the model with money. Ta-
ble (7.1) shows that the three-way trade-o⁄is resolved in favour of price stability. Indeed,
in￿ ation volatility is observed to be much smoother than any other endogenous variable￿ s
volatility over the business cycle. Moreover, in order to assess how sensitive in￿ ation
stability is with respect to the size of the sticky wage distortions, we also consider the
case of a higher degree of wage stickiness (i.e. e ￿ = 0:9), which implies that wages are
reoptimised only every ten quarters. In this case, as shown in column 2 of Table (7.1), the
optimal volatility of price in￿ ation increases and the optimal volatility of wage in￿ ation
decreases. However, price in￿ ation remains much smoother over the business cycle than
wage in￿ ation. In this sense, the Ramsey pursues a policy of in￿ ation targeting. As for
the importance of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rate, Table (7.1) shows that
the standard deviation of the nominal interest rate is 0:4 percentage points at an annual
rate. On the other hand, the mean of the nominal interest rate in the Ramsey stochastic
steady state is 3:4 percent. This implies that for the nominal interest rate to reach the
zero lower bound it must fall by more than 8 standard deviations below its target level.
The likelihood of this taking place is so small that within the theoretical economy, the
1All structural parameters of the model take the values shown in Table (6.1) and we consider a degree of
price stickiness of 0:66 and a degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour of 0:3.164
zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate does not impose an economically strong
constraint on the conduct of optimal monetary policy.
Variable ￿ = 0:66 e ￿ = 0:69 ￿ = 0:66 e ￿ = 0:9
Nominal interest rate 0:4 0:4
Price In￿ ation 0:2 0:4
Wage In￿ ation 1:1 0:9
Output Growth 0:7 0:7
Consumption Growth 0:4 0:4
Investment Growth 1:2 1:4
Table 7.1. Model with Money: Standard Deviations under the Ramsey Op-
timal Stabilisation Policy
The same message carries on to the case of a cashless economy. The Ramsey planner
now faces a two-way trade-o⁄as the absence of the distortion due to transactional frictions
implies that minimising volatility of the nominal interest rate is not Ramsey optimal. Table
(7.2) reports the standard deviations, measured in percentage point per year, of in￿ ation
and other macroeconomic variables under the Ramsey-optimal stabilisation policy. On
the one hand, the table shows that the standard deviation of the nominal interest rate
is 0:3 percentage points at an annual rate. On the other hand, the mean of the nominal
interest rate in the Ramsey stochastic steady state is 2:8 percent. This implies that for the
nominal interest rate to reach the zero lower bound it must fall by more than 8 standard
deviations below its target level. Hence, the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate
does not impose a strong constraint in the conduct of monetary policy. Moreover, the
policy trade-o⁄ faced by the Ramsey planner is again resolved in favour of price stability.
In the case of a higher degree of wage stickiness, as shown in column 2 of Table (7.2), the
optimal volatility of price in￿ ation increases and the optimal volatility of wage in￿ ation
decreases. However, price in￿ ation remains much smoother over the business cycle than
wage in￿ ation.165
Variable ￿ = 0:66 e ￿ = 0:69 ￿ = 0:66 e ￿ = 0:9
Nominal interest rate 0:35 0:35
Price In￿ ation 0:1 0:3
Wage In￿ ation 1:2 1:0
Output Growth 0:6 0:6
Consumption Growth 0:4 0:4
Investment Growth 1:1 1:3
Table 7.2. Cashless Model: Standard Deviations under the Ramsey Optimal
Stabilisation Policy
We now proceed to characterise the Ramsey-optimal impulse responses to the three
shocks that drive aggregate ￿ uctuations: the permanent neutral technological shock, the
permanent investment-speci￿c technological shock, and temporary variations in govern-
ment expenditure. Speci￿cally, we present the responses of key macroeconomic variables
and we focus on how the Ramsey planner uses monetary policy to respond to each of
the three shocks. We consider both the model with money and its cashless counterpart.
In characterising impulse response functions, we follow Schmitt-GrohŁ and Uribe (2007).
The nominal interest rate and the in￿ ation rate are expressed in levels in percent per year.
Output, wages, investment, and consumption are expressed in cumulative growth rates
in percent. Hours and capacity utilisation are expressed in percentage deviations from
their steady-state values. The two models indeed imply very similar stabilisation policies.
Moreover, the dynamic responses in both economies closely resemble the ones presented
in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007), who consider backward-looking price indexation.
Figure (7.1) and Figure (7.2) show the response to a one percentage increase in the
growth rate of the neutral technology shock in the model with money and its cashless
counterpart respectively. The Ramsey planner raises nominal interest rate and allows
in￿ ation to fall. By doing so, the Ramsey planner is trying to replicate the allocation
that would prevail in an economy characterised by ￿ exible prices and ￿ exible wages. In a166
￿ exible-price and ￿ exible-wage economy, the real interest rate should rise in response to
a positive shock to the growth rate of technology. When prices are sticky, the Ramsey
planner ￿nds optimal to induce a rise in the real interest rate without having to rely
on costly movements in the rate of in￿ ation. Since the real interest rate is simply the
di⁄erence between the nominal interest rate and the in￿ ation rate, the Ramsey-optimal
policy is to raise nominal interest rates by more or less the same amount that real interest
rates would rise in the ￿ exible-price and ￿ exible-wage economy. This is true in both
the model with money and its cashless counterpart, although the nominal interest rate
is tightened to avoid de￿ ation in the model with money whereas is tightened to avoid
in￿ ation in the cashless model. A permanent increase in technology raises the demand
for capital and labour. Speci￿cally, hours decline on impact in response to a permanent
increase in neutral technology. This is line with the ￿nding in Gal￿ (1999) whereas it runs
contrary to what found in Altig et al. (2005). The intuition for the initial decline in hours
is linked to the Ramsey planner￿ s intent of replicating the allocation that would prevail
in the ￿ exible-price and ￿ exible-wage economy. Given that the Ramsey planner ￿nds
optimal to induce a strong increase in the real interest rate on impact, the initial increase
in consumption is small. It follows that, at least initially, the positive wealth e⁄ect brought
about by the increase in technology results in an increase in consumption of leisure. After
the initial period, higher real wages make households substitute current work for future
leisure. Capital is used more intensively which generates additional changes in hours
given that the two factors are complementary in the production of goods. Overall, both
models are capable of explaining a strong rise in equilibrium hours, output, consumption,
investment and real wage.
Figure (7.3) and Figure (7.4) show the response to a one percent innovation in gov-
ernment expenditure in the model with money and its cashless counterpart respectively.
Ramsey-optimal policy calls for a contraction in monetary policy, which is in line with
conventional wisdom, and implies a higher nominal interest rate that reverts the initial
increase in the rate of in￿ ation. An exogenous and temporary increase in government167
Figure 7.1. Model with money: Ramsey response to a neutral productivity shock.
Figure 7.2. Cashless model: Ramsey response to a neutral productivity shock.168
Figure 7.3. Model with money: Ramsey response to a government expendi-
ture shock.
expenditure reduces the present value of households￿after-tax income which results in an
increase in the labor supply which leads to temporarily higher equilibrium employment
and output and a decrease in real wage. However, there is still a crowding out e⁄ect of
private consumption and investment. Given the complementarity between capital and
labour in production, the increase in hours determines an increase in the degree of capital
utilisation.
Figure (7.5) and Figure (7.6) show the response to a one percentage point increase in
the growth rate of the investment-speci￿c technological shock in the model with money and
its cashless counterpart respectively. The Ramsey planner ￿nds optimal to ease monetary
policy. The intuition is that the Ramsey planner replicates what would prevail in the
￿ exible-price and ￿ exible-wage economy. In the absence of stickiness in prices and wages,
the real interest rate would fall. The Ramsey planner thus lowers nominal rates so to
achieve a fall in real rates without putting pressure on the rate of in￿ ation. This is true
in both the model with money and its cashless counterpart. A permanent increase in169
Figure 7.4. Cashless model: Ramsey response to a government expenditure shock.
investment-speci￿c technology raises the demand for capital and labour. Hours rise on
impact in response to a permanent increase in investment-speci￿c technology. On impact,
the increase in investment-speci￿c technology results in a decrease in consumption and
investment. Capital is used more intensively which generates additional changes in hours
given that the two factors are complementary in the production of goods. Overall, both
models are capable of explaining a strong rise in equilibrium hours, output, consumption,
investment and real wage.
7.2. Optimal Operational Interest-rate Rules
In this section, we analyse the issue of the implementation of optimal monetary policy
by characterising optimal, simple, and implementable interest-rate rules. On the one hand,
the solution to the Ramsey problem de￿nes the equilibrium behaviour of the policy vari-
able, namely the nominal interest rate. On the other hand, the equilibrium process of the170
Figure 7.5. Model with money: Ramsey response to an investment-speci￿c
productivity shock.
Figure 7.6. Cashless model: Ramsey response to an investment-speci￿c pro-
ductivity shock.171
nominal interest rate depends on all the state variables of the Ramsey equilibrium, which
include all the exogenous driving forces and all the endogenous predetermined variables.
Most of these variables, such as the past values of the Lagrange multipliers associated with
the constraints of the Ramsey problem, are not readily available nor easily controllable
in reality. Moreover, even if the policy maker could observe all these variables, using the
equilibrium process of the nominal interest rate as the policy regime could bring about
multiplicity of equilibria.
The ￿rst example of operative rules for the nominal interest rate is the so-called Taylor
Rule, introduced in the seminal paper of Taylor (1993). Much of the recent literature has
concentrated on simple instrument rules that can be considered extensions of the original
speci￿cation by Taylor2. In our analysis we ￿rst follow Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007)
as we characterise simple interest-rate feedback rules of the form
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The nominal interest rate thus depends linearly on its own lag, price in￿ ation, wage in￿ a-
tion, and the growth rate of output. The target values R￿, ￿￿, ￿W￿ and ￿￿
y are postulated
to be the Ramsey steady-state values of the respective endogenous variables. Beyond
simplicity, as in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007), we also require for the the rule to be
operational. That is, the rule must induce a unique rational expectation equilibrium and
the associate path for the nominal interest rate rule must not violate the zero bound3.
Moreover, we study optimal operational interest-rate rule as we look for rules that max-
imise welfare. In other words, the four policy parameters (￿￿, ￿W, ￿y, ￿R) are chosen so
as to maximise welfare. Welfare is given by the conditional expected value of the repre-
sentative household lifetime utility. Speci￿cally, welfare is conditional on the initial state
2For instance, among others, McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Taylor (1999). Clarida et al. (1998) show
how Taylor rules provide a good approximation for the actual conduct of monetary policy over the past
forty years.
3Speci￿cally we follow Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2005) requiring the target value for the nominal interest
rate be greater than two times the standard deviation of the nominal interest rate (formally ln(R￿) ￿
2￿ ^ Rt).172
of the economy being the Ramsey steady state. We solve the model with the perturbation
method, and the algorithm that implements it, developed in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe
(2004b). The algorithm approximates the conditional welfare measure to second-order
accuracy by using a second-order approximation to the policy function.
We consider both the model with money and the cashless model. With this respect,
it is important to stress that the target values in the two rules are di⁄erent, as discussed
in the previous sections4. The optimal operational interest-rate rule in the model with
money is of the form
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The policy parameters are observed to be nearly identical to the ones reported in Schmitt-
GrohØ and Uribe (2007), namely (￿￿ = 5, ￿W = 1:6, ￿y = ￿0:1, ￿R = 0:4). The rule
displays a greater-than-unity response to both price and wage in￿ ation (i.e. it is an active
rule) and basically no response to the growth rate of output. Furthermore, it prescribes
that the optimal policy is inertial, since the autoregressive parameter on the lagged value
of the interest rate is signi￿cantly greater than zero but lower then one. As stressed in
Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) "the optimal interest-rate rule can indeed be interpreted
as a pure in￿ation targeting rule". The same result obtains in the cashless economy. In
this case the optimal operational interest-rate rule is given by
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There are virtually no di⁄erences between the coe¢ cients on the output gap and on lagged
interest rate of this rule and the one in the model with money. However, the coe¢ cients
on price and wage in￿ ation are greater than their counterparts shown in (7.2). In other
4In characterising the optimal operational interest-rate rules we set the degree of price stickiness, ￿, to
0:66 and the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour, !, to 0:3. The interest-rate rules are robus to alternative
specifaction for ￿ and !. Speci￿cally, we have considered combining limiting values for ! (i.e. ! = 0:01
and ! = 0:7) with limiting values for ￿ (i.e. ￿ = 0:3 and ￿ = 0:8). The coe¢ cients in the rule change
slightly, but the rule is always found to be active in price and wage in￿ ation, mute in output growth and
moderately inertial.173
words, the message given by these rules is the same (i.e. a pure in￿ ation targeting rule),
with a stronger evidence in the case of the cashless economy5.
Finally, we consider optimal operational interest-rate rules that replace output growth
with a measure of output stabilisation. Speci￿cally, we consider the possibility of an
interest-rate rule that replaces the growth rate of output with a measure of output gap,
namely the log-di⁄erence between the level of output in the Ramsey economy and the
social planner level of output. In other words, the interest-rate rule prescribes that the
nominal interest rate depends linearly on the log-di⁄erence between the Ramsey level of
output and the social planner level of output, denoted with ySP
t .
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The optimal operational interest-rate rule in the model with money is of the form
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whereas the optimal operational interest-rate rule in the cashless model is given by
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There are two main observations to take from the interest-rate rules (7.5) and (7.6).
First, the optimal policy reacts positively to the gap between the level of output in
the Ramsey economy and the social planner level of output. Regardless of the pres-
ence/absence of money in the model, the optimal interest-rate rule remains active in both
price and wage in￿ ation and inertial, but also prescribes a concern for stabilising the
level of output around the e¢ cient level of output. Second, the rules are virtually iden-
tical across the models. In other words, if demand of money is seen to matter when the
interest-rate rule implies a concern for the rate of growth of output, the same is not true
once the measure of output stabilisation that enters the operational interest-rate rule is
5Note however that the relative importance of price and wage in￿ ation in the two rules, i.e. the ratio
￿￿=￿w; is almost the same.174
the gap between the level of output in the Ramsey economy and the social planner level
of output.CHAPTER 8
Conclusions
The main contribution of this thesis is the investigation of the e⁄ect of in￿ ation per-
sistence due to rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters on optimal monetary policy. The
analysis takes place in New Keynesian models where the supply-side of the economy is
characterised by monopolistically competitive ￿rms that face rigidity in the setting of
prices. A fraction of price setters does not behave rationally when setting a new price,
but follows a rule-of-thumb. This introduces persistence in the evolution of in￿ ation. The
e⁄ects of in￿ ation persistence due to rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters are stud-
ied when the monetary authority acts under commitment. The thesis addresses what
constitutes optimal monetary policy in:
1) The basic purely forward-looking New Keynesian model which we extend by al-
lowing a fraction of price setters to behave in a backward-looking rule-of-thumb
manner. This results in a Phillips curve with both a forward-looking term and
a backward-looking term. Backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour is speci￿ed
in two ways. First, following Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) we allow the rule-of-thumb
price setters to index their prices to lagged in￿ ation. Second, following Steins-
son (2003) we allow the rule-of-thumb price setters to index their prices to both
lagged output gap and lagged in￿ ation. In all models, steady-state distortions
are assumed to be small so that it su¢ ces to approximate the equilibrium of the
model to ￿rst order to obtain a second-order accurate measure of welfare. We
derive utility-based objective functions for the monetary authority and analyse a
range of optimal commitment policies that have been proposed in the literature:
the zero-optimal policy and two types of timeless perspective commitment policy
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2) The medium-scale New Keynesian model developed by Altig et al. (2005) which
we extend by allowing a fraction of price setters to behave in a backward-looking
rule-of-thumb manner ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). We depart from the assump-
tion of small steady-state distortions and consider the case of a largely distorted
steady state. We characterise optimal monetary policy with a Ramsey-type ap-
proach. We describe the Ramsey steady state and the Ramsey dynamics using
the algorithms developed in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007). We study the im-
plementation of optimal monetary policy by characterising optimal, simple, and
implementable interest-rate rules. Large steady-state distortions imply that to ob-
tain a second-order accurate measure of welfare it does not su¢ ce to approximate
the model￿ s equilibrium conditions up to ￿rst order. In characterising interest-
rate rules, we use the methodology and the algorithm developed in Schmitt-GrohØ
and Uribe (2004b) for second-order approximations to policy functions of dynamic
and stochastic models.
Regarding (1):
a) Rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters, speci￿ed either ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999) or ￿ la Steinsson (2003), breaks the optimality of zero long-run in￿ ation
found in New Keynesian models. A key implication of the purely forward-looking
New Keynesian model is that zero long-run in￿ ation is the optimal target of mon-
etary policy. Woodford (2003) writes "It is sometimes supposed that the existence
of a long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄, together with an ine¢ cient natural rate,
should imply that the Phillips curve should be exploited to some extent, resulting
in positive in￿ation forever, even under commitment. But here that is not true
because the smaller coe¢ cient on the expected in￿ation-term relative to that on
current in￿ation-which results in the long-run trade-o⁄- is exactly the size of the
shift term in the aggregate supply that is needed to precisely eliminate any long-
run incentive for nonzero in￿ation under an optimal commitment." Woodford177
(2003, p. 415). Moreover, as shown in Woodford (2003), zero long-run in￿ ation
is also robust to the presence backward-looking price indexation. Rule-of-thumb
behaviour, regardless of its speci￿cation, implies that the stimulative e⁄ect of
higher in￿ ation is greater than the output cost of higher in￿ ation thus generating
a long-run incentive for positive in￿ ation under an optimal commitment. Optimal
steady-state in￿ ation collapses to zero in the absence of backward-looking rule-
of-thumb behaviour, in the absence of a long-run Phillips-curve trade-o⁄, and in
the absence of steady-state distortions.
b) Positive optimal long-run in￿ ation also obtains in the purely forward-looking New
Keynesian model under a type of timeless perspective commitment policy that has
recently been proposed in the literature (i.e. Blake (2001), Jensen and McCallum
(2002), and Damjanovic et al. (2008)) and is based on the optimisation of the
unconditional value of the central bank￿ s objective function. The intuition for
this result hinges on the discount factor. If the central bank shares the same
discount factor of the private sector, there is no long-run incentive for positive
in￿ ation and optimal steady-state in￿ ation is zero. Conversely, if the central
bank does not discount the future, positive steady-state in￿ ation emerges under
commitment even in the purely forward-looking model. Moreover, the alternative
timeless perspective commitment policy is robust to the introduction of backward-
looking rule-of thumb behaviour, when this is characterised as in Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999), with the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate being invariant to the degree of
rule-of-thumb behaviour.
c) All optimal positive long-run in￿ ation rates turn out to be small in magnitude.
We perform sensitivity analysis for ample ranges of two key structural parameters,
namely the degree of price stickiness and the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.
On the one hand, the optimal long-run in￿ ation rates we derive are not capable
of explaining the observed in￿ ation rates. On the other hand, the policy-driven178
steady state is very close to the steady state around which the models are log-
linearised, which is characterised by zero in￿ ation.
d) The di⁄erent commitment policies rank in terms of welfare in line with the intu-
ition. We consider both welfare the on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium
and on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium, which stems from augmenting the
aggregate-supply with a cost-push shock. Our main objective is, as in Jensen
and McCallum (2002), to rank the alternative commitment policies. On the basis
of the deterministic equilibrium, the zero-optimal commitment policy ranks ￿rst
followed by the alternative timeless perspective policy and the standard timeless
perspective policy. Moreover, steady-state in￿ ation is found to be welfare en-
hancing with respect to a policy of zero steady-state in￿ ation. A positive but
small level of in￿ ation, which generates positive steady-state price dispersion,
is thus preferable to a policy of zero in￿ ation at all times, which implies zero
steady-state price dispersion. The reason for this is that positive steady-state
in￿ ation, by bringing about positive output gap, allows eliminating some of the
steady-state loss due to monopolistic competition. On the basis of the stochastic
equilibrium, we consider both an unconditional welfare measure and a measure of
welfare conditional on initial conditions. In both cases the di⁄erent commitment
policies rank according to the a priori belief. When considering unconditional
welfare, the alternative timeless perspective policy ranks ￿rst followed by the
standard timeless perspective policy and the zero-optimal policy. When consid-
ering welfare conditional on initial conditions, the zero-optimal policy ranks ￿rst
followed by the standard timeless perspective policy and the alternative timeless
perspective policy.
Regarding (2):
a) Rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters, speci￿ed ￿ la Gal￿ and Gertler (1999)
implies optimal positive in￿ ation in the Ramsey steady state only in the absence of179
transactional frictions. Otherwise, the Friedman prescription for de￿ ation governs
the optimal steady-state in￿ ation: the average level of the nominal interest rate
should be su¢ ciently low so that there should negative in￿ ation on average. As in
the linear-quadratic framework, the positive in￿ ation rate in the Ramsey steady
state target is found to be small for ample ranges of the degree of price stickiness
and the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour. Moreover, the in￿ ation rate is again
observed to be monotonically decreasing in the degree of price stickiness and
monotonically increasing in the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour. In the linear-
quadratic framework the steady-state in￿ ation rate is directly proportional to the
steady-state e¢ ciency gap, which is the gap between the steady-state level of
output and the e¢ cient steady-state level of output. We proceed to analyse the
social planner allocation so to compute the social planner steady state. We ￿nd
that the steady-state e¢ ciency gap in the medium-scale economy is only slightly
larger than in the case of small steady-state distortions assumed in the linear
quadratic framework. This may explain the reason as to why the in￿ ation rate
in the cashless medium-scale model is again positive but it is only slightly larger
than the one that obtains in the linear-quadratic framework.
b) Ramsey dynamics are not a⁄ected by the presence/absence of money in the the-
oretical economy. The zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate does not
constitute an impediment to optimal monetary policy. The reason for this is that
under the Ramsey-optimal policy, the zero lower bound poses an impediment to
monetary policy only in the case of an adverse shock that forces the interest rate
to be more that 8 standard deviations below its mean. The probability of this
happening is so small that, as found by Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) in the
case of backward-looking price indexation, the zero lower bound on the nomi-
nal interest rate does not impose an economically important constraint on the
conduct of optimal monetary policy. We study Ramsey-optimal responses to the180
three shocks that drive aggregate ￿ uctuations: the permanent neutral technologi-
cal shock, the permanent investment-speci￿c technological shock, and temporary
variations in government expenditure. The Ramsey-optimal stabilisation policy
to all three shocks is robust to the presence/absence of money in the model.
c) Optimal operational interest-rate rules are not a⁄ected by the presence/absence
of money in the theoretical economy. We characterise the operational interest-
rate rule, which is de￿ned exactly as in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007), in both
the medium-scale model with money and its cashless counterpart. In both cases,
the optimal operational interest-rate rule is con￿rmed to be active in price and
wage in￿ ation, mute in output growth and moderately inertial. However, in the
cashless economy the coe¢ cients on price and wage in￿ ation are greater than
in the model that features transactional frictions. We consider a modi￿cation
of the operational interest-rate rule, which prescribes a concern not for output
growth per se but for stabilisation of output around a welfare-relevant measure of
output, namely the gap between the Ramsey level of output and the e¢ cient level
of output. We ￿nd that the optimal operational interest-rate rule remains active
in price and wage in￿ ation and moderately inertial, but also implies a positive
coe¢ cient on the output gap. This is true in both the model with money and its
cashless counterpart.
Taking together the basic message of our results is that
￿ The widespread practice in the New Keynesian literature of restricting the atten-
tion to the case of an e¢ cient natural level of output is not innocuous. A policy
that is optimal for an economy with an e¢ cient steady state di⁄ers from what
is optimal in an economy where the subsidies that achieve Pareto e¢ ciency are
unavailable.
￿ The two most popular sources of in￿ ation persistence, namely rule-of-thumb be-
haviour and price indexation, have di⁄erent consequences as for the optimal181
steady-state in￿ ation rate. In this sense, the results we obtain in the linear-
quadratic framework con￿ ict with Woodford (2003).
￿ The results in the linear-quadratic framework carry on to the case of a medium-
scale model only when the theoretical model does not feature transactional fric-
tions. Interestingly, while the presence of money matters for the Ramsey steady
state, it does not seem to a⁄ect the Ramsey-optimal stabilisation policy and the
implementation of optimal monetary policy via simple interest-rate rules.
Our results are sensitive to both the assumption of in￿ ation persistence being caused by
rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters and the Calvo￿ s (1983) assumption of a constant
probability of price adjustment, irrespective of the duration of prices. Future research
based on this thesis may address the consequences of relaxing these two assumptions. Dif-
ferent sources of in￿ ation persistence have in fact been put forward in the literature. The
importance of these ideas is discussed further in Woodford (2007). For instance, Milani
(2005;2007) shows how a process of adaptive learning by agents explains some persistence.
In a similar vein, Paloviita (2006) and Roberts (1997) account for in￿ ation persistence by
arguing that it results from in￿ ation expectations not being formed rationally. Moving
away from Calvo￿ s (1983) assumption of a constant probability of price adjustment can
also be achieved in di⁄erent ways. For instance, Goodfriend and King (1997) suggest that
an upward-sloping probability of changing price would be a more appropriate assumption
than the constant probability of the Calvo model. Sheedy (2007a) builds on this sug-
gestion and derives a Phillips curve that exhibits intrinsic in￿ ation persistence. In￿ ation
persistence is intrinsic in the sense that in￿ ation determination is partially backward-
looking even though all agents remain forward-looking1. Mankiw and Reis (2002) replace
the assumption of sticky prices with that of sticky information and show how in￿ ation
persistence is also implied by agents￿limited ability to update or absorb information. Per-
haps, the most natural extension of this thesis would be an investigation of the e⁄ects of
1Sheedy (2007b) goes on to analyse optimal monetary policy in response to shocks, but the steady state
he considers is Pareto e¢ cient.182
these di⁄erent reasons for in￿ ation persistence on the optimal target for monetary policy
in economies where the steady state is not assumed to be Pareto e¢ cient.CHAPTER 9
Appendices
9.1. Appendix A. Detailed Derivation of the Hybrid Phillips Curve under
Rule-of-thumb Behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003)
We begin by log-linearising the aggregate price level (2.25)
(9.1) b Pt = (1 ￿ ￿)b p
￿
t + ￿b Pt￿1
A log-linearisation to the overall reset price (2.26) is given by
(9.2) b p
￿
t = (1 ￿ !)b p
f
t + !b p
b
t
As shown in Woodford (2003, Chapter 3), a log-linearisation of the notional short-run
aggregate supply curve, which is implicitly de￿ned by ￿1(p
f
t;p
f
t;Pt+s;Yt+s;e ￿t+s) = 0, takes
the form
(9.3) log(p
f
t=Pt) = ￿xt
where ￿ is the elasticity of the notional short-run aggregate supply curve curve. Under
the assumption of speci￿c labour markets, ￿ is given by
(9.4) ￿ =
(￿￿1 + $)
(1 + $￿)
> 0
Combining the de￿nition of the forward-looking reset price (2.28) with the log-linearisation
of the notional short-run aggregate supply curve (9.3) yields
(9.5) b p
f
t = (1 ￿ ￿￿)Et
1 X
s=0
(￿￿)
s
h
b Pt+s + ￿xt+s
i
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Quasi-di⁄erencing (9.5), we obtain the log-linearised forward-looking reset price
(9.6) b p
f
t = (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿xt + (1 ￿ ￿￿)b Pt + ￿￿Etb p
f
t+1
Log-linearising the backward-looking reset price under rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steins-
son, (2.29), delivers
(9.7) b p
b
t = b p
￿
t￿1 + ￿t￿1 + ￿xt￿1
Combining the log-linearised aggregate price level (9.1) with the log-linearised overall
reset price (9.2) we obtain the evolution of the aggregate in￿ ation rate
(9.8) ￿t =
1 ￿ ￿
￿
h
(1 ￿ !)(b p
f
t ￿ b Pt) + !(b p
b
t ￿ b Pt)
i
In order to derive the hybrid Phillips curve we need to ￿nd: I) the di⁄erence between
the log-linearised forward-looking reset price and the log-linearised aggregate price level,
namely b p
f
t ￿ b Pt and II) the di⁄erence between the log-linearised backward-looking reset
price and the log-linearised aggregate price level, that is b p
f
t ￿ b Pt.
Using the log-linearised aggregate price level (9.1) at time t ￿ 1 to substitute for b p￿
t￿1
in the log-linearised backward-looking reset price (9.7), b pb
t ￿ b Pt takes the form
(9.9) b p
b
t ￿ b Pt =
1
1 ￿ ￿
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t + ￿xt￿1
Rewriting the log-linearised forward-looking reset price (9.6) in terms of b p
f
t ￿ b Pt yields
(9.10) b p
f
t ￿ b Pt = (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿xt + ￿￿Et(b p
f
t+1 ￿ b Pt)
We thus need to ￿nd the expected value of the di⁄erence between the log-linearised
forward-looking reset price at time t + 1 and the log-linearised aggregate price level at
time t, namely b p
f
t+1￿ b Pt. Combining the log-linearised overall reset price, as given by (9.2)
at t+1, with the log-linearised backward-looking reset price, as implied by (9.7) at t+1,185
gives
(9.11) b p
￿
t+1 ￿ b Pt = (1 ￿ !)(b p
f
t+1 ￿ b Pt) + !(b p
￿
t ￿ b Pt￿1 + ￿xt)
where we subtract b Pt from both sides. Rewriting the log-linearised price level (9.1) allows
￿nding an expression for the di⁄erence between the log-linearised overall reset price and
the log-linearised aggregate price level in the previous period, that is
(9.12) b p
￿
t ￿ b Pt￿1 =
1
1 ￿ ￿
￿t￿1
Using this to substitute for both b p￿
t ￿ b Pt￿1 and b p￿
t+1￿ b Pt in (9.11) and taking the expected
value at t, Et(b p
f
t+1 ￿ b Pt) is given by
(9.13) Et(b p
f
t+1 ￿ b Pt) =
1
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ !)
Et(￿t+1 ￿ !￿t) ￿
!￿
(1 ￿ !)
xt
We can now go back to equation (9.10) for b p
f
t ￿ b Pt. Substituting Et(b p
f
t+1 ￿ b Pt), as given
by (9.13), in (9.10), b p
f
t ￿ b Pt takes the form
(9.14) b p
f
t ￿ b Pt = (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿xt +
￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ !)
Et(￿t+1 ￿ !￿t) ￿
￿￿!￿
(1 ￿ !)
xt
Having found both b p
f
t ￿ b Pt and b p
f
t ￿ b Pt as functions of in￿ ation and output gap only, the
hybrid Phillips curve is the solution to the system of equations (9.8), (9.9), and (9.14).
Combining them and solving for in￿ ation delivers
(9.15)
￿ + ￿￿! + (1 ￿ ￿)!
￿
￿t =
8
> <
> :
￿￿
￿ Et￿t+1 + !
￿￿t￿1 +
(1￿￿)!￿
￿ xt￿1
+
h
(1￿￿)(1￿!)(1￿￿￿)￿￿(1￿￿)￿￿!￿
￿
i
xt
9
> =
> ;
Normalising on ￿t and taking into account the speci￿cation of ￿ in (9.4), we obtain
the hybrid Phillips curve under rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson in the main text
(i.e. (2.53) with the coe¢ cients de￿ned as in (2.54) and (2.55)).186
9.2. Appendix B. Detailed Derivation of the Utility-based Objective
Function under Rule-of-thumb Behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (2003)
Under Calvo (1983) staggered price setting and backward-looking rule-of-thumb be-
haviour by price setters, the distribution of prices in any period, fpt(i)g, consists of ￿ times
the distribution of prices in the previous period, fpt￿1(i)g, an atom of size (1￿￿)(1￿!)
at the forward-looking reset price, p
f
t, and an atom of size (1 ￿ ￿)! at the rule-of-thumb
backward-looking reset price, pb
t
(9.16) fpt(i)g = ￿fpt￿1(i)g + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ !)p
f
t + (1 ￿ ￿)!p
b
t
Let ￿t = vari logpt(i) denote the degree of price dispersion and P t = Ei flogpt(i)g denote
the average price, hence P t ￿ P t￿1 = Ei
￿
logfpt(i)g ￿ P t￿1
￿
. Recalling the overall reset
price (9.2), which implies that logp￿
t = (1￿!)logp
f
t +! logpb
t, and using the distribution
of prices in (9.16), P t ￿ P t￿1 can be rewritten as
(9.17) P t ￿ P t￿1 =
0 z }| {
￿Ei
￿
flogpt￿1(i)g ￿ P t￿1
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)(logp
￿
t ￿ P t￿1)
Similarly, ￿t can be rewritten as
￿t = Ei
n￿
logfpt(i)g ￿ P t￿1
￿2o
￿
￿
Ei logfpt(i)g ￿ P t￿1
￿2
=
￿Ei
n￿
logfpt￿1(i)g ￿ P t￿1
￿2o
+ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ !)(logp
f
t ￿ P t￿1)2
+(1 ￿ ￿)!(logpb
t ￿ P t￿1)2 ￿ (P t ￿ P t￿1)2
(9.18)
P t is related to the Dixit-Stiglitz price index through the log-linear approximation
(9.19) P t = logPt + O
￿￿
￿ ￿￿
1=2
￿1;e ￿;%
￿
￿ ￿
2￿
the second-order residual follows from the fact that the equilibrium in￿ ation process (as
the equilibrium output process) satis￿es a bound of second order O(
￿ ￿ ￿e ￿;%
￿ ￿ ￿
2
) together with
a second-order bound on the initial degree of price dispersion, ￿￿1. Note that, as in187
Woodford (2003), ￿￿1 is assumed to be of second order (that is why it enters the second-
order residual in (9.19) to the power of 1=2). It then follows that this measure of price
dispersion continues to be only of second order in the case of ￿rst-order deviations of
in￿ ation from zero.
In order to derive the utility-based objective function we need to ￿nd: I) the log-
di⁄erence between the forward-looking reset price and the lagged aggregate price level,
namely logp
f
t ￿ P t￿1 and II) the log-di⁄erence between the backward-looking reset price
and the lagged aggregate price level, that is logpb
t ￿ P t￿1.
Recalling the backward-looking reset price under rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steins-
son (9.7), which implies that logpb
t = logp￿
t￿1 + ￿t￿1 + ￿xt￿1, and using the log-linear
approximation (9.19), logpb
t ￿ P t￿1 is given by
(9.20) logp
b
t ￿ P t￿1 = logp
￿
t￿1 ￿ P t￿2 + ￿xt￿1 + O
￿￿ ￿
￿￿
1=2
￿1;e ￿;%
￿ ￿
￿
2￿
Similarly, using I) the overall reset price in (9.2), II) the backward-looking reset price
under rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson (9.7), and III) the log-linear approximation
(9.19), we can rewrite logp
f
t ￿ P t￿1 as
logp
f
t ￿ P t￿1 =
1
1 ￿ !
(logp
￿
t ￿ P t￿1) ￿
!
1 ￿ !
(logp
￿
t￿1 ￿ P t￿2) (9.21)
￿
!￿
1 ￿ !
xt￿1 + O
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
1=2
￿1;e ￿;%
￿ ￿ ￿
2￿
Using the log-linear approximation (9.19), the distribution of prices in (9.17) can be rewrit-
ten as
(9.22) ￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)(logp
￿
t ￿ P t￿1) + O
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
1=2
￿1;e ￿;%
￿ ￿ ￿
2￿
Accordingly substituting in the expressions for logpb
t ￿P t￿1, (9.20), and for logp
f
t ￿P t￿1,
(9.21), we obtain
(9.23) logp
b
t ￿ P t￿1 =
1
1 ￿ ￿
￿t￿1 + ￿xt￿1 + O
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
1=2
￿1;e ￿;%
￿ ￿ ￿
2￿188
(9.24) logp
f
t ￿ P t￿1 =
1
(1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ ￿)
(￿t ￿ !￿t￿1) ￿
!￿
(1 ￿ !)
xt￿1 + O
￿￿ ￿
￿￿
1=2
￿1;e ￿;%
￿ ￿
￿
2￿
Having found both logpb
t ￿P t￿1 and logp
f
t ￿P t￿1 as functions of in￿ ation and output gap
only, the degree of price dispersion (9.18), by taking into account the log-linear approxi-
mation (9.19), can be rewritten as
￿t = ￿￿t￿1 +
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
2
t +
!
(1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ ￿)
[￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿xt￿1]
2 (9.25)
+O
￿￿
￿ ￿￿
1=2
￿1;e ￿;%
￿
￿ ￿
2￿
Integrating forward, starting from any small initial degree of price dispersion, ￿￿1, the
degree of price dispersion in any period t ￿ 0 is given by
￿t =
1 X
s=0
￿
t￿s
2
6
4
￿
(1￿￿)￿2
t+
!
(1￿!)(1￿￿) [￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿xt￿1]
2
3
7
5 (9.26)
+￿
t￿1￿￿1 + O
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
1=2
￿1;e ￿;%
￿ ￿ ￿
3￿
The term ￿t￿1￿￿1 is independent of monetary policy. Taking the discounted value of the
degree of price dispersion (9.26) over all periods t ￿ 0 gives
1 X
t=0
￿
t￿t =
1
1 ￿ ￿￿
1 X
t=0
￿
t
2
6 6
6 6 6
4
￿
(1￿￿)￿2
t+
!
(1￿!)(1￿￿)
2
6
4
￿t ￿ ￿t￿1
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿xt￿1
3
7
5
2
3
7 7
7 7 7
5
(9.27)
+t:i:p + O
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
1=2
￿1;e ￿;%
￿ ￿ ￿
3￿
Taking the discounted value of the second-order approximation to the period utility func-
tion (3.22) over all periods t ￿ 0 delivers
(9.28)
1 X
t=0
￿
tUt = ￿
Y e uc
2
2
6 6
4
(￿￿1 + $)
1 P
t=0
￿
t(xt ￿ x￿)2
+(1 + $￿)￿
1 P
t=0
￿
t￿t
3
7 7
5 + t:i:p + O
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿y;e ￿;%
￿ ￿ ￿
3￿189
Combining (9.27) with (9.28) and normalizing on in￿ ation, we obtain the utility-based
objective function under rule-of-thumb behaviour ￿ la Steinsson in the main text (i.e.
(3.23) with the single-period loss function as in (3.24) and the coe¢ cients de￿ned as in
(3.25)).
9.3. Appendix C. Functional Forms and Equilibrium Conditions in
Stationary Variables
9.3.1. Functional Forms
We use the same functional forms in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007). The period utility
function is given by
(9.29) U =
h
(ct ￿ bct￿1)
1￿￿4 (1 ￿ ht)
￿4
i1￿￿3
￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿3
This entails that equilibrium conditions (6.13), (6.15), and (6.25) become respectively
(9.30) 8
> <
> :
(1 ￿ ￿4)(ct ￿ bct￿1)
(1￿￿3)(1￿￿4)￿1 (1 ￿ ht)
￿4(1￿￿3)
￿b￿Et(1 ￿ ￿4)(ct+1 ￿ bct)
(1￿￿3)(1￿￿4)￿1 (1 ￿ ht+1)
￿4(1￿￿3)
9
> =
> ;
= ￿t [1 + ‘(vt) + vt‘
0 (vt)]
(9.31) ￿4 (ct ￿ bct￿1)
(1￿￿3)(1￿￿4) (1 ￿ ht)
￿4(1￿￿3)￿1 =
￿twt
e ￿t
(9.32)
f
2
t =
h
￿4 (ct ￿ bct￿1)
(1￿￿3)(1￿￿4) (1 ￿ ht)
￿4(1￿￿3)￿1
i￿
wt
e wt
￿e ￿
h
d
t+e ￿￿Et
 
￿t+1
(￿z ￿ ￿t)
e ￿
!e ￿ ￿
e wt+1
e wt
￿e ￿
f
2
t+1
The production function takes the Cobb-Douglas the form
(9.33) F (k;h) = k
￿h
1￿￿
This implies that equilibrium conditions (6.42), (6.43), and (6.44) become respectively190
(9.34)
￿
utkt)
￿(zth
d
t
￿1￿￿
￿  z
￿
t =
￿
ct [1 + ‘(vt)] + gt + ￿
￿1
t [it + a(ut)kt]
￿
st
(9.35) mctzt(1 ￿ ￿)(utkt)
￿(zth
d
t)
￿￿ = wt
￿
1 + v
Rt ￿ 1
Rt
￿
(9.36) mct￿(utkt)
￿￿1(zth
d
t)
1￿￿ = r
k
t
The investment adjustment cost function is assumed to be the same as in Christiano et
al. (2005), namely
(9.37) S
￿
it
it￿1
￿
=
k
2
￿
it
it￿1
￿ ￿I
￿2
with ￿I being the steady-state growth rate of investment. This implies that equilibrium
conditions (6.10) and (6.17) become respectively
(9.38) kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + it
"
1 ￿
k
2
￿
it
it￿1
￿ ￿I
￿2#
(9.39)
￿t
￿t
= ￿tqt
"
1 ￿
k
2
￿
it
it￿1
￿ ￿I
￿2
￿
￿
it
it￿1
￿
k
￿
it
it￿1
￿ ￿I
￿#
+￿Et￿t+1qt+1
￿
it+1
it
￿2
k
￿
it+1
it
￿ ￿I
￿
The transaction cost function takes the functional form used in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe
(2004a), that is
(9.40) l(v) = ￿1 + ￿2=v ￿ 2
p
￿1￿2191
which implies that demand for money is given by
(9.41) v
2
t =
￿2
￿1
+
1
￿1
Rt ￿ 1
Rt
Finally, the costs of higher capacity utilisation take the form
(9.42) a(u) = ￿1 (u ￿ 1) +
￿2
2
(u ￿ 1)
2
9.3.2. Stationary Variables
The theoretical economy displays two permanent shocks. Hence, some variables are not
stationary along the balanced-growth path. The nonstationary variables and the respective
rescaling factors are the same as in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007). Speci￿cally, I)
variables ct, mh
t, mt, wt, e wt, yt, gt, ￿t, x1
t, x2
t, and ￿t are rescaled by z￿
t; II) variables kt+1
and it are rescaled by ￿tz￿
t; III) variables f1
t and f2
t are rescaled by z
￿(1￿￿3)(1￿￿4)
t ; IV )
variables qt and rk
t are rescaled by 1=￿t; and V ) variable ￿t is rescaled by z
￿(1￿￿3)(1￿￿4)￿1
t .
The remaining variables, namely p
f
t, pb
t, e pt, vt, ut, mct, ht, hd
t, st, e st, and ￿t, are instead
stationary.
Dividing the nonstationary variables by the associated scaling factor, we obtain the
stationary variables, which we denote with the corresponding capital letters. That is:
(9.43) Ct = ct=z
￿
t
(9.44) M
h
t = m
h
t=z
￿
t
(9.45) Mt = mt=z
￿
t
(9.46) Wt = wt=z
￿
t192
(9.47) f Wt = e wt=z
￿
t
(9.48) Yt = yt=z
￿
t
(9.49) Gt = gt=z
￿
t
(9.50) ￿t = ￿t=z
￿
t
(9.51) X
1
t = x
1
t=z
￿
t
(9.52) X
2
t = x
2
t=z
￿
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9.3.3. Equilibrium Conditions in terms of Stationary Variables
We report the complete set of equilibrium conditions in the model with money, namely
(6.10), (6.11), (6.13), (6.15)-(6.26), (6.28), (6.35)-(6.45), and (6.47)-(6.50), written in sta-
tionary form. To this end, we de￿ne ￿z￿;t = z￿
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9.3.3.1. Cashless model. We report the complete set of equilibrium conditions in the
cashless model, namely (6.10), (6.15)-(6.17), (6.19)-(6.25), (6.35)-(6.40), (6.44), (6.45),
(6.47), (6.48), (6.52), (6.53), (6.54), (6.55), (6.56), and (6.57), written in terms of station-
ary variables.
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9.4. Appendix D. The Social Planner Allocation: Equilibrium Conditions in
Stationary Variables
We maintain the same functional forms for utility, technology, investment adjustment
cost, and costs of higher capacity utilisation described in Appendix C. The economy dis-
plays two permanent shocks. Hence, some variables are not stationary along the balanced-
growth path. The nonstationary variables and the respective rescaling factors are the same
as in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007). Speci￿cally, I) variables ct, yt, and gt are rescaled200
by z￿
t; II) variables kt+1 and it are rescaled by ￿tz￿
t; III) variable qt is rescaled by 1=￿t;
and IV ) variable ￿t is rescaled by z
￿(1￿￿3)(1￿￿4)￿1
t . The remaining variables, namely ut and
ht, are instead stationary.
Dividing the nonstationary variables by the associated cointegrating factor, we obtain
the stationary variables, which we denote with the corresponding capital letters. That is:
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9.4.1. Equilibrium Conditions in terms of Stationary Variables
We report the complete set of equilibrium conditions, namely (6.58)-(6.65), written in
terms of stationary variables. To this end, we de￿ne ￿z￿;t = z￿
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